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THREE ESSAYS ON OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION
INTRODUCTION
In 1978, over 38 million women participated in the United
States labor force. l These women were of all ages, of differ-
ing backgrounds, qualifications and motivations. Each brought
to the labor market a unique combination of skills and aptitude.
Nonetheless, many had in common a pattern of labor force parti-
cipation which is distinctly different from that of men. Two
factors serve to characterize the position of women in the labor
market: a restricted range of occupational assignments and a
sizable wage gap between men and women of similar backgrounds
and in similar occupations. These factors have remained re-
markably stable over time, despite the rapid growth in labor
force participation of women of all ages since World War II and
despite the increasing continuity of their participation over
the life-cycle.
The persistence of a wage gap and occupational segregation
has attracted the attention of many economists, sociologists and
psychologists. Some economists have tried to explain both fac-
tors as the consequences of horne and market productivity differ-
ences and preferences between men and women. Others have located
the source of the differing labor force positions in discrimina-
tory behavior on the part of employers, fellow employees and
customers. Sociologists and psychologists, on the other hand,
have attempted to account for differences in the labor force
status of men and women by examining the basis for the preferences
which economists take as given.
2In these essays we will focus on economic analysis as a
tool for understanding the persistence of occupational segre-
gation, and these psychological and sociological dimensions
will thus play only an implicit role in the analysis. The
categories with which economists organize their thinking on oc-
cupational segregation often neglect these unobservable or un-
measurable dimensions, and while we recognize their importance,
our concern is with the contribution which can be made by economic
theory to the study of differences in the occupational distribu-
tion of men and women.
This part of the first essay will examine the extent of
occupational differences between men and women, documenting both
the "crowding" of women into a relatively small number of occu-
pations and the segregation of male and female labor across
occupations. The second part of this essay will explore occu-
pational segregation, employing factor analysis to determine
those traits which characterize jobs held predominantly by women
and those traits which characterize men's jobs. This exploration
of sex-related job traits is not intended as a theory of occu-
pational segregation; rather, it points to empirical regularities
which shed some light on the sources of segregation. The second
essay reviews and appraises the various approaches taken by
economists to the theory of occupational segregation. In the
final essay, empirical tests are designed to investigate the
nature of the mechanisms generating occupational segregation for
a sample of older men and a sample of younger women. The third
3essay concludes by proposing employment policies which might
alter the occupational distribution of men and women and sug-
gesting directions for further research into the determinants
of occupational segregation.
4PART ONE: THE NATURE OF OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION
The pattern which we call occupational segregation has two
distinct strands: segregation, the absence of men in women's
occupations, and crowding, the concentration of women in rela-
tively fewer occupations than men. The extent of segregation in
1970 is demonstrated in Tables I-I and I-2, which present the
distribution of men and women across occupations by sex composi-
tion of the occupation. In 1970, forty-two percent of all women
employed in the sample of 183 detailed Census occupations were in
occupations in which women comprised over 90 percent of total
employment, while only seven percent were in occupations which
2
were over 90 percent male. Despite the popular notion that womer
were moving into male jobs in large numbers, the fraction of all
experienced female workers found in occupations which were over
90 percent male remained remarkably constant at seven percent be-
tween 1950 and 1970. The fraction of women employed in 90 to 100
percent female jobs was also stable, dropping only slightly from
44 percent in 1950 to 42 percent in 1970. The fraction of women
employed in the less segregated occupations also was relatively
unchanged during the twenty-year period.
While the concept of crowding in "relatively fewer" occu-
pations depends on the ways in which occupations are defined, it
is possible to gain an approximate understanding of this pattern
by examining detailed Census categories. In 1973, over 40 per-
cent of all women workers were employed in 10 of the detailed
Census occupations, shown in Table I-3. The ten largest occupa-
tions for men, by contrast, employed less than 20 percent of all
male workers. 3
Table I-I
Distribution of Men and Women by Sex Composition of Occupation Category in 1950:
1950, 1960, 1970a -Experienced Civilian Labor Force, Age 14 and Over
(Percentages)
Sex coIllfX)sition
cate<pry 1950 1960 1970
(~nen as a ~nen as a ~Il'ell as a ~nen as a
percentage percentage percentage percentage
of total in of total in of total in of total in
occupation sex coIrp:>si- sex corrposi- sex corrq;osi-
in 1950) M:m ~ tion category ~n ~ tion category M:m ~ tion category
0-10 72.8 7.3 3.9 72.4 6.8 4.4 68.2 7.0 6.1
11-20 10.7 4.3 13.9 11.5 4.5 16.0 12.4 5.4 21.7
21-40 5.9 6.3 30.2 '4.8 4.2 30.2 5.9 4.1 30.3
41-60 7.1 17.6 50.1 6.6 17.5 56.4 7.6 17.0 58.5
61-80 1.7 11.0 72.3 2.2 10.7 69.4 2.5 11.4 73.9
81-90 0.9 9.5 82.5 1.2 11.1 83.0 1.6 12.9 84.0
91-100 1.0 44.0 94.5 1.2 45.0 94.5 1.7 ·42.1 94.0
'Ibtalb 100.0 100.0 28.6 100.0 100.0 32.5 100.0 100.0 38.7
~sed on a sanple of 183 detailed census cate<pries.
bIbNs may not sum to colunn totals due to rounding.
Source: Francine D. B1au, Equal Pay in the Office, (~, Ml\.: D.C. Heath am Co. I 1977), p. 16.
Table I~2
occupations in Which 70 Percent or More of the Workers Were Women:
1900, 1950, and 1970
1900
occupation
Percent of female
labor force
in occupation
Females as a Percent
of total
in occupation
1. Dressmakers and seamstresses
2. Milliners
3. Private household workers
4. Nurses
5. Attendants, hospital and other
institutions, midwives and
practical nurses
6. Operatives--paperboard con-
tainers and boxes
7. Charwomen and cleaners
8. Boarding and lodging housekeepers
9. Attendants and assistants, library
10. Telephone operators
11. Operatives--knitting mills
12. Housekeepers and stewards, except
private household
13. Teachers
14. Librarians
15. Stenographers, typists and
secretaries
16. Operatives--miscellaneous fabri-
cated textile products
17. Operatives--apparel and accessories
manufacturing
7.8
1.4
28.7
0.2
1.8
0.3
0.5
1.1
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.5
6.1
0.0
1.8
0.3
3.0
100
100
97
94
89
84
84
83
80
80
78
78
75
72
72
71
70
occupation
1. Nurses
2. Dressmakers and seamstresses
3. Telephone operators
4. Attendants, physicians' and
dentists' offices
5. Private household workers
6. Stenographers, typists and
secretaries
7. Milliners
8. Librarians
9. Office machine operators
10. Sales workers-demonstrators
11. Operatives--manufacturing, apparel
and accessories
12. Bookkeepers and cashiers
13. Counter and fountain workers and
waitresses
14. Housekeepers and stewards, except
private household
15. Teachers
16. Attendants and assistants, library
17. Spinners, textile
18. Operatives--knitting
19. Operatives--miscellaneous fabricated
textile products
20. Boarding and lodging housekeepers
21. Dancers and dancing teachers
22. Religious workers
23. Operatives--tobacco manufacturing
1950
Percent of female
labor force
in occupation
2.9
0.9
2.2
0.2
8.9
9.5
0.1
0.3
0.8
0.1
4.0
4.7
4.0
0.5
5.2
0.1
0.4
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
Females as a Percent
of total
in occupation
98
97
96
95
95
94
90
89
82
82
81
78
78
78
75
74
74
72
72
72
71
70
70
1970
Occupation
1. Dental assistants
2. Prekindergarten and kinderqarten
teachers
3. Secretaries
4. Registered nurses
5. Practical nurses
6. Home management advisors
7. Airline stewardesses
8. Dressmakers and seamstresses
9. Chambermaids, except private household
10. Receptionists
11. Telephone operators
12. Typists
13. Dental hygienists
14. Health trainees
15. Stenographers
16. Sewers and stitchers
17. Meat wrappers
18. Child care workers
19. Health record technologists and
technicians
20. Dieticians
21. Demonstrators
22. Milliners
23. Teacher aides
24. School monitors
25. Hairdressers and cosmetologists
26. Waitresses
27. Bank tellers
28. Nursing aides and attendants
29. Health aides, except nursing
30. Cashiers
Percent of female
labor force
in occupation
0.30
0.42
9.12
2.79
0.79
0.02
0.11
0.32
0.65
0.99
1.33
3.18
0.05
0.06
0.41
2.81
0.14
0.42
0.04
0.13
0.12
0.01
0.41
0.08
1.47
3.14
0.74
2.11
0.35
2.38
Females as a Percent
of total
in occupation
97.9
97.9
97.6
97.3
96.4
96.0
95.8
95.1
94.9
94.8
94.5
94.2
94.0
93.7
90.3
93.7
93.2
93.0
92.1
92.0
91.0
91.0
90.3
90.2
90.1
89.0
86.2
84.8
84.6
83.7 Q)
occupation
197·0 (cont.)
Percent of female
labor force
in occupation
Females as a Percent
of total
in occupation
31. Billing clerks
32. Bookkeepers
33. Dancers
34. File clerks
35. Librarians
36. Solderers
37. Lay midwives
38. Hucksters and peddlers
39. Library attendants and assistants
40. Clerical assistants, social welfare
41. Enumerators and interviewers
42. Welfare service aides
43. Food counter and fountain workers
44. Food service workers
45. Clothing ironers and pressers
46. Clerical, not specified
47. Proofreaders
48. Office machine operators
49. Produce graders and packers
50.' Clerical, allocated
51. Laboratory technologists and
technicians
52. Housekeepers, except private
household
53. Boarding and lodging housekeepers
54. Teachers, secondary school
0.30
4.35
0.02
1.01
0.35
0.11
0.32
0.34
0.17
0.04
0.40
0.85
0.47
2.10
0.07
1.41
0.07
1.90
0.29
0.26
0.02
0.37
82.3
82.0
82.0
81.9
81.9
81.6
79.6
79.2
78.9
78.2
77.6
76.5
76.3
75.9
75.3
75.2
74.8
73.7
73.0
72.6
72.0
71.9
71.7
70.3
Source: 1900 and 1950 data, David M. Kaplan and M. Claire Casey, Occupational Trends in
the United States, 1900 to 1950, Bureau of the Census Working Paper No.5. Washington-,-
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958, Tables 6 and 6b; 1970, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, u.S. Census of the Population, Detailed Characteristics,
Final Report PC (1) 01, u.s. Summary. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1973, Table 33, pp. 155-159.
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Table 1~3
Ten Occupations Employing Over 800,000 Women in 1973
Occupation
Secretary
Retail trade salesworker
Bookkeeper
Private household worker
Elementary school teacher
Waitress
Typist
Cashier
Sewer and stitcher
Registered nurse
Percent of Female Employment
9.4
4.8
4.5
4.1
3.4
3.3
3.1
2.8
2.7
2.5
40.6%
Source: u.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Standards
Administration, Women's Bureau, 1975 Handbook on Women Workers
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975) pp.
89-91.
More recent data from the 1978 Current Population Survey
shows little change, as shown in Table 1-4 which presents the oc-
4
cupational distribution of both men and women. Men dominate
most of the professional and managerial occupations, all the
craft occupations, operative jobs in the transportation industry
and unskilled laboring jobs. Women in the professional occupa-
tions are largely confined to nursing, teaching and social work,
which account for 60 percent of all professional women. The
majority of women workers, over 55 percent, are to be found in
clerical and service jobs. within the clerical category, most
women are secretaries, typists, bookkeepers or cashiers. Women
in the service sector are evenly distributed across categories
occupation, Sex,Employed
Table I-4
Household Data Annual
Persons by Detailed
Averages
and
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such as cleaning workers, food, health and personal service
workers, although very few women are protective service workers
(guards, fire fighters or police)~
The degree of segregation at a moment in time is striking,
but even more remarkable is the replication of a similar pattern
in planned and market economies throughout the world and the
resistence of the pattern to changes in occupational structure,
relative labor supplies of men and women, and increasing equality
of educational opportunity. We turn now to a brief examination
of occupational segregation over time and across national
boundaries.
Many studies have documented the stability of the occupa-
tional distribution of men and women over time in the United
States. There is some evidence of a weakening in sex segregation
between 1870 and 1920,5 and in the 1940'5 Rosie the Riveter broke
ground for women in male occupations, but following World War II,
women returned to sectors in which they comprise a majority of
total employment. One difficulty in ascertaining trends in sex
segregation is that the analysis is extremely sensitive to changes
in occupational classifications in the decennial censuses from
which our knowledge of the occupational distribution is drawn.
Whenever categories are combined, the increased aggregation dis-
guises any segregation which may be present, and whenever new
14
categories are added or old ones separated, segregation becomes
more apparent. For this reason, studies using Census data usu-
ally choose a subsample of occupations in which categorization
has remained standard across the Census years under consideration.
A measure which is often used to summarize the extent of
sex segregation at a given point in time is the occupational dis-
similarity index, also known as the index of segregation, de-
veloped by Duncan and Duncan: 6
(1)
where: = the percentage of the male labor force employed
in occupation i in period ti
= the percentage of the female labor force em-
ployed in occupation i in period t.
The index can range from a value of a to 100, with a pointing to
complete integration and 100 to complete segregation, where in-
tegration denotes participation in shares equal to their share
in the employed labor force for both men and women. The value
of D can therefore be interpreted as the percentage of workers who
would have to change occupations in order to bring about perfect
integration.
Fuchs has pointed out that changes in the index can occur
when the occupational composition of employment changes as well
7
as when the sex composition of particular occupations changes.
Following Fuchs, Blau and Hendricks decompose the index into two
8
components in order to separate out these two effects. MIX
measures the effect of the changing occupational structure be-
tween any two years and COMP measures the effect of a changing
15
sex composition within an occupation between any two years:
(2) MIX
(3) COMP = .!on: qi2
Til Pi2Til
- r
qilTil PilTil }2 , rq'2T 'l rp'2T 'l rq'lT'l rp'lT'l~ , ~ ~ , ~ ~ i ' ~ ~ i ~ ~~ ~ ~
where: Pit is the share of women in occupation i at time t
qit is the share of men in occupation i at time t
Tit is total employment in occupation i at time t
This breakdown involves selection of an appropriate weighting
scheme, introducing the familiar index-number problem. Blau and
Hendricks choose to employ beginning year weights, and the con-
sistent use of base year weights results in a residual since the
two components will not necessarily sum to the total differences
in the index between any two years. Unadjusted for changes in
occupational categories, the index was 65.6 in 1950, 68.4 in 1960
and 65.8 in 1970. However, since each Census has tabulated oc-
cupational information at a more detailed level than the previous
Census, an upward bias is introduced by failing to standardize
across occupational categories. Blau and Hendricks remove this
bias by computing the index for 183 detailed occupations which
remained standard in all three Census years. Between 1950 and
1960, this index increased from 72.65 percent to 73.75 percent,
declining to 70.65 percent in 1970. The Council of Economic
Advisors found a similar decline from 62.9 to 59.8 between 1960
16
and 1970 in a sample of 197 occupations, differing from those
studies by Blau and Hendricks in that the Council includes some
large residual categories. 9
Utilizing the procedure described above for allocating
changes in the index between changes in the mix and the composi-
tion of occupations, Blau and Hendricks attribute the decline in
the index between 1960 and 1970 primarily to a decline in intra-
occupational segregation, as shown in Table r-5. Shifts in the
composition of the work force were of two types: first, there
has been a secular decline in the agricultural, unskilled and
self-employed jobs which have been traditionally male. At the
same time as the "male sector" has diminished in importance,
there has been growth in demand for traditionally female jobs
such as nursing, teaching and clerical work. These two factors
have combined so that the flow of men into women's jobs has been
greater than the flow of women into men's jobs.
Blau and Hendricks also perform an interesting conceptual
experiment, simulating the changes in the index which would be
predicted if new hiring were random with respect to sex:
Specifically, net increases in the size of occupations
over the period were filled in the same sex ratio as
prevailed in the "hiring pool" comprised of net labor
force entrants and individuals released from declining
occupations. To the extent that the simulation ig-
nores the substantial opportunities for occupational
integration created by replacement needs, the declines
in the index that would be produced by random hiring
are underestimated. On the other hand, to the extent
that the simulation does not take into account occu-
pational entry requirements, it may overestimate what
would have been possible. lO
17
Starting with the occupational distribution prevailing in 1960,
the simulation generates a decline in the segregation index of
17.70 percentage points rather than the actual decline of 3.10
points,. a result which suggests that occupational assignments
continue to reflect sex-stereotyping. That this stereotyping
should be so robust over time has prompted several theories
which will be examined in detail in the next essay.
Table 1-5
Sources of Changes in Segregation Indices 1950-1970
Period
1950-1960
1960-1970
1950-1979
Actual Changes
+1.10
-3.10
-2.00
Mix Effects
+1.14
-0.51
+0.63
Composition Effects
-0.54
-4.26
-4.80
Note: Changes not attributed to either mix or composition are
considered "interaction" effects.
Source: Francine D. Blau and Wallace Hendricks. "Occupational
Segregation by Sex: Trends and Prospects." The Journal of Human
Resources XIV no. 2 (Spring, 1979): 202.
Although the precise pattern of occupational segregation
varies across countries, the existence of a stable distribution
of women across jobs which differs markedly from that of men
characterizes both industrialized and less-developed economies
throughout the world. The pattern which is most common to less-
developed nations is one described for Latin America by Elsa
Chaney:
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Not only are more women found in the lowest-paid,
lowest-status jobs in the traditional sector (while
men dominate the modern sector with its better sala-
ries, greater job security, pensions, health bene-
fits and union protection), but they are more likely
to remain there. ll
In Latin America, 40 percent of women working for wages are em-
ployed in the service sector, most of them as private household
workers. 12 One side-effect of rapid population growth coupled
with a shift from labor-intensive agricultural production to a
more capital-intensive industrial structure has been the "crowding-
out" of women from better job opportunities as their traditional
sources of employment in agriculture and domestic services dwindle.
This has resulted in actual declines in labor force participation
rates for women in some developing countries such as India, where
labor force participation for women halved between 1911 and 1971,
from 34 percent to 17 percent. 13 Inroads into new occupations
and traditionally male occupations tend to be made during periods
of relative male labor scarcity; in conditions where male labor
is abundant, those women who cannot find work in the diminishing
sectors which previously employed them leave the paid labor force.
This has occurred in dozens of countries throughout Asia, Africa
and Latin America. 14
The occupational distribution of women in the industrialized
world follows a pattern of crowding and segregation similar to
that of the United States. In these countries, roughly 80 per-
cent of women can be found in the service sector, earning wages
considerably lower than those earned by men. In Sweden, for
example, a country generally considered highly egalitarian in
ideology, four-fifths of women workers are in occupations in
19
which they comprise two-thirds or more of total employment. IS
The scarcity of female managers and administrators is visible in
industries and public agencies world-wide. In Canada, only 16
percent of these jobs were held by women in 1974, a figure roughly
16
comparable to the 18 percent u.s. share for 1973. It has also .
been observed that where women are able to infiltrate a previously
male occupation, that occupation often loses prestige, as in the
case of doctors in the U~SR and dentists in Scandivavia. 17 In
addition, some societies allow female professionals to cater to
female clients, particularly where the social system involves
rigid segregation of men from women, such as in the Middle East. 18
That the bold outlines of segregation should be so similar
for countries at similar stages of development nonetheless hides
the differences in detailed occupational assignments across coun-
tries. Even within agricultural societies, for instance, women
can be found specializing in herding, cultivating, harvesting,
or water-carrying in different regions. A detailed investigation
of the types of work performed by women in different countries
is outside the scope of the present analysis, and has not, to our
knowledge, been performed since it is extremely difficult to ob-
tain comparable data at the disaggregate level for many countries.
Our purpose here is merely to provide a broader framework in
which to appraise economists' approaches to the study of occupa-
tional segregation in the United States. Any analysis of the
occupational distribution in this country should shed light on
the determinants of segregation in industrialized countries abroad,
and should also serve to explain changes over time.
20
The preceding pages have documented the extent of inter-
occupational segregation, utilizing data aggregated across es-
tablishments and then across industries. Although very little
information is available with which to examine intraoccupational
segregation within establishments and within industries, there
is evidence that this occurs. Blau, for example, found that even
within occupational categories as narrowly defined as payroll
clerk or tabulating-machine operator, men and women were segre-
gated by establishment, tending "to work together within the same
establishment to a significantly greater extent than would occur
19by chance." Chance is represented by Blau as the result of a
random hiring process in which each firm hires according to the
sex ratio of the labor pool, measured by the number of people
currently employed in each occupation in each city, and the out-
come of the process is predicted by a Bernouilli trial. (The
assumption of independent trials is, of course, not entirely
accurate, but Blau argues that this does not seriously threaten
the robustness of the results.) On the basis of this expected
distribution, she calculates indices of segregation for each
city and for selected occupations, and finds that in all cases
the actual index of segregation exceeds the predicted:
While a fairly large degree of segregation would be ex-
pected even on the basis of random hiring ... the dif-
ferences between the actual and expected values of the
index ... are generally of considerable magnitude. Thus
a sizable proportion of women (or men) would have to be
reallocated among firms for the actual distribution to
approximate a situ~tion of random hiring on the basis
of sex. 20
Some selected results are shown in Table r-6, which also shows dif-
ferences in the extent of segregation across cities which exceed
Table 1-6
Actual and Expected Indices of Segregation by City: Selected Occupations
Index of Segregation
Selected Occupations City Actual Expected Difference
Accounting clerk
Class A Boston 72.62 28.92 43.70
New York 59.54 27.77 31.77
Philadelphia 72.58 32.32 40.26
Class B Boston 59.53 43.91 15.62
New York 58.69 28.06 30.63
Philadelphia 82.22 34.60 47.62
Office boy/girl Boston 74.65 31.31 43.34
New York 82.22 20.60 61.62
Philadelphia 65.12 33.76 31.36
Tabulating-machine
operator
Class A New York 84.65 26.45 58.19
Class B New York 77.11 23.91 53.20
Computer programer '\
Class B Boston 51.78 31.13 20.65
New York 43.85 33.97 9.88
Philadelphia 65.85 42.82 23.03
Source: Computed from unpublished Bureau of Labor Statistics data, collected for the
Area Wage Surveys between April and November 1970, by Francine Blau in Equal Pay in the
Office, Lexington, Ma.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1977, p.57.
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the differences which would be expected as a result of differing
compositions of the labor pool. For example, New York and
Philadelphia have predicted indices of segregation for class B
accounting clerks of 28.1 and 34.6, respectively. That hiring
is not "random" as defined by Blau is revealed in the actual in-
dices of 58.7 and 82.2, respectively. (Also note the intercity
differences in the degree of segregation.)
In this study we will confine our attention to inter-
occupational segregation, thereby underestimating the extent to
which women are truly segregated in the workplace. The data
necessary to examine segregation as microscopically as in the
study cited above by Blau are not available for a broad range of
occupations, and it is also likely that different theories of
firm and worker behavior will be needed to explain segregation
within occupations at the establishment and industry level.
Occupational segregation is of concern to the economist for
two reasons. The first is the efficiency of production, which
depends upon the employment of workers in the occupation where
they are most productive. Suppose that segregation results from
discrimination by employers against women in a particular occu-
pation. If there were women who were more qualified to perform
that job than other jobs, this discrimination would impede the
specialization of labor in its most productive use. Society as
a whole could gain by allowing both men and women free entry into
the occupations which best suit their preferences and their
abilities.
The second reason for examining the source of occupational
segregation is that differences in earnings are closely linked
23
to differences in occupation. Table I-7 shows that on average,
women earned 58 percent as much as men with equal years of school-
ing in 1974. One reason for this gap is that men and women with
equal schooling do not perform the same jobs, and women are found
in occupations which pay less on average than do male occupations.
That pattern, along with differences within broad occupational
groups, is shown in Table I-8. Since 13 percent of all families,
were headed by women in 1976, and since nearly half of all fami-
lies in poverty are headed by women,21 the wage gap between men
and women is of particular concern.
The tables cited above are only rough estimates of the con-
tribution of the occupational distribution to the earnings dis-
tribution. More sophisticated estimates can be derived by re-
gression analysis, controlling for differences in experience and
training as well as differences in education. Among the many
such studies is Blinder's analysis of race and sex wage differences
which attributes one-third of the wage gap between men and
d · ff . . l' 22 h d'women to 1 erences 1n occupat1ona ass1gnment. Ot er stu 1es
which employ different samples and different specifications of
earnings functions have derived varying estimates of the importance
of occupational dissimilarity, but no study has been able to ex-
plain away the wage gap without examining the nature of the oc-
cupational distribution.
If our purpose is to promote both economic efficiency and
equitable treatment of men and women, the appropriate policy
recommendations will depend critically upon the nature of the
mechanism which generates occupational segregation. For example,
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Table 1-7
Ratio of Women's to Men's Median Income, Year-Round Full-Time
Civilian Workers 25 Years Old and Over with Income by
Educational Attainment, 1970 and 1974
Educational attainment Ratio: Women/Men
1974 1970
Total, 25 years and over ..... 0.58 0.59
Elementary: less than 8 years ... 0.63 0.63
8 year s ............. 0.57 0.55
High school: 1 to 3 years ....••.. 0.53 0.55
4 year s ............. 0.57 0.58
College: 1 to 3 years ........ 0.59 0.59
4 years or more ..... 0.60 0.63
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current
Population Reports, Series P-60, Nos. 99 and 80.
Table 1-8
Ratio of Women's to Men's Median Earnings, Year-Round Full-Time
Civilian Workers 14 Years Old and Over With Earnings by
Occupation of Longest Job, 1974
Occupation of longest job Ratio: Women/Men
1974
Total with earnings .
Professional, technical, and kindred workers .
Managers and administrators, except farm...•.•...
Sales workers ...............•.................•..
Clerical and kindred workers ...............•...•.
Craft and kindred workers ......•.......•.........
Operatives, including transport ........••........
Laborers, except farm..................•...•.....
Farmers and farm managers ..............•.........
Farm laborers and farm supervisors .........•.....
Service workers, except private household .
Private household workers .
0.57
0.64
0.56
0.41
0.59
0.54
0.57
0.72
(X)
(X)
0.58
(X)
X Not applicable.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current
Population Reports, Series P-60, Nos. 99 and 97.
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if women are in traditionally female occupations by voluntary
choice, attempts to place them in male occupations will result
in a loss in efficiency and equity. On the other hand, if dis-
crimination by employers or fellow employees prevents women from
entering their chosen occupations, affirmative action programs
will be necessary. The most effective form of those programs will
also depend on the source of occupational segregation.
Thus, we need to know whether women choose to be in female
occupations, whether they are less productive than men at men's
jobs, whether discrimination by fellow employees is a barrier to
entry in some occupations or whether employers assign women to
female jobs through ignorance or through preference. All of
these explanations have been suggested by economists examining
the occupational distribution of men and women, and in this work,
we will describe these theories and appraise them in the light
of empirical evidence. The following section explores some of
the characteristics of male and female jobs using data from the
Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles.
26
PART TWO: A FACTOR ANALYTIC STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL SEX-TYPING
The phrases "women's work" and "men's work" are often en-
countered in popular usage but their meanings are not well-defined.
For example, women's work is generally considered to involve nur-
turing or serving behavior while men's work is characterized by
supervisory duties or heavy physical demands. The previous
chapter has outlined the distribution of men and women across
occupational titles which were developed by the U.s. Bureau of
the Census to correspond to particular types of jobs. In this
chapter, we investigate characteristics of jobs and their rela-
tionship to the sex composition of employment. Among the charac-
teristics considered are requirements for intelligence, physical
strength and motor skills. We attempt to answer the following
questions: can we characterize jobs along a small number of
dimensions, and does the female share of total employment vary
systematically along these dimensions?
The dimensions of occupations are represented by indices of
job characteristics which are derived through the use of a multi-
variate technique known as factor analysis. We discover, for
instance, that the female share of employment is negatively cor-
related with intellectual demands and physical strength require-
ments, while the female share is positively related to interaction
with people.
We begin this chapter by describing the data from which the
indices are derived. The results of the factor analysis are
presented and interpreted, highlighting differences in the charac-
teristics of jobs performed by women and by men. In this fashion,
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we move from the description of the distribution of men and women
across job titles to a description couched in terms of job charac-
teristics. We find that many of the stereotypes concerning men's
work and women's work are confirmed by the analysis, but that the
job characteristics employed in the analysis cannot explain a
substantial portion of the variance in the female share of em-
ployment across the 539 occupations studied.
Description of the Data
The information on job characteristics was originally col-
lected by the Department of Labor and published in the third
edition of the ·Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).23 The
DOT consists of detailed descriptions of nearly 14,000 jobs and
notes the presence or absence of many job characteristics. It
has been difficult to utilize these data in most empirical work
because of the sheer volume of the characteristics and job cate-
gories involved. Fortunately, Lucas has transformed the
data into categories corresponding to the 1960 three-digit Census
occupational codes using a Census/DOT conversion matrix}4 Each
Census category is made up of a number of DOT occupations, and
the conversion transforms the categorical data on job charac-
teristics for the detailed DOT jobs into the probability that
the aggregate Census category will involve a particular job
characteristic (weighed by 1966 employment in each of the DOT
categories comprising each Census category.)
The raw data used in the factor analysis were the Lucas
transformations of 28 DOT job characteristics for each of 539
Census occupations. The characteristics employed in the analysis
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are listed in Table I-9, and include the cognitive and physical
requirements of the job, the presence of adverse working condi-
tions and the hierarchical relationship to people on the job.
Each variable is defined in a narrow sense by the DOT, and these
definitions must be kept in mind during the presentation of the
results. For example, the variable "taking instructions, help-
ing," refers here to assisting in a non-learning capacity. Thus
doctors are not considered helpers despite the popular term,
"helping profession." Similarly, teaching can take place out-
side a classroom as well as inside so that craft jobs which in-
volve training apprentices are considered to be teaching occupa-
tions.
One issue must be addressed before the results are presented.
Since there are no job descriptions similar in scope to the DOT,
there is no current standard of comparison by which one might
evaluate the accuracy of the DOT descriptions. In particular,
it is possible that women's jobs might be systematically under-
rated with respect to "male" characteristics such as supervisory
duties or physical requirements. For example, it is possible
that licensed practical nursing is not considered an occupation
requiring strength even though LPN's often lift patients in the
course of their work. It is interesting in this light to examine
some jobs which differ in the sex composition of employment but
which to us appear similar in many respects.
Janitors, chambermaids and charwomen perform tasks which are
very similar, yet significant differences exist in the DOT des-
criptions of their requirements for physical strength and educationa:
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Table 1-9
Job Characteristics Employed in the Factor Analysis, as Defined
in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
I. SPECIFIC CAPACITIES AND APTITUDES REQUIRED TO LEARN OR
PERFORM THE JOB:
A. Intelligence, measured on a scale of low to high: IQ
B. Verbal ability: VERBAL
C. Numerical ability: NUMERICAL
D. Motor coordination: MOTOR COORDINATION
E. Manual dexterity: MANUAL DEXTERITY
F. Finger dexterity: FINGER DEXTERITY
II. TYPES OF SITUATIONS TO WHICH WORKERS MUST ADJUST:
A. A variety of duties, often entailing frequent change:
CHANGE
B. Repetition of set procedures: REPETITION
C. Duties carried out under specific instructions, with
little room for autonomy: LOW AUTONOMY
D. Responsibility for the planning, direction and control
of an entire activity: AUTONOMY
E. Dealing with people, beyond the giving and receiving
of instructions: PEOPLE
F. Interpreting feelings, ideas and facts in terms of
personal viewpoint: FEELINGS
G. Stress or risk: STRESS
III. PHYSICAL DEMANDS:
A. The degree of physical strength required, measured on
a scale of low to high: STRENGTH
B. Climbing or stooping: CLIMB
30
IV. WORKING CONDITIONS:
A. Location of job is outside, with no effective pro-
tection: OUTSIDE
B. Unpleasant working conditions: HEAT, WET, NOISE,
HAZARD, FUMES
V. HIERARCHICAL RELATIONSHIP TO OTHERS:
A. Taking instructions and helping without learning:
HELP
B. Serving the needs of others, with immediate response
involved: SERVE
C. Instructing, training or making recommendations on
the basis of technical disciplines: TEACH
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development, as presented in Table 1-10. In general, the two fernal'
jobs are considered to be less physically demanding and to neces-
sitate lower educational development. In the absence of any
technological studies of these occupations, we can only point to
these differences and suggest that further reseach is necessary
before we accept them as meaningful descriptions of the three
jobs. Similarly, we note that hairdressers and cosmetologists,
traditionally women, are considered to have finger dexterity, a
trait often assigned to women, while barbers are not characterized
by that trait according to the DOT. We also note that dancing
is defined as an occupation with a 100 percent chance of a low
physical strength requirement, while sports instructors have a
50 percent chance of needing medium physical strength (as defined
in Table 1-10). Our concern that licensed practical nursing might
not have a high requirement for strength proved to be incorrect,
as the physical requirements are similar, and indeed heavier,
than those for hospital orderlies.
An exhaustive examination of the DOT characterization of
occupations for sex bias is beyond the scope of this analysis.
It is important, however, to bear in mind that characteristics
associated with the female share of employment in the following
factor analysis may be associated through a bias in job evalua-
tion as well as through technological requirements.
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Table 1-10
Selected Job Characteristics for Similar Occupations:
Lucas Matrix of DOT Data
Probability that the Job Requires:
IDW Medium Heavy Very Heavy
QXUPation Strength Strength Strength Strength GED Level 2 GED Level 3
Janitors .14 .36 .50 .02 .49 .45
Chamber-
naids &
naids .85 .01 .14 .00 .86 .11
~ .31 .42 .24 .00 .89 .05
Definitions from the DOT:
Low Strength: Frequent lifting or carrying of items up to 10
pounds, with a maximum of 20 pounds; walking or
standing to a significant degree even if weights
are negligible.
Medium Strength: Lifting 50 pounds maximum, with frequent lifting
of objects up to 25 pounds; also frequent walking
or standing.
Heavy Strength: Frequent lifting and carrying of up to 50 pounds;
maximum weight is 100 pounds.
Very Heavy Strength: Frequent lifting of up to 80 pounds, occa-
sional lifting of items over 100 pounds.
GED Level 2:
GED Level 3:
Can read simple lists, safety warninqs and ad-
dresses, perform simple addition and subtraction,
apply common sense to carry out spoken or written
one- or two-step directions.
Can read movie or detective magazines, add, sub-
tract, multiply or divide whole numbers, apply
common sense to carry out detailed but uninvolved
written or oral instructions.
Source: Unpublished data provided by Robert E. B. Lucas, Associate
Professor of Economics, Boston University; U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Employment Security, U.S. Employment Service, Estimates
of Worker Trait Requirements for 4000 Jobs (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1956)-.--- ----
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In addition to job characteristics, the 1970 female share of
total employment in each occupation was included in the factor
analysis. Since the job characteristics were based on 1960 occu-
pational classifications, and since these classifications differed
from those used in 1970, it was necessary to convert the employment
data using the bridge provided by the Census, 1970 Occupation and
Industry Classification Systems in Terms of Their 1960 Occupation
and Industry Elements (1972).25
Methodology
In factor analysis, a large number of observed and intercorre-
lated variables are presumed to measure a smaller number of factors
which are linear combinations of the observed variables. Thus,
factor analysis examines the correlation matrix of the observed
variables for regularities which are attributed to variation in the
underlying factors. The technique has two purposes: first, to re-
duce a larger set of variables to a smaller set of factors which are
linear combinations of those variables and second, to assess the
proportion of variance in each of the variables in the larger set whi
is accounted for by variance in the underlying factors taken singly
and as a set. To economists accustomed to regression analysis, this
might appear to be circular, but it serves a purpose as explained
by Rozeboom:
If the data variables are to be analyzed as linear com-
binations which are, themselves, in turn, defined as com-
posites of the data variables, aren't we just going in
circles? Well, yes--in a way we are, but ... transformation
of a set of data variables into a set of factors may very
well reveal important relationships which are difficult to
discern among the variables in their original form. In
particular, extraction of factors economically exhibits the
degree of linear dependence among the data variables. 26
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Factor analysis assumes that Kl underlying but unobservable
factors are measured by K2 observed variables, where Kl is less
than K2. 27 Th d I b t de mo e can e represen e as:
(4)
where:
Z = XL + €
Z is the N x K2 matrix of standardized observed
variables,
X is the N x Kl matrix of standardized unobservedfactors,
L is the Kl x K2 matrix of factor loadings,
£ is the N x K2 matrix of residual errors.
This model implies that the standardized observed variables can
be decomposed into a portion which is determined by the underly-
ing factors (and thus shared by all the observed variables) and
a portion which is unique to each variable.
If we knew the underlying factors, we would simply regress
Z on X in order to obtain the factor loadings which in this case
would be estimated regression coefficients. However, since the
X matrix is not observed, it is necessary to use the observed
correlation matrix to estimate L, ~X = (liN) (X'X) and
L£ = (l/N)£'£:
(5) Z'Z = (L'X' + E') (XL + E) = L'X'XL + L'X'E + €'XL + E'E
Factor analysis makes the following additional assumptions:
(6)
or that the unique portion of each observed variable is
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orthogonal to the shared or common factors and to the unique
portions of all other variables. Therefore, the correlations
among observed variables are entirely the result of their rela-
tionships with the shared underlying factors:
(7) E
z
= (l/N)E(Z'Z) = (l/N)L'E(X'X)L + (I/N)E(e'E)
= L'E L + EEX
Factor analysis further assumes that the underlying factors are
orthogonal so that the correlation matrix Ex is equal to the
identity matrix:
(8) L = L'L + LE
z
The resulting model is now identified up to orthogonal trans-
formations of the original variables and the fac~or loadings.
This property is utilized in the common rotations of the factor
solutions which change the factor loadings so that they may be
easily interpreted.
Given the estimation problem posed by (5) many different
methods for deriving a solution have been proposed, all of which
involve an initial estimate of EE and the subsequent subtraction
of that estimate from the R correlation matrix of observed
z
variables:
~)
~
L'L = R - EEZ
The method employed here is principal factoring with iteration. 28
In this technique, the number of factors to be extracted is de-
termined by solving the following equation
(10) det(R - AI) = 0
z
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and counting the number of eigenvalues greater than one, the
generally adopted rule-of-thumb criterion. 29 Since all vari-
ables are normalized, the total variance in the data equals the
number of variables, the sum of the eigenvalues of the equation
above. The associated eigenvectors normalized to have unit
length represent the initial estimates of the factors.
Next, the main diagonal elements of the correlation matrix
are replaced with initial estimates of communality, the propor-
tion of total unit variance explained by all the factors taken
together. The initial estimator employed is the squared multiple
correlation between each variable and the rest of the variables
in the set. In the third step, the same number of factors are
extracted by solving the equation.
(11) *det(R - AI) = 0
z
*where R is the adjusted correlation matrix with initial communa-
z
lity estimates placed in the main diagonal. The process
continues iteratively until successive communality estimates
differ by less than 0.001. The final factor solution is generally
rotated in order to produce factors which are more readily in-
terpretable in terms of the observed variables.
In the final, rotated solutions, factor loadings (L,.) repre-1.J
sent the net correlation between each factor and the observed
variables, the squared factor loadings (L. ,2) represent the pro-1.J
portion of unit variance in variable i which is "explained" by
factor j after allowing for the contributions of other factors,
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and the sum of the squared factor loadings E(L .. )2 represents the
1.J
proportion of unit variance in variable i which is explained by
all the factors taken together. Few of the factor analytic tech-
niques which have been developed have associated tests of signi-
ficance for the factor loadings. The technique we employ, the
most common method, is not a maximum likelihood estimator and it
is therefore inappropriate to specify significance levels. How-
ever, since we view the technique as a descriptive rather than
inferential tool this lack of conventional statistical tests is
not a problem.
The technique is most often used by psychologists, but one
pertinent example in economics provides a precedent to our
analysis. Adelman and Morris were interested in re~
lationships among a group of 22 social and political variables
and per capita GNP among underdeveloped countries. 3D Using
factor analysis, they collapse the larger set of variables into
four dimensions, and find that 66 percent of the variance in per
capita GNP among the sample countries can be explained by four
factors which they define as an index of urbanization and in-
dustrialization, an index of the extent of political Westerniza-
tion, an index of coherent leadership and an index of social and
political stability. The variables comprising these indices
include the extent of literacy, the size of the traditional
agriculatural sector and the political strength of the military.
The variable of interest to Adelman and Morris is per capita
GNP across countries as a measure of the level of development.
The factor analytic technique produces an estimate of the pro-
portion of variance in each variable (and thus, for example, in
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gNP) which can be "explained" by all the factors in the model
taken together. In this manner, Adelman and Morris find that
66 percent of the variance in per capita GNP across the sample
underdeveloped countries can be explained by the subset of four
factors.
It is our intention to perform a similar experiment, focus-
ing on the female share of employment across occupations. Using
factor analysis, we find the proportion of variance in the female
share across 539 Census occupations which can be accounted for
by a small number of underlying factors derived from the larger
set of 29 job characteristics presented in Table 1-9.
Results of the Factor Analysis of Job Characteristics
Principal axis factor analysis produced nine factors which
h · .. 31 h f 1 d' ..met t e Ka~ser cr~ter~on. T e actor oa ~ngs matr~x ~s pre-
sented in Table I-II. Factor loadings represent the correlation
between each observed variable and each of the factors. When
squared, the loading represents the proportion of variance in a
standardized variable which can be explained by that factor alone,
controlling for the influence of the other factors. The last
column of Table 1-11, the communality measure, is found by a
summation of the squared factor loadings for each variable across
all factors, and thus represents the proportion of (unit) variance
in a standardized variable which is "explained" by all the fac-
tors taken together. We see, therefore, that 37 percent of the
variance in the female share of employment across the sample oc-
cupations can be accounted for by variance in the nine factors
extracted by the analysis.
Table I~ll
Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix
VARIABLE FACIOR FACIOR FACIOR FACIOR FAC'IOR FAC'IOR FACIOR FACIDR FACIOR CDMlNALI'lY
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
HIGH IQ -.14 .10 .12 -.24 -.07 -.13 -.11 .00 .93
VERBAL .83 -.21 .11 .17 .34 .01 -.16 -.11 .02 .93
NUMERICAL .81 -.18 .10 .17 -.03 -.08 -.10 -.11 -.01 .76
AtJI'()Na.1Y .75 -.19 .21 -.10 .19 .00 -.11 -.06 -.05 .70
LCM IQ -.55 -.23 .46 -.02 -.25 -.15 -.07 -.02 .21 .71
TFACH .51 -.09 .06 -.01 .15 .04 -.11 -.08 .00 .33
HELP -.49 .30 -.31 -.01 -.20 -.39 .16 .17 -.29 .76
HEAT -.1 -.17 -.07 -.05 -.08 -.03 .00 -.05 .74
WET -.12 .69 -.22 -.14 -.05 -.07 .06 .02 -.09 .57
NOISE -.17 .59 -.10 -.02 -.13 -.06 .11 .10 .11 .39
HAZARD -.19 .50 .03 -.07 -.09 -.20 .48 .13 .28 .66
FUMES -.26 .39 -.12 -.04 -.11 -.29 .13 .05 .19 .44
REPETITICN -.35 .23 -.81 -.13 -.18 -.09 .04 .04 -.10 .91
CHANGE .08 -.12 .58 .11 .10 .13 .14 .05 .03 .42
I1JIV AtJI'()Na.1Y -.26 .40 -.61 -.16 -.18 .13 .21 .08 -.16 .76
IDIOR COORDINATICE .06 -.13 .06 []J .09 -.02 -.13 .02 -.09 .49FINGER DEXTERITY .06 -.07 -.01 .65 .15 .05 -.09 -.02 .15 .65MANUAL DEXTERITY -.04 -.01 .35 .63 -.02 -.13 .08 .10 -.08 .57
MEDIUM IQ .22 -.18 .16 .14 []J .06 -.02 -.03 -.02 .89FEELINGS .04 -.05 .06 .07 .41 .01 -.09 -.07 .04 .19
SERVE -.08 -.03 .03 -.03 -.09 em .00 -.03 .02 .54PEOPLE .37 -.23 .22 -.03 .30 .53 -.20 -.04 .16 .68
CUMB -.25 .44 -.02 -.14 -.10 -.05 .57 .14 -.02 .64
OursIDE -.07 -.11 .03 -.11 -.03 -.06 .56 .06 .14 .37
HIGH STRENGTH -.22 .22 .00 .01 -.11 -.09 .54 -.15 -.05 .44
MEDIUM STRENG'IH -.30 .08 .04 .05 -.13 -.14 -.03 [ill .05 .99I..fJN STRENGTH .25 -.32 .08 -.10 .08 .21 -.33 -.41 .05 .51
STRESS -.02 .03 .11 .01 .04 .04 .11 .02 I .63 ) .42
FEMALE SHARE OF
EMPLOYMENT -.10 -.20 -.03 -.03 .13 .45 -.25 -.19 -.03 .37 w\.0
Percent of variance: .437 .134 .111 .084 .069 .049 .048 .038 .030
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Variables which have high loadings on a particular factor
are utilized to interpret the factor. We have represented the
results in Table I-II so that the variables with highest load-
ings on a particular factor are grouped together in a box; the
contents of the box, then, serve as a key to the meanings of the
factor. The interpretations which we give to the factors and
the correlation of the female share of employment with each of thE
factors is presented on the following pages.
Factor One: Intellectual Requirements for the Job
Factor One clearly represents the intellectual requirements
of a job, with highest loadings from highIQ, verbal and numeri-
cal ability and teaching responsibilities. Autonomy tends to
accompany high intellectual demands, and it is rarely necessary
to take instructions or assist others. Strength is not important,
as shown by a positive loading for low strength and negative
loadings for medium and heavy physical strength. The factor
accounts for nearly 44 percent of total variance in the observed
variables, indicating that one of the major differences across
jobs is to be found in the nature of their intellectual require-
ments. (It is inherent in the estimation technique that the
first factor accounts for a larger proportion of the variance
and that the remaining factors each contribute a small proportion.
The negative loading on this factor for the female share of
employment indicates a tendency for jobs characterized by high
intellectual requirements to be held by men, a result consistent
with the strong representation of men in professional and mana-
gerial jobs.
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Factor Two: Adverse Working Conditions
The variables with high loadings on this factor all measure
adverse working conditions: heat, wet, noise, hazard and fumes.
In addition, this factor involves a requirement for high physical
strength, climbing or stooping and taking instructions in an
environment characterized by low autonomy. Not surprisingly,
the female share of employment has a negative loading on this
factor, which accounts for roughly 13 percent of total variance.
Protective legislation, unionization in the face of unpleasant
working conditions and traditional sex roles have all combined
to prevent women from entering jobs marked by these traits. The
factor also has negative loadings from dealing with people and
the need to interpret feelings, both traits commonly associated
with female jobs.
Factor Three: Variety of Duties
This factor portrays the amount of variety and the extent
to which duties must be performed according to set procedures.
Jobs characterized by variety tend to entail manual dexterity
and autonomy, and are associated with lower female employment.
These traits are exhibited by jobs in the skilled trades, occu-
pations with extremely low representation of women; these jobs
are likely to be the source of this factor, which accounts for
an additional 11 percent of total variance.
Factor Four: Motor Coordination and Dexterity
The variables having highest loadings on this factor are
the" need for motor coordination, manual and finger dexterity,
lending a ready interpretation to the factor. Despite the common
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assumption that women possess greater finger dexterity than
men, the female share has a negative but small loading on the
factor. The skilled crafts jobs are again likely to be respon-
sible for this effect. Notice that variety, teaching, verbal
and numerical ability have positive loadings, and that these are
traits associated with skilled occupations. The factor contri-
butes 9 percent to the overall variance.
Factor Five: Personal Interpretations
This factor is based upon several traits which are tradi-
tionally considered to be the province of women: interpreting
feelings, ideas or facts in terms of a personal viewpoint, ver-
bal ability, working with people and teaching. Medium intelli-
gence also has its highest loading on this factor. Thus, it is
not surprising that the female share of employment is positively
correlated with the factor. Women in jobs exhibiting these
traits are teachers and social workers. The factor explains
7 percent of total variance.
Factor Six: Serving Others
Like factor five, this factor is dominated by traits tradi-
tionally associated with women's roles: a serving relationship
to others and a need to deal with people. As would be expected,
the female share of employment has its highest loading on this
factor. The coefficient on the female share indicates that 20
percent of the variance across occupations in female employment
is accounted for by the degree of the serving relationship. It
is likely that nursing is represented by a high score on this
factor, as the factor also entails frequent change in duties, a
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requirement for low strength and the presence of little autonomy.
Five percent of total variance is accounted for by this factor.
Factor Seven: Outside Physical Demands
Characteristics having highest loadings on this factor in-
clude the need to work outside without effective protection from
weather and requirements for heavy and medium degrees of physi-
cal strength. These traits are associated with adverse working
conditions as well, particularly the presence of hazard. The
female share of employment is negatively correlated with these
characteristics, as would be expected, and in fact, has its
second highest loading on this factor, which contributes nearly
5 percent of total variance.
Factor Eight: Medium Strength
This factor, which accounts for only 4 percent of total
variance, is not clearly distinguished from the previous factor,
except in the degree of physical strength required. Like factor
seven, it represents adverse working conditions and outside ex-
posure, but entails a less arduous working environment in these
respects as in the amount of strength required. The female
share of employment is still negatively correlated with these
traits, but the correlation is weaker for the less arduous
characteristics.
Factor Nine: Stress
The only trait having its highest loading on this factor is
the presence of stress, the need to deal with unexpected and
sometimes hazardous working conditions. Women are rarely found
in jobs characterized by this sort of stress, as evidenced by the
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negative, but small loading from the female share of employment.
This factor, however, represents only 3 percent of total variance.
Conclusions
That we have discovered a systematic pattern in the charac-
teristics of jobs held by men and women is not to imply a casual
relationship. The raw material of factor analysis is a corre-
lation matrix, and it is inappropriate to base inferences upon
correlations in the absence of a clear hypothesis and known
statistical properties of the estimation technique. We view the
results presented above as a form of descriptive statistics which
summarizes observed correlations in aggregate and incomplete data.
Just as it is inappropriate to infer causality on the basis
of these correlations, it is also inappropriate to infer economic
or social justification for the particular division of labor out-
lined by the factor analysis. It is interesting, however, to
note how little of the variance in the female share of employment
across jobs can be accounted for by variance in the job charac-
teristics included in the study. Seventy-three percent of the
variance across Census occupations in the sex composition of
employment appears to be uncorrelated with variance in measures
of intellectual, physical and temperamental requirements of these
jobs. In order to make normative statements about this division
of labor, and to derive useful policy recommendations, we must
ask how this assignment of occupations came to exist. There are
many ways of answering that question, among them, historical
studies of particular occupations, technological studies of job
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requirements, and psychological and sociological studies of role
appropriateness and conflict. Our approach in what follows is
to ask what economic theories contribute to our understanding of
the mechanism generating and perpetuating occupational segrega-
tion. While no definitive theory of sex segregation has been
developed by economists, many have addressed the issue, offering
widely differing hypotheses. In the following essay we examine
some of these contributions by economists to the literature on
occupational segregation of men and women.
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A REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE OF OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION
A number of economic theories have been devised to explain
the existence and persistence of occupational segregation in the
labor market. Some of these theories locate the source of seg-
regation in preferences and aptitudes of workers, others in pre-
ferences or a lack of information on the part of employers.
These models generally fall into one of two categories: neo-
classical ffiodels and institutional ~odels of occupational segregatj
While the assumptions and implications of the different neoclassicaJ
models are quite distinct from one another, they are all charac-
terized by a choice-theoretic approach to the behavior of indivi-
dual economic units, each acting atomistically to maximize its
own welfare. The institutional literature, on the other hand,
takes as its basic unit of analysis economic institutions which
embody the collective behavior of groups of economic agents.
The neoclassical approach can be further categorized into
the human capital literature, the tas~e for discrimination litera-
ture and information theories. Human capital theorists such as
Mincer and Polachek stress the importance of decisions made by
individual women and their families in determining the nature and
extent of labor force participation. 1 Becker and Bergmann trace
the special position of women in the labor force back to discri-
minatory pr~ferences on the part of employers, employees, or both,
treating these preferences as exogenous to the labor market. 2
The information literature, represented by Arrow and Spence,
characterizes discrimination as the outcome of cost-minimizing
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behavior on the part of employers who have imperfect information
on an individual's ability to perform well at any particular task.
The institutional approach, on the other hand, tends to des-
cribe and analyze underlying balkanization in the labor market of
which sex segregation is viewed as one line of stratification.
The primary adherents of this theory are Doeringer and Piore, who
have developed a model which contrasts the positions of workers
within a firm's "internal" labor market with the treatment re-
ceived by workers who participate in the external labor market
(which corresponds more closely to neoclassical notions of labor
4
markets) .
While these authors do not examine the relationship of dual
labor markets to occupational segregation, they develop the con-
ditions under which such segregation is likely to occur. Blau
draws on these conditions in an examination of urban office workex
in a study which extends dual labor market theory to an analysis
of the position of women in a particular labor market. 5 Other
empirical tests of dual labor market theories have been provided
by Stevenson, who specifically examines sex segregation, and
Osterman, who tests for segmentation in general without examining
its relationship to sex segregation. 6
Each of these theories will be examined in detail in the
pages which follow. Where a model has been subjected to empiri-
cal tests, those tests will be discussed and the results evaluated
It is difficult to compare the theoretical approaches since many
of them treat occupational segregation only tangentially. How-
ever, the models do have testable implications in the realm of
occupational segregation, and it is in the later comparison
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of the predictive power of the various models that an attempt
will be made to assess their contributions to our understanding
of the division of labor between men and women in the U.S. OC-
cupational structure.
I. Neoclassical Models of Occupational Segregation
A. Human Capital Theory
The most fully articulated paradigm of labor market choices
7
and outcomes is that presented by human capital theory. In this
framework, individuals are seen choosing to invest in human capi-
talon the basis of a comparison between the discounted stream of
earnings expected to result from the investment (formal schooling
or on-the-job training) and the costs (income foregone and direct
outlays) of accumulating human capital. In most versions of the
model, individuals choose only the amount of education and train-
ing they will procure, and the question of occupational choice -
the type of education and training - is left unspecified. Recent
formulations of the model, however, have allowed the choice of
occupation to be made simultaneously with the choice of the
f h . b 'd 8 'ff . h .amount 0 uman cap~tal to e acqu~re. D~ erences ~n t e ~n-
vestment and occupation choices made by individuals can arise in
this framework as a result of differing preferences, of differing
expected participation levels over the life-cycle and as a result
of differing costs of acquiring human capital. It is argued by
most human capital theorists that any and all of these factors
might thus contribute to the observed differences in the nature
and extent of investment by men and women. We will concentrate
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here only on that portion of the human capital literature which
explicitly models occupational choice. While most of the empi-
rical work in human capital functions has not adopted this frame-
work, the extent ion of the model to occupational choice is re-
latively straightforward and follows logically from the main body
of human capital theory.
In keeping with the choice-theoretic framework of human
capital analysis, some economists claim that women choose those
occupations in which their human capital will be subject to the
slowest depreciation during the periods in which they do not
participate in the labor market. This criterion for occupational
choice was first suggested by the seminal study of the relation-
ship between human capital and earnings for married women done by
Mincer and Polachek and was later extended by Polachek to a study
9
of occupational choices among women.
The original Mincer and Polachek article attempted to in-
vestigate the extent to which discontinuities in female labor
force participation affect market earnings. If time out of the
labor force results in a depreciation of market skills, termed
"atrophy" by Polachek, a simple summation over years of experience
for women will seriously misspecify the stock of human capital
embodied in an individual woman at any moment in time. Mincer
and Polachek estimate women's earnings functions by breaking up
years of exposure to the labor force into episodes in the labor
force and episodes of "hometime," thus testing the hypothesis
that the human capital investment profile is not monotonic for
married women whose labor force experience is interrupted for
childbearing and childrearing. The earnings functions thus
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constructed (see Table II-I) can explain between 25 to 30 percent
of the dispersion in wage rates of white married women. On this
basis, Mincer and Polachek conclude that a large portion of the
wage gap between men and women can be explained by differences
in the work histories of the two groups. Using the coefficients
derived from their estimation on a sample of women from the Na-
tional Longitudinal Surveys, they conclude that 42 percent of the
wage gap between men and women would be eliminated if women's ex-
perience were rewarded in the same manner as that of men, or em-
ploying the converse procedure, 45 percent could be eliminated
if worren exhibited the sane work histories as men but were rewarde
for experience according to the coefficients derived from female
earnings functions. The question of occupational segregation is
not raised here, but bears directly on the legitimacy of imputing
earnings to women on the basis of either equivalent work histories
or equivalent rewards for differing work histories. Rewards for
continuous labor force experience vary across occupations, and it
is the concentration of women in occupations which do not reward
tenure as highly as do male occupations which brings about the
flatness of their earnings-experience profiles. Thus, claiming
to "explain" over 40 percent of the wage gap as attributable to
differences in experience raises more questions of the extent of
discrimination than it answers. In a discussion of discrimination
near the end of the 1974 paper, Mincer and Polachek fail to add-
ress the problem of occupational segregation and its relationship
to the earnings-experience profile: .
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Table II-l
Regression of Log Female Earnings on Schooling, Segmented
Work Experience and Other Variables, United States, 1967
White Black
Married
with Never
Children Married
V~riab1e
Married
with
Children
(a) (a)
Never
Married
(b) (a) (b)
Constant
Schooling
Work before
first child
~vork after
first child
Current job
tenure
Total years
worked
Square of total
years worked
Hornetime after
first child
Other hometime
Total hometime
In hours per
week on
current job
In hours per
year on
current job
R2
0.09
0.064*
0.008*
0.001
0.012*
-0.012*
-0.003
-0.11*
0.03
0.28**
0.55
0.077*
0.009
0.026
-0.0007
-0.009
-0.43*
0.21
0.41**
1.48
0.054*
0.036*
-0.0005*
0.666*
0.67
-0.02
0.095*
0.005
0.001
0.006
-0.006
-0.005
-0.30*
0.08*
0.39**
-0.48
0.100*
0.0004
0.0004
-0.0003
-0.02
-0.13
0.03
0.46**
i~
Notes:
(a) hourly earnings
(b) manual earnings
* indicates significance at the 5% level
** indicates inclusion of other variables in the regression
(for example, illness and years resident in state)
Sources:
(a) J. Mincer and S.W. Polachek, "Family Investments in Human
Capital: Earnings of Women," Journal of Political Economy
82 (March/April 1974).
(b) S.W. Polachek, "Potential Biases in Measuring Male-Female
Discrimination," Journal of Human Resources 10 (Surruner 1975).
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At this stage of research we cannot conclude that the
remaining (unexplained) part of the wage gap is attri-
butable to discrimination, nor, for that matter, that
the 'explained' part is not affected by discrimination.
More precisely, we should distinguish between the
concepts of direct and indirect effects of discrimina-
tion. Direct market discrimination occurs when dif-
ferent rental prices (wage rates) are paid by employers
for the same unit of human capital owned by different
persons (groups). In this sense, the wage-gap residual
is an upper limit of the direct effects of market dis-
crimination. Indirect effects occur in that the
existence of market discrimination discourages the
degree of ,market orientation in the expected alloca-
tion of time and diminishes incentives to investment
in market-oriented human capital. Hence the lesser job
investments and greater depreciation of female market
earning power may to some extent be affected by expec-
tations of discrimination. lO
Although occupational segregation is not named in the above
passage, the direction of inquiry for human capital theorists
attempting to explain the wage gap was clear. Polachek pursued
the subject in a later article in wh~ch he argued that an ex-
planation for the peculiar earnings profiles of women might be
found in an examination of the types of occupations in which
11
women are generally found. The model he posits is built on the
key proposition that differing occupational choices among women
can be explained by differing lengths of planned labor force
participation, with those women planning lower lifetime parti-
cipation choosing those occupations in which human capital skills
depreciate the least during periods of disuse. Before turning
to this model and to the empirical tests to which he subjects
the model, it is critical to note that while the model is one of
occupational choice, the data on which Polachek bases the tests
are, of course, market data. Thus, the pairings between indivi-
dual women and their occupations reflect not only occupational
choice, but also occupationalassignrnent made by employers
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who mayor may not discriminate between men and women and be-
tween different groups of women. Polachek claims to have eli-
minated this sort of bias by testing the model on a cross-section
of women: that is, he attempts to explain varying choices made
among women on the basis of their work histories, thus holding
employer discrimination constant across the sample. However, if
discrimination takes the form of barring women from certain oc-
cupations, the inference of occupational choices from market
data will be biased for certain women, and if the characteristics
of those women most affected by occupational barriers are sys-
tematically related to their work histories and their human
capital investment, coefficients on experience and schooling will
also not reflect true occupational choices. In addition, if
employers assign women to jobs on the basis of age, marital sta-
tus and number of dependents, and if these traits are correlated
with schooling and experience, further bias will be introduced
and the estimated coefficients will once again confound occupa-
tional choice with occupational assignment based on statistical
discrimination.
In addition, one dimension of occupational segregation is
not addressed by the model. The model may explain crowding, or
the concentration of the female labor supply in certain, broadly
defined occupations; it does not explain segregation. For examplE
although the model may well explain why women choose household
work, it does not explain why men are butlers and women are house-
keepers. Nor, for that matter, does it explain why women are
nurses and men are machine operators. Clearly, a fuller story
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is needed to account for the often idiosyncratic nature of the
occupational distribution.
Blau and Jusenius raise this point in a 1976 summary arti-
cle on economic models of segregation~
.•• both male and female occupations require varying
amounts and types of skills. Some female as well as
some male occupations require lengthy general train-
ing prograrns--nursing and architects, for example.
Furthermore, some female as well as some male occupa-
tions require firm-specific-training--executive sec-
retaries and administrative assistants, for instance.
Finally, some female as well as some male occupations
require few skills and do not provide a potential for
productivity increases through experience--for example,
waitressing and janitorial work.
The point is that men and women are in occupations
of each skill type and that within each category cer-
tain occupations are 'more' acceptable for women to
enter than others. The human capital school's reliance
on the primacy of the family in a women's life could
only explain a greater tendency of women to be in 'low-
skill' jobs. with this reasoning, they could not explain
the concentration of women in a small number of female
occupations within each skill category.12
Polachek incorporates occupational choice into a standard
human capital framework by relaxing the assumption that human
capital is accumulated or depreciated at the same rate in all oc-
cupations. If the time path of human capital depends upon occu-
pational choice we can write:
(1)
where: = fraction of time in period t spent investing
in human capital;
Kt = human capital stock at time t;
~t = a vector of occupational characteristics;
~ = annual depreciation of human capital, assumed
independent of occupational choice.
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In order to focus on the effect of intermittent labor force parti-
cipation, Polachek deals with only one component of the £ vector,
the atrophy rate:
Specifically, by assuming that occupations can be charac-
terized hedonically by the existence of varying human
capital "atrophy" rates (i.e., depreciation of market
skills occurring during periods of labor force intermit-
tency) as well as varying compensating market rental
(wage) rates, I incorporate the occupational choice de-
cision into the human capital framework. The main theorem
to be derived is that greater life cycle labor force in-
termittency is associated with a higher probability of
being in an occupation with a relatively low degree of
atrophy.13
Assuming that the rental rate of human capital depends upon one's
occupation and that occupation can be characterized hedonically
by a unique atrophy rate, the wage becomes a function of 0:
(2) W = W(o)
Individuals choose the investment path which maximizes life-
time income:
(3)
sUbject to: Kt = f(St,K t ) - [~+(l-Nt)Ot]Kt
W = W(o)
where: Nt = fraction of time t spent in the labor force;
r = interest rate on asset accumulation;
and all other variables are as defined above.
Nontrivial solutions for optimal 0 depend upon a wage-atrophy pro-
file which is concave: W'>O and W"<O. This implies that the
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market compensates atrophy with a higher rental rate of capital.
The optimization can then be reduced to a two-stage procedure by
assuming that occupational choice is made once and for the life-
time at period 0 of the investment horizon. The individual first
chooses the optimal investment path, conditional upon the exo-
genous expected lifetime participation rate. This path determines
the optimal occupation as the one whose depreciation rate maxi-
mizes the present value of lifetime income which is attainable
with that investment path. Substituting the capital constraint in
the objective function for the second, occupational choice, stage
of the optimization, we derive equation (3a). The first order con-
ditions for attaining a maximum value of lifetime income are given
in (3b) and (3e), and have the following interpretation: the in-
dividual will choose an occupation in which the present value of
increased depreciation associated with a marginal change in 0 is
just balanced by the present value of the increased earnings with
which the market will compensate an increment in depreciation.
T T
( 3a) Max F(oINt , S*) = Max f (N - St)W(o) [KO + f {f(S~, K*0 t 0 0 t 0 "[
- ; + (1 - N )OK*}dT]e-rt dtT T
aF T
- St)~~ KO e-rtdTdt( 3b) a8 = f (Nt0
T t
aw K*)e-rt+ f (N - S*) f f (S*, dTdt
0 t t 0 a8 T T
T
aw
t
-rt
- J (N - S*) f ; K e dTdt
0 -t t 00 0 T
T t
Oaw)K*J (Nt - S*) f (1 - Nt) (W + e-rt dTdt =
0 t 0 00 T
1'-' aF(3e)
a8 - H(o, N, §.*) = 0
59
The purpose of the model is not to derive an analytical solu-
tion in terms of occupational characteristics, but rather to in-
vestigate the effect of an exogenous change in labor force parti-
cipation in all periods (~) on the optimal path of occupational
depreciation, and thus on the optimal occupation. Assuming that
the first stage optimization of St has taken place and that the
path of investment is invariant to changes in ~, a comparative
statics exercise demonstrates the dependency of occupational choic
upon lifetime participation. Totally differentiating equation (3c
and solving for do/dN, we obtain equation (4):
(4) ao = -3H/3N > 0aN aH/30
Since the numerator of the right hand side of this equation re-
presents the second-order condition for a maximum in the optimi-
zation of equation (3a), we assume that the term is negative.
Providing that the depreciation term ~ is not extraordinarily
large, the sign of (4) is therefore positive. Although more com-
as*plicated mathematically, the case where ~ >0 yields the same
results. 14
While equation (4) refers to an increase in labor force
participation at every period, occupational choice will be affecte
by planned nonparticipation in any period of the life cycle. The
further from the initial period of the planning horizon, the ex-
pected intermittency the lesser the impact on the optimal in-
vestment path and occupation.
Having demonstrated theoretically that occupational choice
will be affected by life cycle labor force participation decisions
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(if occupations differ systematically in the extent to which they
penalize intermittency), Polachek utilizes a logistic approach to
estimate the extent of the dependence of occupation on planned
intermittency for a cross-section sample of white married women
aged 30 to 50 from the Income Dynamics Panel. This test of the
hypothesis is performed twice: first, assuming that "hometime"
is exogenous to the occupational choice decision and then, allow-
ing for hometime and occupation to be jointly determined.
Under the assumption that hometime is exogenous, logit
analysis can be employed to estimate the parameters of the fol-
lowing system of (m - 1) independent equations:
(5)
where:
P'tIn(~) = S . + S ,St + S .et + S ,ht + EtPIt oJ 1J 2J 3J
j = an index of occupations running from 2, •.• ,m;
t = an index of individual observations;
e = years of labor force exposure (age - schooling - 6) ;
h = years of hometime;
s = years of schooling;
and occupation one is professional work.
In general, the results indicate that hometime is negatively
and significantly related to the probability of choosing other
occupations over professional work, and that the magnitude of the
relationship varies systematically across occupations. Thus,
greater hometime affects the odds of being in unskilled work rathe
than professional work more than it affects the choice of clerical
over professional work. Polachek agrues that this differential
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magnitude across occupations reflects the differing atrophy rates
of human capital in different occupations. To bolster this claim,
he examines the correlation between the hometime coefficients de-
rived in the logit estimation for each broadly-defined occupation
and atrophy estimates derived in the same manner as in previous
work with another sample of white married women from the National
Longitudinal Survey. These atrophy estimates are the ordinary
least squares coefficients on hometime estimated from simple
earnings equations of the form:
(6)
where:
In y. = a . + a .s. + a .e. + a .h. + E
J oJ 1J J 2J J 3J J
j = an index of occupations;
y = earnings;
s = years of schooling;
e = years of exposure to the labor force;
h = years of hometime.
Polachek recognizes that there is a measurement problem here:
The hometime coefficient (a3) represents a measure of net
atrophy -- namely the effect on earnings of being out of
the labor force a greater amount (percentage) of one's
lifetime. This estimate of atrophy is not pure. It in-
cludes other forms of investment and depreciation caused
by the natural aging process. IS
The atrophy estimates thus derived and their correlation with the
logit hometime coefficients from the Income Dynamics Panel are
presented in Table II-2. The negative correlation of -.7S implies
that those with higher hometirne are likely to be found in occupa-
tions characterized by low atrophy rates. It is curious that the
professional and clerical-sales categories are characterized by
the same amount of estimated atrophy, and that the category of
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Table II-2
Atrophy Estimates From the Income Dynamics
Sample of White Married Women
occupation Atrophy Estimate N
Professional .004 63
Managerial .024 20
Clerical-Sales .004 152
Operative .014 62
Unskilled -.007 81
~imPle correlation between atrophy estimates and hometime COef-jficients from multiple logit equations for occupational choice =-.75
~imPle correlation between atrophy estimates and hometime coef-Jficients from simultaneous logit approach to occupationalchoice = -.99
operatives has greater atrophy than does the professional category.
While one would expect a high degree of atrophy in managerial oc-
cupations, this estimate is derived from an extremely small sample
of 20. We are not convinced these estimates of atrophy correspond
to economically meaningful concepts; in addition, since Polachek
does not report standard errors, it is difficult to assess their
statistical significance.
Developing the agrument further, Polachek runs an ordinary
least squares regression for the entire Income Dynamics sample in
which the dependent variable is the atrophy estimate appropriate
for each individual's occupation and the independent variables
include hometime, schooling, exposure and a dummy variable for
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the presence of young children. Again, the hometime variable is
negatively related to atrophy estimates by occupation for each
individual. The equation for this regression is:
(7) o. =
J
0.086 - .001h + .000ge + .Olls
(4.1) (-2.8) (1.7) (9.3)
.006y
(- • 9)
.20
where: o. = atrophy estimates derived from equation (6) by
J occupation (j) and t-values are in parentheses.
A ready criticism of this empirical test is that occupational
choice might also determine hometime: since the price of dropping
out from a professional or managerial occupation is quite high,
women in these occupations might be expected to be more permanent-
ly attached to the labor force. This would introduce a bias into
the estimated logit coefficients analogous to least squares bias.
Polachek attempts to correct for this bias within the context of
the logistic model with a technique involving a nonlinear maximum
likelihood estimator of the following two equation system
(8)
where:
(9)
X is the vector of independent variables defined as
for equation (5)
h = h ( c, n2 ' • •c. , nM' s , e)
where: c = constant
n. = a dummy variable for occupations 2 through M
J
s,e = as defined above
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Specification of the likelihood function for parameter estimates
of this system is difficult since the system involves one poly-
p.
tomous endogenous variable (In(:2!)) and one continuous endogenous
PIt
variable (h). In order to simplify the problem, Polachek follows
a procedure developed by Schmidt and Strauss and breaks h t into
a dichotomous variable h t , where h is the sample mean of h t and
where
-(10) h t = 1 if h t < hi 2 if h t > h
Equations (8) and (9) are thus transformed into equations (11)
and (12) and are estimated with a nonlinear maximum likelihood
technique.
(II)
(12)
where:
-
In p(n = j[& .h= a. + a. + a. .S + a. .e
pen = 11 h) oj 1J 2J 3J
p(h 2lliL MIn = L: .n.= y + y .s + y .e + y
p(h = lin) oj j=l 1J 2J 3J J
j = 1, ... , M is an index of occupations
This sophisticated technique yields new estimates of the hometime
coefficients which differ very little from the logit coefficients
derived in the logit analysis described above. The simple corre-
lations between these new hometime coefficients and the atrophy
estimates derived earlier are presented in the lower part of
Table I1-2 and are even stronger than the correlations based on
the single-equation logit estimates.
Polachek concludes his case for a link between occupational
choice and atrophy with a more readily interpretable method for
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estimating a simultaneous system which employs an instrument for
hometime. The instrument is derived from equation (13), and when
inserted in equation (7) yields a relationship between hometime
and atrophy which is represented by equation (14):
(13) h = -4.89 + .76e + 1.3k - .45s - .57y + .26sh + .OOlwh + .02~
(-1.9) (9.1) (6.0) (-2.8) (-.7) (2.0) (1.3) (0.3)
R2 = .45
where:
(14)
k = number of children
s = husband's schoolingh
w = husband's wage rateh
e = husband's labor market exposureh
°jt = .086 - .002h + .002e + .Olls - .OO5y(4.1 ) (-1.7) (1.6) (8.4) (-.8)
It is interesting to note that the hometime coefficient in equa-
tion (14) is no longer significant at the 5% level, while it was
significant in the context of the single equation (7).
While the importance of atrophy is the occupational outcomes
of the women in the sample seems to have demonstrated, it is not
clear to what extent these equations explaining variance among
women in occupational assignment help to explain variance between
men and women. Polachek attempts to answer this question by es-
timating the occupational distribution expected for women if they
were to have a full commitment to the labor force (i.e., hometime
of zero). The resulting occupational distribution is given in
Table II-3, in which, according to Polachek:
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Table 1I-3
Occupational Distribution by Sex, Observed and Predicted From
Logit Equation Assuming Zero Years Hometime
Occupation Female Male
Observed Predicted Observed
Professional 18.5% 23.6% 23.5%
Managerial 4.6 8.8 17.4
Clerical-Sales 41.3 34.2 15.0
Operative 16.4 26.0 28.0
Unskilled 19.3 7.4 16.0
100.1 100.0 100.0
••. it can be seen that differences in labor force com-
mitment alone account for much of the difference in sexual
employment patterns. If women were to have a full com-
mitment to the labor force, the number of women profes-
sionals would increase by 35 percent, the number of women
in managerial occupations would more than double, and wo-
men in unskilled occupations would decrease by more than
60 percent. While large sex differences still exist in
the clerical occupation, the changes in this and other
occupations are in the predicted direction. Such results
indicate that life cycle labor force participation pat-
terns are related to career choices even on as aggregated
a level as the five occupations chosen.1 6
Several arguments can be made against the inference of a new
occupational distribution on the basis of full labor force commit-
ment on the part of women. First, such an imputation is clearly
a partial equilibrium analysis involving changes of such enormous
magnitude in the division of labor and in relative labor supplies
that any inferences must be viewed with great skepticism. Se-
condly, the tremendous increase in the labor force participation
of married women since the second World War has not resulted in
any significant changes in the occupational distribution, as was
documented in the first essay.
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Finally, the ability of the
model to explain the occupational distribution of women depends
critically on the extent of aggregation employed in the analysis.
Broad occupational categories such as those employed in Polachek's
study often disguise the extent of segregation within the smaller
categories which comprise them. For example, in 1978, 65 per-
cent of all teachers were female, but less than 34 percent of
all college.teachers were female. The Polachek model addresses
segregation at so aggregate a level that its usefulness in ex-
plaining the starker forms of segregation remains to be demon-
strated.
In addition, the model clearly does not generalize as well
to interfirm differences in the composition of the workforce
for narrowly-defined occupations. Since Blau and McNulty have
h h h d 'ff d' d d 17 d'ff 'hsown t at suc ~ erences 0 ~n ee occur, ~ erences ~n t e
demand for labor are likely to be responsible for some of the
patterns of segregation which are observed.
An indirect test of the Polachek hypothesis is posed in
Zellner's study of the determinants of occupational segregation. 18
The key assumption of the model she tests is that differences in
intended labor supply interact with the steepness of the wage-
participation profiles in different occupations to bring about
occupational segregation. Segregation in this model results if
three conditions exist simultaneously:
1) the more female-dominated occupations do in fact of-
fer a higher wage than the more male-dominated occupa-
tions for lower levels of participation (and, of course,
a lower wage than the male-dominated occupations for
higher levels of participation);
68
2) the women who enter the more female-dominated occu-
pations do in fact intend to work less in the market than
persons who enter the more male-dominated occupations; and
3) not only are their intended levels of participation
lower than those of persons in the more male-dominated
occupations, but they are sufficiently lower as to make
pursuit of a more male-dominated occupation relatively
unprofitable. 19
Since it draws upon differences in labor supply to produce
sex segregation, this model is similar to that of Polachek, but
it differs in that it simply specifies a monotonic wage-partici-
pation profile and does not allow the timing of nonparticipation
to affect the results. These three conditions would also be con-
sistent with a human capital hypothesis that women choose jobs
which can build on and develop home skills since they -intend to
work part of their lives in the home rather than in the market-
place.
Zellner argues that the presence of demand-side factors such
as differing growth rates among occupations distorts the observed
market data so that a more appropriate test of a labor sypply hy-
pothesis lies in examining factors which only influence female
labor force supply and are therefore more indicative of underlying
occupational choices made by individual women. One such factor,
for example, is the presence of small children, which would be
expected to influence female labor force supply without affecting
demand for female labor. Her test of the hypothesis is based on
the logic that any factor which diminishes intended labor force
supply should be positively related to the proportion female of
the occupation chosen, and vice versa.
Zellner thus sets up a two-stage empirical test of the labor
supply occupational choice hypothesis. The first stage involves
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estimating female labor supply equations, restricting the sample
to white, married (spouse present) women employed in 1959 as wage
and salary workers in the private nonagricultural sector. These
equations are estimated twice: in one case, the dependent vari-
able is weeks worked in the previous year, and in the other, the
dependent variable is dichotomous, separating those women who
were in the labor force for the continuous period 1958-1959 from
those who have only begun work in 1959. Despite errors in the
estimation procedure, which will be discussed later, the results
are generally consistent with the female labor supply literature,
and are summarized in Table II-4. In the second stage of the
procedure, those variables which affected labor supply are enterec
as explanatory variables in a regression on the proportion female
in an individual woman's chosen occupation.
In general, the model is not upheld at this second stage of
the test. The result which is most damaging to the hypothesis
is the fact that the presence of children under 6 is negatively
and significantly related to the proportion female in a women's
occupation (see Table 11-4). One would predict that women with
small children intend to supply less labor to the market (have
higher expectations of hometime) and would therefore be found in
occupations with flatter wage-participation profiles, those oc-
cupations predicted to be female-dominated. Zellner explains
this curious result by arguing that those women with small child-
ren who are observed working are likely to be women with strong
tastes for market work, or women who have already invested sub-
stantial amounts in human capital and who are protecting their
capital stock against depreciation by remaining in the labor forcE
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Table II~4
Estimated Supply Equations for Married Women (spouse present)
Expected Dependent Variable = Dependent Variable =
Sign IIWeeks Worked in Yearll llLabor Force Stabi1ityll
Estima.ted Estimated
Independent Variables coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wife's potential wage NP +0.1910 5.7888 +0.0033 3.9058
Wife's nonlal:x:>r incorre (-) -0.2772 -5.1916 -0.0036 -2.6395
Husband's actual incorre (-) -0.0482 -7.6663 -0.0014 -8.4675
Husband's schooling (-) -0.0291 -0.5331 -0.0019 -1.3465
No. children 0 to 5 (-) -4.3190 -11.7938 -0.0897 -9.6401
No. children 6 to 11 (-) -1.3321 -3.9212 -0.0025 -0.2884
No. children 12 to 19 NP -0.4000 -1.4540 +0.0112 1.6077
Wife's age NP +0.7011 5.6388 +0.0346 10.9475
Wife's age squared (-) -0.0076 -4.9574 -0.0004 -9.6822
Wife's schooling NP +0.0580 0.5814 +0.0001 0.0525
2 2R =.119. R =.114.
Estimated Occupation Equation for Married Women
(spouse present)
Independent Variables
Expected
Sign
Dependent Variab1e=
Proportion Female
Estimated
. coefficient t-va1ue
Wife's potential wage
Wife's nonlabor income
Husband's actual income
Husband's schooling
No. children under 6
No. children 6 to 11
No. children 12 to 17
Wife's age
Wife's age squared
Wife's schooling
Note: NP = No prediction.
(-)
(+)
(-)
NP
(+ )
(+)
NP
(-)
(+ )
NP
-0.0016
+0.0006
+0.0001
+0.0054
-0.0186
-0.0063
-0.0115
-0.0104
+0.0001
+0.0122
2R =.037.
-2.8349
+0.6587
+1.2753
+5.8361
-2.9817
-1.0814
-2.4503
-4.8974
+4.3957
+7.1538
Source: Harriet Zellner, liThe Determinants of Occupational Segre-
gation. 1I Sex, Discrimination and the Division of Labor. Edited by
Cynthia B. Lloyd. New York: Columbia University-Press, 1975.
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despite the presence of small children. This might have been
ascertained by investigating the occupational distribution of
women with small children in the sample: if those women were
found in professional and managerial jobs in disproportionate
numbers, and if those women had high levels of general educationaJ
development, one could argue that the presence of small children
serves as a population discriminator, singling out women with
stronger than average attachments to the labor force. Since the
data on which Zellner tests the model are from the 1960 Census,
this explanation is quite compelling. Women with small children
who were working in 1959 comprised a much smaller fraction of
working women than they do today.
Another result which is even more disturbing is the positive
relationship between a woman's level of schooling and the pro-
portion female of the occupation in which she is employed. Zellne
argues that this may be the result of encountering greater dis-
crimination at high levels of educational attainment. Since we
are observing the results of occupational assignment by employers
as well as choice by employees, this argument does provide a clue
to the puzzle, but more likely, says Zellner, "points to some
serious omission in the formulation of the model."
Zellner summarizes her results below:
It is clear that a good deal of work is required in order
to develop a satisfactory explanation of occupational
segregation. The failure of the labor supply model to
predict occupational affiliation as well as one might
have expected could be attributed to a number of factors.
Some have already been noted .... It may also be that
assumptions ·(1) or (3) of the model (which were not
tested in this paper) do not hold; the more female-
dominated occupations may not, in fact, be characterized
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by a flatter wage-participation relationship; even if
they are, it may be that the participation level at
which more male-dominated occupations become more re-
numerative is so low that female labor supply intentions
are not relevant to their occupational choice decisions.
Finally, it may be that discrimination plays a signifi-
cant enough role in determining occupational distribution
that failure to specify and control for its operation
prevents us from observing some of the relationships
implied by the labor supply model. 20
~
One error in the two-stage formulation of the hypothesis
test should be noted here, although it is unlikely that this er-
ror was responsible for the perverse results of the second stage.
The labor supply equations estimated by Zellner were ordinary
least squares regressions run on a truncated sample of working
women; it has been recognized for several years now that a more
appropriate procedure is to take a sample of working and nonwork-
ing women, to impute a wage based on a standard human capital
earnings function, and to estimate the parameters of the labor
supply model in the context of this simultaneous system of wage
21
and supply determination and with a random sample of women.
The bias which she introduces in the first stage of the hypothe-
sis, however, is unlikely to have affected the signs of the para-
meters estimated at the second stage, although it certainly
affects the magnitudes estimated in the first stage. Only in
those cases in which ordinary least squares would have led to a
prediction of the wrong sign for a factor influencing labor sup-
ply would failure to use the instrumental variables approach
introduce error into the second stage.
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Another study in the human capital vein is that by Elizabetr.
Landes, who estimates the effect on male-female differences in
wages and employment of differences in turnover and specific capi
tal. 22 The theory of specific human capital predicts that high
turnover workers will have a lower stock of human capital since
employers will be reluctant to share in the costs of training for
employees whose expected duration of employment is low. In addi-
tion, depreciation of skills will be more marked for high turnove
workers, and their optimal investment path will thus involve lowe
accumulation of skills. Although Landes considers turnover to
result from movement between occupations as well as from movement
in and out of the labor force, the model she presents is related
to the Polachek model since "turnover is conceptually identical
d .. h .. 1" 23to eprec1at1on on urnan cap1ta .
Commenting on the possibility that higher turnover, lower
human capital investment and lower wages are the result of bar-
riers to entry for women in "high investment" occupations, Landes
argues that barriers to entry would result in lower wages and
lower turnover rates as long as women did not work in the home.
The effect of barriers as in the Bergmann crowding model would be
to limit inter-occupational mobility and thus lower turnover rate
However, if women respond to occupational exclusions by choosing
to work in the home, the effect of such crowding would be to de-
press the market wage and thus lower the labor force participatio
rate of women. This fall in the participation rate could result
in increased or decreased turnover, as no necessary relationship
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obtains between turnover and the once-and-for-all-time decline
in participation caused by a fall in women's wages.
The model estimated by Landes is based on the existence of
a compensating differential in the wage offer which results in
lower wages to high turnover workers and higher wages to workers
with a strong attachment to the occupation. Thus, the slope of
a firm's "demand curve" for turnover (illustrated in Figure II-I)
represents the return to an employer for an extra unit of invest-
ment in firm-specific human capital, which is by definition the
compensating differential for a reduction of one unit in turnover.
Figure 11-1
Wage
( Investment)
o
Group B's turnover-wage function
A's turnover-wage function
a A
Turnover rate
If we rank workers according to their turnover rates, a market
equilibrium will involve a matching of low turnover workers
(group B) with high investment firms, and high turnover workers
(group A) with low investment firms. This model thus generates
several empirical hypotheses:
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... Bls wages and turnover rates should be denser along
higher demand curves--i.e., higher wages, greater skills
and lower turnovers--and A's wages and turnover rates
should be denser along the low demand curves, since this
pattern of sorting minimizes the total cost to the mar-
ket of labor turnover. Along any demand curve, however,
the difference in wag5received by the two groups will
be a compensating difference for differences in turnover
costs, and the relative size of the differential is clearly
greater along the higher, steeper demand curves than along
the lower, flatter ones; i.e., at higher levels of skills,
the effect on wages of differences in turnover is aug-
mented. 24
The unit of analysis on which she tests these hypotheses is the
occupation, and all observations are measured as averages for men
and for women within occupations. The first part of her estima-
tion deals with the wage-turnover tradeoff, and employs three
measures of turnover. The results and definitions of the variablE
are presented in Table II-5. The steepness of the wage-experiencE
profile, DWAGE, is provided by the difference in average hourly
earnings between men in each occupation with 10-20 years of ex-
perience and those with 0-10 years of experience. The other
variables which enter into the wage equations are standard for
earnings functions of this class, with the exception of the vari-
able which captures the effect of regional variation in wages.
Wage equations are estimated separately for men and for women.
Recognizing that the error structures in these equations will be
correlated as a result of inter-occupational shifts in demand,
the method of estimation is generalized least squares for seem-
ingly unrelated equations. The signs are generally as predicted,
with two exceptions: the logarithm of hours worked appears to be
negatively and significantly related to the log of wages, and the
turnover estimate which measures occupation switching is positive
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Table 11-5
t~age Equations
Dependent Variables = Log (WAGE)
t1ales Females
(1) (2) (3) (4 ) (5) (6)
SCHL 11.80 10.43 9.34 10.21 10.09 9.68
(11.76) (7.60) (7.15) (10.31) (12 .. 34) (11.07)
EXP 13.57 10.32 10.56 -.034 -.072 -.21
(4. 03) (3.42) (3.73) (.0018) (.036) ( .10)
EXP 2 -.24 -.19 -.20 -.0021 .0065 .009
(3.58) (3.23) (3.16) (.036) (.15 ) ( . 20)
PSO -.18 -.11 -.055 .018 -.24 -.27
(.77) (.61) (. 33) (.11 ) (1.83) (2.01)
HRS -1.03 -1.11 -1.16 -1.22
(4.40) (5.01) (5.69) (5.76)
PFT 2.01 2.09 1.07 1.10
(3.66) (4.06) (6.79) (6.93)
PTR -.015 .041 -.37 -.40
(.053) (.15 ) (1.75) (1.83)
VAR -.21 -.21 -.046 -.050
(2.58) (2.74) (.88) ( . 97)
DWAGE 8.74 2.51
(4.17) (1.33)
CONSTANT -1.91 .69 .96 -.44 3.03 3.29
(4 . 07) ( . 66) (.97 ) (1.28) (4.50) (4 . 56)
Numbers in parentheses are the ratio of the coefficients to their
standard errors. Coefficients are multiplied by 100, where neces-
sary, to reflect percentage effects.
Name
EMPf' EMPm
SCHLf , SCHLm
EXPf' EXPm
HRS f , HRSm
PFTf , PFTm
VARf , VARm
DWAGE
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Variables and Definitions
Definition*
Average hourly wage (Measured in natural
logarithms.)
Number employed (Measured in natural logarithms.
Average number of years of school completed.
Average number of years since completion of
formal schooling. (Potential labor market
experience. )
Average hours reported during the week prior to
interview. (Measured in natural logarithms.)
Percent who worked full time (i.e., at least 35
hours per week) when they worked in 1966.
Percent who reported that current job differed
from the longest job held in 1966, either be-
cause of a change in employer or occupation.
Variance in weeks worked in 1966.
Difference in average hourly wage between white
males with 10-20 years of potential labor force
experience and those with 0-10 years of poten-
tial experience.
Percent residing in the south.
*All variables are occupation-specific. Subscripts m and f denote
males and females within the occupation, respectively.
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and significantly related to wages. The latter result is easily
explainable on human capital terms, since individuals move be-
tween occupations in response to differing relative wages and in
order to maximize earnings. The perverse effect of wages is at-
tributable, according to Landes, to a "spurious negative corre-
lation... produced if weekly earnings reported by some individuals
are independent of random fluctuations in their reported hours
worked during the week. 11 25 Since Landes does not report the 96
occupations selected for the study, it is difficult to interpret
this result. However, if occupations in which individuals re-
ported higher hours are occupations in which there are no provi-
sions for overtime (i.e., salaried professional occupations) or
are occupations in which overtime pay is received later than one
week after the hours are worked,.this result is not surprising
in view of the construction of the dependent variable.
Landes interprets these results as evidence of a wage-turnoveJ
tradeoff which will generate the clustering of men~d women around
certain occupations. However, it is disturbing that this conclu-
sion rests on the signs of 6 coefficients (the coefficients on
the three measures of turnover), of which two are the wrong sign
and two are insignificant at the 10 percent level. This is true
for both the male and the female equations. It is our opinion
that more accurate measures of turnover are needed in order to
assess the existence of a market-clearing wage-turnover relation-
ship.
Later in the paper, Landes reports similar generalized least
squares results for equations in which the dependent variable is
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the log of employment of individuals of each sex in each of the
96 occupations studied. These equations are designed to test the
hypothesis that lithe equilibrium density of women would be greater
in the lower investment occupations, in which there is a smaller
trade-off between wages and turnover ... Evidence of this was given
by the wage equations: the female wage equation exhibited a weaker
tradeoff between wages and turnover than the male equation." Re-
suIts of these employment equations are presented in Table II-6.
Landes again finds confirmation of her hypothesis in these results
... the relative density of male to female employment is
inversely related to turnover and directly related to
training across occupations: two out of the three turn-
over variables have a weaker positive effect in the
male employment equation than the female equation.
(The effect of VAR is negative in the male employment
equation.)26
While the effect is certainly weaker for men, the fact remains
that none of the turnover measures is significant at the 5 percent
level for men, and the only significant turnover measures in the
women's equation are positively related to employment for women.
This would not appear to be convincing evidence that the occupa-
tional distribution is related to the turnover measures available
Landes in the SEO data set.
One question which makes these results even more destructive
of the hypothesis that inter-occupational differences in the em-
ployment of men and women result from the turnover measures she
uses is the existence of simultaneous equations bias in the es-
timation of the turnover coefficients. It has been recognized,
by Polachek, among others, that low specific capital causes high
turnover , and this should bias her coefficients on turnover in
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Table II-6
Equilibrium Employment of Men and Women
Dependent Variable = Log (number employed)
Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4 )
PFT 3.96 6.68 1.38 1.57
( . 86) (1. 31) (1.92) (2.14)
PTR 1.90 1.87 -2.10 -2.30
(.87) (.82 ) (1.39) (1.46)
VAR -1.08 -1.29 1.51 1.52
(1.69) (1. 91) (4.22) (4.19)
D~lAGE 41.70 10.98
(1. 90) ( . 83)
WAGE -1.45 -2.48 -.61 -.82
(1.80) (2.45) (1.31) (1.66)
CONSTANT 3.46 1.85 3.07 2.98
( . 80) (.40) (3.51) (3.36)
Number in parentheses are the ratios of coefficients to their
standard errors. Coefficients are multiplied by 100, where
necessary, to reflect percentage effects.
81
o 0 dO' 27 .. .~n negat~ve ~rect~on. Desp~te th~s bias, the coeffic~ents
remain unalterably positive, in the case of the female equation,
or insignificantly different from zero, in the case of the male
equation.
Perhaps the most important change that must be made before
a test of this sort can proceed is to develop more accurate mea-
sures of turnover within occupations. The more recent longitu-
dinal surveys permit accurate assessment of the number of occupa-
tions in which an individual has been employed over his or her
working life, and contain precise estimates of the amount and
timing of hometime. We will use these estimates in some of the
empirical work which is reported in the final essay, but much
work remains to be done which carefully distinguishes among rea-
sons for entering and leaving different occupations.
B. Other Neoclassical Approaches to Occupational Segregation
The human capital literature explains occupational segre-
gation as the result of choices made over the life-cycle by in-
dividual workers, and can therefore be considered a modelof the
labor supply decision. Other neoclassical theorists who have
been interested in the question of segregation have focused their
attention on the demand for labor, asking under what circumstan-
ces might the demand for female labor differ from the demand for
male labor, and what implications might follow from differences
in optimal hiring rules between men and women. Two distinct
branches of demand-based segregation theory can be distinguished,
and we now turn to an examination of these models: the perfectly
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competitive taste for discrimination model, and the information
costs model.
The "taste for discrimination" literature has its foundations
in Becker's 1957 demonstration of the relationship between pre-
judice, wage differentials and occupational segregation. 28 In
the early 1970's Bergmann united this model with one of the ear-
liest economic treatments of men and women in the labor market,
the "overcrowding hypothesis." That crowding of women into a'
small number of occupations wouid depress wages was first suggestec
by Fawcett in 1918 and was formalized in 1922 by Edgeworth. 29
Information costs models show how uncertainty as to an em-
ployee's potential productivity leads employers to predict pro-
ductivity on the basis of certain characteristics. Race and sex
are two easily observable characteristics, and the need to econo-
mize on the costs of obtaining information may lead employers to
substitute these indexes for other, more expensive but more accu-
rate data on productivity. Arrow's statistical discrimination
model illustrates how discrimination may occur in this setting,
and produces occupational segregation if wages are not flexible. 30
The signaling model put forth by Spence shows that use of indexes
to estimate future productivity can lead to segregation, and that
segregation gives rise to a situation where an employer's beliefs
about productivity for race-sex groups are never challenged by ob-
o d . 0 31
servat10ns on actual pro uct~V1ty.
In the following pages we will consider the crowding and in-
formation theories of demand-based segregation. Empirical work
on these hypotheses has largely sought to explain racial discri-
mination, however, and it will be necessary to develop additional
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tests for sex segregation in order to assess the usefulness of
these demand-centered neoclassical models.
Tastes for Discrimination and Occupational Segregation
Becker's analysis of the economic consequences of prejudice
proceeded along several lines, only one of which is relevant to
the question of occupational segregatio~ as most forms of dis-
criminatory behavior in the Becker model produce wage differen-
tials rather than segregated workforces. In its simplest form,
the Becker analysis predicts segregation by sex if male employees
who are perfectly substitutable for women derive disutility from
working alongside women and must be compensated for this loss of
32
utility by an increase in the male wage. Production in this mode
is assumed to take place in a one-sector economy characterized by
perfectly competitive firms operating under constant returns to
scale in the long run. In short-run equilibrium, no firm would
employ both men and women since minimum cost will be found at
either of the segregated extremes. Equilibrium is thus charac-
terized by completely segregated workforces. Since each worker
earns the value of his or her marginal product, and since workers
are assumed to be perfect substitutes, men and women earn equal
wages and production is efficient. The intuitive appeal of this
model is severely dampened by its inability to account for simul-
taneous wage differentials and segregation, so we will now turn
to more sophisticated versions of the model.
Concerned that the Becker model rules out the very combina-
tions of wage and job disparities which characterize the position
of disadvantaged groups in the labor market, Arrow shows
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that the segregated extreme may not be cost-minimizing in a dy-
namic sense if firms incur costs of adjusting the composition of
their workforces. 33 Arrow demonstrates that a short-run equili-
brium might thus encompass both segregated and integrated firms,
with concomitant wage differentials.
The argument hinges strongly on a complete flexibility
of the firm with regard to its labor force; it must be
prepared to fire its entire labor force and replace it
by one of the opposite color~e~if this act will lower
its costs. Suppose we assume instead that there is a
capital cost associated with the addition of a worker
to the labor force. (The capital costs may be hiring
costs, training, or more subtle kinds of organizational
adjustment.)34
Assume that all firms have identical production functions and
make a personnel investment in a new worker equal to r. If we be-
gin from a situation in which there are no women in the labor
force, and both men and women enter subsequently, firms which plan
a total labor force comprised of M men and W women minimize total
cost as given in equations (15) or (16):
(15)
(16)
where:
If M is greater than the original labor force L :
a
TC = C(M,W) + r(M + W - Lo }
If M is less than the original labor force L :o
TC = C(M,W) + rW
C(M,W) is a concave function of M for fixed L = M + W.
For those firms choosing to hire more male labor, costs will be
minimized by hiring only male labor, and for those firms who choose
less male labor, costs are minimized at either of the segregated
extremes, so that three configurations are possible:
85
(17) (SW) M = 0, W = L
(18)
( 19)
(1)
(SM)
M = L , W = L - L
o 0
M = L, W = 0
However, integrated firms must thus incur the wage differential
required by male labor if it is to work with female labor. We
can therefore write total costs as the sum of wage payments, com-
pensations for disutility and hiring costs. Let v(M/L) be the
difference between male and female wages which occurs if the pro-
portion of men in the labor force is (MIL). Total costs for each
configuration are then given by the following expressions:
(20)
(21)
(22 )
(SW) (w + r)L
w
(1) (w + r)L + [v (LolL) - r]Lw 0
(SM) [w (1) + r]L- rL
m 0
Profits in each case are given by subtracting costs from the value
of production, feLl, since capital is assumed fixed and we can
normalize the price of output. The magnitudes of labor hired in
each situation can be derived from the first order conditions for
profit - maximization:
(23)
(24)
(25)
(SW) f I (L) (w + r) = 0
w
(I) f I (L) (w + r) - L dV (L ILVaL = 0
w o 0
(SM) f I (L) - [w (1) + r] = 0m
Each firm hires labor until the value of the marginal product just
equals the marginal cost, which can include hiring and compensa-
tion costs as well as the wage. Subtracting (23) from (24), and
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(23) from (25) permits a comparison of the marginal product in
these configurations:
(26 )
(27)
f' (L ) - f I (L )I SW
f' (LSM) - f' (LSW)
= L dv(L /L)/dL
o 0
= v (1)
The sign of dV(Lo/L)/dL is positive,35 which implies that LI is
less than LSW . By the same reasoning, we can infer that LSM will
be less than L if vel) is greater than zero. In other words,
sw
only segregated male firms are hiring men, which therefore requires
that those firms be as profitable as firms which are hiring women.
Manipulation of the profit expressions reveals the conditions undel
which different types of firms prevail in short-run equilibrium.
For the equilibrium to be characterized by equally profitable SW
and 8M firms with I firms which are no more profitable than SW
firms, employee discrimination must exceed an adjusted version of
personnel investment costs:
(28) WM(Lo/LSW) - WM(l) > r - TISM(LSM ) - TI SM (LSW )
1 - (Lo/LSW) Lsw - Lo
The other possible equilibrium position is one in which female
firms and integrated firms are equally profitable while male firms
are no more profitable than integrated firms. This will occur
when employee discrimination is less than adjusted investment
costs:
(29 ) r -
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Under the condition stated in (28), employee discrimination
is so pronounced that compensatory payments would exceed capital
costs and the large-scale adjustment in workforce composition
predicted by Becker's simple model is indeed profit-maximizing
for the firm. On the other hand, if (29_) obtains, complete seg-
regation would be too costly, and there will exist both integrated
and segregated firms in equilibrium. The model as adjusted by
Arrow is, of course, more in harmony with the observed patterns
of occupational segregation.
Arrow also demonstrates that the model can be manipulated to
produce simultaneous segregation and wage differentials. Depend-
ing on the relationship between the degree of employee discrimina-
tion and a firm's personnel costs, some firms will remain segre-
gated, some may switch to female workers and others will employ
both men and women. Even if the equilibrium consists of totally
segregated firms, those firms which have replaced their male
workforces with women will pay the women less than they were pay-
ing men, and less than men are earning in the segregated male
firms since wages to new workers will be equal to the marginal
product less the personnel investment. The existence of hiring
costs results in wage differentials since firms hiring women must
offset these costs by earning a return on these new workers.
Arrow points out that these conditions constitute "a very
special case," and it is not clear whether they can account for
the particular pattern of occupational segregation and wage dif-
ferentials which prevails among men and women. For one thing,
the Arrow model explains why competition would not completely
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eliminate discriminatory phenomena, but it does predict that some
narrowing of wage and occupational distributions should be ex-
pected over time. In addition, Arrow notes that all theories
which "invoke a dislike of association,,,36 group together degrees
of dislike and differing types of association which might best be
separated analytically. This is all the more true in the case of
sex discrimination than in the case of racial discrimination, sinc
men and women do not live in separate societies and certain asso-
ciations in the workplace provoke more distaste than others.
Nonetheless, the employee discrimination model does generate
some predictions which can be measured against the weight of em-
pirical evidence. First, the model predicts that those men work-
ing in integrated establishments should earn more than men working
in segregated firms. Secondly, the model predicts that wage dif-
ferentials should be more prevalent in monopolistic industries
since those firms would be sheltered by market power and the
resultant monopoly profits from the competitive pressures which
would tend to attenuate discrimination.
Although establishment data are difficult to obtain, there
is evidence that wage differentials between men and women are
actually lower in integrated establishments than in the labor
market taken as a whole. In a 1967 study of eleven narrow occu-
pational classifications in 84 metropolitan areas, McNulty found:
The occupational wage advantages for men were usually
much smaller among establishments employing both sexes
in the same job than among all establishments, includ-
ing those employing men or women only in an occupation ...
in establishments employing both sexes in an occupation,
men class A accounting clerks earned 12 percent more
than women, compared with 19 percent in all establish-
ments. The corresponding figures for elevator operators
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were 14 percent in establishments emp10yi~g both sexes
in an occupation and 44 percent in all establishments ...
In nearly all instances, occupational earnings for men
were about the same among establishments employing both
sexes as among those employing men only. In contrast,
occupational averages for women were consistently higher
among establishments employing both men and women in the
same job than in establishments employing women only. 37
In the study cited earlier, Blau found that for narrowly defined
occupations in selected urban centers wage differentials were
lower when men and women worked side-by-side than the differentiall
prevailing between firms which employed segregated workforces in
those occupations. 38 McNulty's occupations included eight office
jobs and 3 plant jobs while Blau confined herself to clerical oc-
cupations. Since occupations were defined very narrowly in both
studies, the absence of data on the actual productivity of the
individuals within those occupations is unlikely to introduce
substantial error. A more serious problem is introduced by the
possibility that integrated and segregated establishments differ
systematically in ways other than the composition of their work-
forces. For instance, segregated male establishments might be
characterized by internal labor markets, or might be more presti-
gious and thus entitled to "first pick" of the labor queue. In
this case, a comparison of male/female differentials within inte-
grated establishments to the over all male/female wage differentia
would not be an appropriate test of the employee discrimination
hypothesis.
A more broadly-based test of the second hypothesis, that
monopoly power and discrimination should be positively related
since discrimination is not profit-maximizing for the firm, can
be found in Oster's analysis of inter-industry wage and employment
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differences by sex and broad occupational categories. 39 She,
too, finds no support for the utility maximizing hypothesis.
Since that hypothesis predicts wage differentials but no segre-
gation, we will not treat her results in depth here. It is in-
teresting, however, that she chose to employ relative numbers of
women employed in an industry in a given occupations as the de-
pendent variable ina regression to be explained by market power,
growth and regional factors. Although the strict form of the
model would require testing for inter-industry differences in
wages, Oster was unable to find wage differentials by industry,
and chose employment patterns on the following rationale:
Industries that discriminate a lot by paying women low
wages are less likely to discriminate in the number of
women hired. The bias probably works to support the
Becker hypothesis. Large concentrated firms are more
likely to have standardized wage scales, and so on, that
make it more difficult to wage discriminate and force
the firm instead to quantity discriminate. 40
While it is not clear that she is testing the employer discrimina-
tion hypothesis with this dependent variable, she does not find
that the market power coefficients are significant. However, we
question these results since the employer discrimination which
should lead to quantity discrimination is not necessarily related
to market power on the firm's part. In addition, her sample in-
eludes only professional workers and the implications of restrict-
ing the sample in that manner are not clear.
Oster also presents a revision of the Arrow-Becker model of
employee discrimination which is based on the more realistic as-
sumption that male workers derive disutility from situations in
which women are on a par with or superior to them in the work
hierarchy, rather than simply deriving disutility from all contact
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with female workers. This model generates both wage differentials
and segregation and is stable in long-run equilibrium since it is
based on profit-maximizing behavior by the firm. Assume that
there are two complementary types of jobs: type 2 jobs from which
women are generally excluded, and type 1 jobs which can be held
41by either sex. Male workers in type 2 jobs are biased against
women in type I jobs, and have utility functions of the form:
( 30) U2 = U2 (W2 ,S)
where: S = LI1/LI2
Lil = number of female -type 1 workers
Ll2 = number of male type 1 workers
WII = wage of female type 1 workers
Wl2 = wage of male type I workers
W2 = wage of type 2 workers
At constant utility levels, we can trace out a tradeoff between
wages and sex composition for type 2 workers:
Since men and women are perfect substitutes in type I jobs by
assumption, the short-run production function and profit function
can be written:
( 32)
(33)
where: Q = output and TI = profit
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Profit maximization yields the following conditions, and women
are paid less than their marginal product, type 2 labor is paid
the value of its marginal product, and men are paid more than
their marginal product in type 1 jobs.
(34) aQ/aLll - Wil - L2 aW2/dLll = 0
(35) d Q/dLl2 - W12 - L2 dW2/dLl2 = 0
(36) aQ/aL2 - W2 = 0
In short-run equilibrium, homonogeneity of degree zero in the
wage/sex composition tradeoff of type 2 labor insures that the
following is true:
Combining equation (37) with the profit maximization conditions
yields a proof that profits of the firm are unchanged by the dis-
crimination as long as the optimal quantities of labor hired are
also unchanged. In the long run, however, this result depends
critically on the assumption of inelastic supplies of labor:
If this were not the case, as it certainly is not, the
discriminatory wage change would induce a change in the
proportions of men and women hired; in general, depend-
ing upon the relative supply elasticities of men and
women workers, profit would change as a result of the
discrimination. Therefore, unless either all type 2
labor has the same taste for discrimination, or labor
supplies are perfectly inelastic, this model does not
lead to a stable situation, since firms would have an in-
centive to increase profits by hiring low-bias type 2
labor. 42
In the long run, allowing for an infinitely elastic supply
of labor to each firm at a wage equal to the marginal product
produces three paths for the firm, depending on the nature and
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extent of type 2 labor's discriminatory preferences. If type 2
labor is sensitive to the proportions of male to female type 1
labor, there will be no wage discrimination but there will be
some segregation (the standard Becker result). If type 2 labor
exhibits an absolute preference for male type 1 labor over female
type 1 labor, no women will be hired. Finally, firms with un-
biased type 2 labor will hire men and women in nondiscriminatory
proportions without a wage differential. Although Oster does not
develop a specific empirical test of the model, she examines the
occupations in her sample for evidence that segregation is more
pronounced for "job clusters" within a firm which involve sub-
stantial contact across occupations.
Any industry that requires a large portion of its en-
gineers, for example, to interact with customers, is
likely to have a disproportionately large number of male
engineers. Not only will its sales engineers be male,
but also will other engineers (who do not work with the
public and hence need not be male on this criterion) be
predominately male. This in turn, is likely to produce
excess discrimination against women designers. As we
move away from engineers in terms of status (i.e., to
draftsmen), the effect diminishes. If positions within
a firm are independent of each other, the discrimination
in one should not be reflected in the other. 43
Although her study did not specify the interactions between occu-
pations, Blau' s finding that there is considerable inter-estab-
lishment segregation is certainly supportive of the Oster hypo-
thesis. 44 However, as Oster points out, establishment data rather
than industry-wide aggregates will be required for a rigorous test
of her version of the Becker employee discrimination hypothesis.
The Becker model does not specifically treat the question
of occupation segregation, suggesting instead that there will be
segregation across firms. Bergmann adapts the framework of
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discriminatory tastes to the specific problem of occupational
segregation in an extension of the crowding model. 45 Although
the "overcrowding hypothesis" was first stated by an early femi-
nist, Millicent Fawcett, in the 1918 Economic Journal,o Edgeworth
formalized in the model in 1922 and is generally credited with
its formulation. 46 According to Fawcett, " ... if demand for a
particular class of labour is either destroyed or very much re-
stricted, a 'downward pull' on wages is called into existence for
the whole class.,,47 It is, incidentally, interesting to note
that Fawcett foresaw many of the explanations which have been
presented here for women's status in the labor market. For example
she comments accurately, if unknowingly, on the low human capital
of many women workers:
War experience ... has stiffened the conviction of many
feminists that a large proportion of supposed feminine
disadvantages exists more in imagination than in reality.
That a woman in the textile trade was paid at a lower
rate than a man for the same work has, for instance, been
accounted for, time out of mind, by saying that a woman
was incapable of "tuning" or "setting" her machine. Very
few of those who used this formula took the trouble to
explain that women were never given the opportunity of
learning how to tune or set a machine. It was looked
upon as a law of nature that a man could set a machine
and that a woman could not. 48
The Bergmann hypothesis is that occupational segregation and
wage differentials can be profit-maximizing for discriminating
employers who are averse to hiring members of a particular group
in certain occupations. 49 This moves the model one step closer
to reality, and like Oster's version, allows for varying degrees
of discrimination across occupations to influence the distribution
of races and sexes across different jobs. The degree of employer
discrimination within a particular occupation can be measured by
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the amount of profits which an employer will be willing to sac-
rifice in order to avoid hiring women, an amount equal to the
wage gap between male and female workers assumed to be perfectly
substitutable in production. This payment which the employer will
be willing to make in order to indulge his discriminatory tastes
is called the "crucial differential." One would thus expect
segregation between occupations wherever the value of the crucial
differential is greater than the difference in marginal producti-
vity which would be gained by moving a worker out of the "over-
crowded" occupation into the other occupation. Crowding causes
the marginal productivity of labor to be lower in the crowded oc-
cupation and thus brings about wage differentials in a perfectly
competitive labor market where all workers are paid the value of
their marginal products. Following Bergmann, let us define two
occupations, menial and prestige, and their crucial differentials,
d
m
and d p ' respectively. If equation (38) holds, there will be
segregation of male and female workers in the two occupations:
(38) d
m
~ (prestige marginal productivity) - (menial
marginal productivity) < d
- P
Bergmann generalizes the model informally:
In the real world of more than two occupations, there are
many occupations which are quite rigidly restricted to one
race-sex group, but there will generally be more than one
integrated occupation in a typical local labor market.
Some occupations will have identical crucial differen-
tials attached to them. Another reason for the multipli-
cation of integrated occupations is that educational and
training differences among workers and differing produc-
tion processes among employers make for a series of labor
markets rather than a single market in which everybody is
a substitute for everyone else in every respect but race
and sex. Of course, a factor which cuts the other way is
that workers may be forced out of the market for which they
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are fitted by education and into a market which includes
workers of a lower educational level. 50
She also recognizes that attempts to verify the hypothesis are
critically sensitive to the definition of occupation:
Measuring the degree of occupational segregation is
fraught with difficulties. When we leave the theore-
tical realm of the simple two-occupation model, the
slippery and inexact nature of the concept of "occupa-
tion" begins to give trouble. The measured degree of
segregation we find empirically will obviously depend
on how we group jobs into occupations and establishments
irito labor markets. 51
A careful attempt to examine crowding outside the two-occupation
model has been made by Stevenson, and later we will turn to an
examination of her evidence. First, however, it is important to
note that the Bergmann model does not explain occupational segre-
gation, but rather points to its implications. Blau and Jusenius
argue that the perfectly competitive employer taste model is in-
adequate to the task of explaining the strength or stability of
the observed occupational distribution.
It is not clear why so many employers would have such
tastes against women in certain occupations, nor is it
clear why employers' aversion should be so 'strong' that
they are not compensated for their disutility by the
prevailing male-female pay differential. However, in the
Bergmann model, complete occupational segregation depends
upon a highly skewed distribution of employer tastes.
Furthermore, it is not obvious that the case of perfect
substitutability between men and women in the production
process is general enough to shed light on the whole
pattern of occupational segregation. 52
Casual examination of the jobs which women do suggest that
the unanimity of employer tastes criticized by Blau and Jusenius
might actually be present in the united States since women's jobs
are characterized by traits which are related to their roles as
wives and mothers (teaching, waitressing and nursing, for example)
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These roles are perceived as appropriate by both men and women,
and thus might affect the type of occupation into which women are
hired and the type of occupation for which women present them-
selves. We would argue, therefore, that a "skewed" distribution
of employer tastes might be expected in a society characterized
by fairly rigid sex roles, and that employers would mirror the
conventional wisdom in a manner that would tend to narrow the
dispersion of crucial differentials.
The assumption of perfect substitutability need not restrict
the model unduly, however, since the theory predicts segregation
within groups of workers who substitutable. Defining these groups
is critical to a test of the model and Stevenson develops a cri-
terion called "occlevel" which permits stratification of the
kf 'h' 53 ,.wor orce 1n t 1S manner. Stevenson categor1zes occupat1ons
by the amount of general educational development (GED) and speci-
fic vocational preparation (SVP) deemed necessary by the Departmen1
of Labor to perform the job adequately, and then aggregates occu-
pations into 17 distinct occlevels. She then examines two aspects
of segregation predicted by the crowding model: first, crowding
will result in lower wages for the discriminated-against group
wherever substitutable workers are segregated; and second, as
Bergmann suggests, the discriminated-against workers may be forced
into occupations for which they are overly qualified. This would
result in higher levels of education but lower pay for women than
for men within occlevels. Stevenson also tests for crowding with-
in occlevels in an effort to determine to what extent the wage
gap within an occlevel is related to the relatively fewer number oj
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occupations held by women than by men in each occlevel. The
hypotheses are tested against the 1967 Survey of Economic Oppor-
tunity sample, and the tests suffer from the deficiencies of
that data set, as will be outlined below.
When computing mean education and wage levels by race and
sex within occlevels, Stevenson finds that "men and women in
the same occlevel do not have the same education level, and that
even when women were more highly educated, they received lower
54pay than men." However, it is difficult to assess the strength
of this finding since so few productivity factors are controlled
for in the study. Stevenson herself points out that the "major
shortcoming" of the data set is the lack of information on years
of experience. Thus, it is possible that a portion of the wage
gap within each occlevel is attributable to differences in ex-
perience and on-the-job training. It is our opinion that this
represents a shortcoming so major as to cast considerable doubt
on the findings, but a similar study by Jusenius which does cor-
rect for actual years of experience provides indirect corrobora-
tion of the crowding model. 55
Jusenius does not employ the occlevel stratification pro-
posed by Stevenson, but rather divides her sample into occupations
characterized by low, medium and high levels of specific vocationa]
preparation through the use of Chow tests. She then estimates
wage equations for each skill group. The explanatory variables
are of the standard types, including education, experience, train-
ing, race, health, region and union membership, with the exception
of a dummy variable which represents the occupation's sex label.
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Since no standard method of categorizing occupations in this
fashion exists, Jusenius adopts the proportion of the labor
force which was female in 1970 as a base line, and labels occu-
pations which are 43.1 percent or more female as typically female
(the labor force proportion of 38.1 plus 5 percent), anyoccupa-
tion with 33.1 percent women as atypical (38.l minus 5 percent)
and the remainder as mixed. Individuals in the mixed occupations
are excluded from the sample.
The sex-label dummy variable is included in order to investi-
gate alternative explanations for the wage gap between women in
female occupations and women in male occupations:
To show that women in typically female jobs earn less
than women in typically male jobs may mean only that
women tend to be concentrated in low-skill occupations
which might be expected to pay lower wages. Moreover,
to the extent that this is the case, it could also be
argued that the presence of women in these low-skill
occupations reflects simply their actual or expected
interruptions in employment. On the other hand, such
an explanation would not be consistent with a finding
that typically female occupations pay lower wages than
typically male occupations within skill categories.
Thus it becomes essential to control for skill level of
occupation in examining the effect on earnings of being
in "female" as opposed to "male" occupations. 56
As shown in Table 11-7, Jusenius found that the sex label
exerts a "downward pull" on wages independent of an individual's
training, education and tenure on the job in both low and medium
skill groups: "All other things being equal, a woman in a typi-
cally female occupation (such as chambermaid) earned almost 20
percent less than her counterpart in a typically male occupation
{such as janitor).,,57 Among women in high-skill occupations,
variance in wages does not appear to be related to the sex-label
, of the occupations. The results therefore support both explanatiol
Table II~7
Regressions Relating 1972 Average Hourly Earnings to Human Capital Variables,
Sex-Type of Occupation, and Control Variables for Women In the LOW, INTERMEDIATE,
and HIGH SKILL Categories
(1) LCM SKI~ (2) MEDIUM SKILL (3) HIGH SKI~
Variable
Regression t-ratio Regression t-ratio Regression t-ratio
coefficient coefficient coefficient
EDUCATION 0.'018 2.34** 0.026 3. 92** 0.064 9.15**
EVER TRAIN 0.092 2.51-*--- 0.067 2.44** 0.140 3.09*-*"
TENURE 0.011 2.64** 0.008 3.47** 0.008 3.15**
YEARS WORKED -0.003 -0.94 0.010 5.13** 0.009 3.62-**
WEEKS WORKED 0.001 2.55** 0.002 5.06** 0.002 2.89**-
FEMOCC -0.196 - 3.66** -0.095 -3.00** 0.015 0.36
SKILL 3 0.013 0.37 a a a a
SKILL 5 a a 0.100 3.65** a a
SKILL 7 a a a a 0.133 3.57-)(-*
SKILL 8 a a a a 0.256 3.49**
Control variables:
BlACK -0.044 -0.95 -0.045 -1.03 -0.115 -2.36**
BAD HEALTH -0.146 -2.80** 0.035 0.85 -0.724 -1.37
PRIVArfE -0.160
-3.39** -0.076 -2.49** ·0.002 0.07
sourr:H
-0.113 -2.57** -0.09~ -2.02 * -0.050 -1.i~9
SIZE 0.00003 1.66* 0.00006 5.59-** 0.00005 3.89**
PARrr-TIME -0.155
- 3.92** -0.039 -1.16 -0.103 -2.39**
COLBAR 0.21+9 5.71** 0.101 3.48** 0.159 3. 91-*"-*
CONSTANT 5.204 44.33** 4.801 47.85** 4.277 28.81**
- 2 0.419 ,.0. 362 08 476R
F-ratio 16.69 20.93 30.69
Nwnbe r of s amp Ie cases 305 492 491
* Significant at Q ~ .05, I-tail test.
** Significant at Q ~ .01, I-tail test.
a Variable does not apply to this regression.
~
o
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for the typically low wages in female occupations: women are
found in occupations which do not reward human capital invest-
ments as highly as do male occupations and, in addition, among
occupations requiring similar levels of skill, those occupations
in which women constitute a disproportionate share of employment
pay lower wages than do male jobs. This second finding is cer-
tainly consistent with the crowding model. A further test of
the crowding hypothesis could draw upon Jusenius' methodology,
since the crowding model al'so predicts that men in female occu-
pations will receive lower wages than they could earn in male
occupations of similar skill requirements.
Information Theories of the Labor Market and Occupational Segregat
All the models which we have considered thus far share the
common assumption that actors in the labor market are perfectly
informed. The perfectly competitive human capital and crowding
models presume that hiring and search activities take place in
the presence of full and accurate information. Beginning with
Stigler's pioneering 1962 paper, theorists have turned their at-
tention to the effect of uncertainty on labor market transactions
d 'l'b' 58an equ1 1 r1um.
Employees are not perfectly informed as to the nature of many
job characteristics, including wages and working conditions, and
the job search process can be considered a search for full infor-
mation on the distribution of job characteristics offered in the
market. The search literature which models this process will not
be reviewed here as we will describe the theories which portray
occupational segregation as the outcome of uncertainty on the
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part of employers. Since employers usually cannot observe the
productivity of a job applicant before hiring has taken place,
they will attempt to predict productivity on the basis of the
observable attributes presented by a job applicant. Even appli-
cants of equal actual productivity might thus be treated unequally
in the labor market if an employer believes them to have unequal
productivity. Wage or employment discrimination can arise in
this context and may persist in the absence of perfect informa-
tion, giving rise to stable discriminatory equilibria.
We will consider two models of employer uncertainty which
can give rise to occupational segregation: Arrow's model in
which training costs produce a penalty for employers who fail to
estimate productivity accurately and Spence's signaling model in
which employees signal their potential productivity to firms. 59
While other authors such as Phelps, Cain and Aigner have shown
how wage discrimination can come about in the presence of uncer-
tainty, segregation is the predicted outcome only in the Arrow
and Spence models. 60
Arrow has developed a simple but elegant model of the rela-
tionship between uncertainty and discriminatory equilibria in
the labor market. The model produces discrimination if three
conditions hold: 6l
1. There is a personnel investment cost incurred by
the employer;
2. Productivity is not observable beforehand;
3. The employer believes that men and women are not
equally qualified for the job.
The first two conditions impose a penalty for errors in predict-
ing a worker's productivity. If hiring were costless, a firm coule
simply hire any workers and discharge those who proved unqualified
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The third condition can arise as a result of simple prejudice or
as "a problem in perception. ,,62 By this Arrow means that an em-
ployer may not actually dislike women, but may instead simply
believe that they are inferior workers. It is clear that only
wage differentials will persuade the employer to hire women if
this is the case. The question which arises, then, is why em-
ployers do not revise their subjective probabilities in this case.
If discrimination is based on erroneous information, the passage
of time should result in learning and discrimination should dis-
appear in the long run. Another way of looking at the long-run
equilibrium foreshadows the signaling model which will be dis-
cussed next. Suppose that a worker is considered qualified if
slhe has made a human capital investment but that this investment
is not readily observable by the employer and that there are
costs to acquiring human capital. In this case, women workers
will tend to invest less in human capital and an employer's sub-
jective beliefs will be confirmed over the long run.
Let us distinguish two types of workers, skilled and un-
skilled, where skilled workers corne to the firm with human capital
and are given additional training by the firm. A worker who comes
to the firm with human capital is considered qualified, and an
employer believes the probability of a woman's being qualified is
P
w
while a man is qualified with probability Pm· For the moment,
assume that P and P accurately reflect the proportions of quali-
m w
fied men and women, respectively. In order to hire both men and
women in skilled jobs an employer will wish to earn an equal return
on his human capital investment in skilled workers of both sexes:
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(39) r = (f
s
- w }P = (f - w }P
sw w s sm m
where: Wsw and wsm are wages for female and male skilled
labor, respectively, and
f s is the marginal physical product of skilled labor.
If Pw is less than Pm there will be wage discrimination in skilled
jobs. Occupational segregation enters the model in incidental
terms:
If for reasons of social pressure or administrative con-
venience, it is not easy to maintain an adequate dif-
ferential between Iw w] and [w ], [women] will be excluded
from [skilled occupa~~ons].63 sm
Three sources of wage rigidities suggest themselves in this
context. First, the passage of equal pay for equal work provi-
sions might result in occupational segregation in this model as
long as employers hold differing assessments of male and female
productivity. Secondly, the presence of a collective bargaining
agreement which sets wages for both men and women will certainly
prevent the maintenance of an "adequate differential." While it
is true that fewer women are found in occupations which are highly
organized than in the service and clerical occupations, it may be
that employee barriers to entry which are based on prejudice have
excluded women rather than a combination of employer uncertainty
and wage rigidity. Finally, the presence of an internal labor
market where wages are administratively fixed will restrict an
employer's ability to wage discriminate, causing segregation when
combined with the type of information gap treated by Arrow.
Such information-generated segregation is likely to be stable
since employers will not revise their probabilistic assessments if
105
they have little information on female productivity in certain
jobs which would contradict their prior beliefs. This failure
of the market to generate substantial evidence which would cause
an employer to revise earlier beliefs is also present in the next
model which we discuss, the signaling model. That model is a
more complete specification than Arrow's model since the signal-
ing model describes the response of job candidates to employer
uncertainty.
The simple model presented by Arrow does generate some em-
pirical predictions. First, the model predicts that women will
be excluded from occupations in which an employer must provide
specific vocation preparation, and would thus be penalized for
an incorrect occupational assignment. In addition, women will
continue to be excluded from occupations in which an employer has
no new information on their productivity. Finally, the model
predicts segregation when wage discrimination is not feasible.
Since the model predicts that exclusion from particular
occupations will persist over time, it is interesting to specu-
late on the original exclusion of women after which the market
will generate no evidence that women might be as productive as
men. It is not surprising that the operative jobs held by women
are job which derive from their roles in the home: sewers,
spinners, meat wrappers and prduce graders, for example. Women's
productivity in the home might have suggested to employers that
they would continue to be productive if the workplace moved from
the home to the factory. Perhaps the occupational distribution
lags behind the division of labor in the home.
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Another model of the labor market in which imperfect in-
formation can lead to a discriminatory outcome is Spence's sig-
naling model. 64 In this model, uncertainty produces a
search for information which will sharpen an employer's probabi-
listic assessment of the productivity of a job applicant. Sig-
naling is the activity through which this information is trans-
mitted by the applicant and interpreted by the employer. The
information upon which an employer bases his probabilistic beliefs
can be divided into two types, signals and indices. A signal is
an observable, alterable characteristic such as education or
certification. An unalterable characteristic such as race or sex
is known as an index and need not necessarily be correlated with
productivity. Job applicants can thus invest in signals at a
cost which is assumed to vary inversely with potential productivity
The model predicts that private and social returns to education
diverge, and that there may be overinvestment in education as
applicants try to signal their productivity to employers.
Equilibrium in the signaling market is defined as a situation
in which an employer's beliefs about the relationship between sig-
nals, indices and productivity are confirmed by the result of his
hiring in the market. In this context, there can be multiple
configurations which lead to equilibria. One curious aspect of
these equilibria is that they are not robust in the usual sense:
displacement from one equilibrium position may result in a move
to another, entirely different equilibrium rather than in a re-
" 65 h' , t d b't'turn to the original pos1t10n. T 1S 1n ro uces an ar 1 rar1-
ness into the equilibria which lends itself to discriminatory
outcomes.
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The interaction between indices and signaling activities has
the effect of separating groups according to indices; if employers I
conditional probability assessments depend upon sex as well as
upon education, men and women participate in different signaling
markets and wage offers to the two groups can diverge:
To see this, let us step back to the simple education
signaling model. There are externalities in that model.
One person's signaling strategy or decision affects the
market data obtained by the employer, which in turn
affects the employer's conditional probabilities. These
determine the wages offered to various levels of educa-
tion, and hence 0- •• rates of return on education for the
next group in the job market ... lf, at some point in time,
blacks and whites are not investing in education in the
same ways, then the returns to education for blacks and
whites will,be different in the next round.66
Discrimination can result since the two groups arrive at indepen-
dent equilibria and there is no logical reason for the two equi-
libria to be the same. Thus, even if men and women were equally
productive, they might receive different wage offers in a one-
market context: '
... the interaction of signals and indices creates the
possibility of arbitrary differences in the equilibrium
signaling configurations of two or more distinct groups.
Some of them may be at a disadvantage relative to others.
Subsets of one may be at a disadvantage relative to com-
parable subsets of the others. Since the mechanism which
generates the equilibrium is a feedback loop, one might ..•
wish to refer to the situation of the disadvantaged group
as a vicious cycle, albeit an informationally based one.
Alternatively, one can refer to the situation of the dis-
advantaged group as a lower-level equilibrium trap, which
conveys the notions of a situation that, once achieved,
persists for reasons that are endogenous to the model. 67
Although different equilibria can occur for two groups without
prejudice on the part of employers and without differences in sig-
naling costs for the two groups, these two factors will tend to
exacerbate the tendency to settle into differing configurations.
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If men and women have differential signaling costs, and employers
fail to make compensatory adjustments, women will offer lower
signals. On the other hand, if signaling costs are the same,
but employers interpret them differently (i.e., employers believe
that a given level of education implies a higher level of com-
petence for men than for women) discrimination can also occur.
In a one-market model, the lower level equilibrium trap results,
characterized by the disadvantaged group producing a lower level
of the signals and thereby receiving lower wages, despite their
equal productivities.
It is in the multimarket setting, however, that occupational
segregation arises:
For in the multimarket setting, it is possible that em-
ployer expectations will be such as to cause entire groups
to self-select themselves out of some markets. When this
happens, employer's beliefs go unchallenged by market
experience and, hence, unaltered. The effect is a per-
sistent occupational or job separation with an informa-
tional underpinning.
Some of these gross differences have a satisfactory ex-
planation in a microeconomic theory with prejudice in-
cluded. To these it is worth adding the possibility of
persistent expectational biases. The analysis suggests
there can occur both within markets and across them.
There is no reason to expect these mechanisms to be
mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they may complement
each other.
But they are not the same thing. One way to see this is
to ask what kinds of changes can be effected and how the
dynamics of change would look. Inforrnationally based
job segregation will collapse when the informational
system is jarred. The informational barriers are real
but fragile. Once the pattern of exclusion is broken,
employers' market experienc~change, and one might ex-
pect a rather rapid "tipping" phenomenon as the system
moves quickly to a new equilibrium. On the other hand,
barriers based on prejudice are unlikely to disintegrate
so rapidly.68
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We are not familiar with any empirical tests of the signal-
ing model. The suggestion that information-based occupational
segregation will disappear rapidly if correct information is
generated in the market does provide one means for comparing this
model to other models which are based on more permanent discri-
minatory preferences. It is interesting to note in this regard
that the forced occupational integration which took place during
World War II was reversed in the 1950's; despite evidence that
women could perform as well as men in many traditionally male
occupations, the return to civilian life implied a return to the
home for ~any women. This does not by itself cast doubt on the
existence of information gaps since women's general labor force
participation declined after the war. Thus, it is difficult to
infer which occupations might have continued to employ women
after the war if their previous exclusion of women had been based
on information rather than prejudice.
Nonetheless, the extreme stability of the occupational dis-
tribution which was documented in the first essay suggests that
employer-employee prejudice or labor supply considerations must
remain prominent in any effort to understand occupational segre-
gation. Very few occupations have "tipped," and many occupations,
particularly those in the skilled crafts, have resisted integra-
tion for decades.
II. Institutional Models of the Labor Market
Thus far we have examined neoclassical models of the labor
market in which the price system performs its allocative func-
tion, distributing workers among occupations and industries in
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response to shifts in demand and supply which are translated
through wage movements. The problem of occupational segregation,
however, can be viewed as a situation in which quantities, rather
than prices, perform the necessary adjustments to shocks which
disturb labor market equilibrium. It is difficult to incorporate
such quantity adjustments into the neoclassical model without
recourse to ad hoc explanations for wage rigidity, as are sum-
moned by Arrow, or a unanimity of preferences which rules out
the possibility that less-discriminating producers would prevail
in the long run.
With the exception of human capital theory, neoclassical
models treat occupational segregation as an anomalous allocative
mechanism which generally results from a failure of wage and
price mechanisms.
Other models of the labor market have been developed, how-
ever, which do not treat institutional rigidity as an anomaly but
rather as part of the intrinsic structure of the labor market.
These models have a long history in labor economics, beginning
with the theory of noncompeting groups and reaching the fullest
modern exposition in Doeringer and Piore's work on the internal
labor market. 69 One application of this model has been in the
work of dual labor market theorists, who divide the labor market
into two segments, one characterized by the rigid job and wage
hierarchies implied by an internal labor market model of the firm,
and another which corresponds more closely to the competitive model,
In this section, we examine the implications of the internal labor
market analysis for male/female occupational assignment, discuss
the usefulness of the dual labor market approach and conclude with
III
an examination of the only empirical work of which we are aware
in which the internal labor market model serves as the framework
for a study of discrimination by sex in the labor market.
Two variants of the segmented labor market theory can be
distinguished: the theory of internal labor markets and the dual
labor market taxonomy. Although some authors treat the two as
equivalent, it is our contention that they are distinct and that
internal labor market theory provides a sharper lens with which
to focus on occupational segregation. In the words of one of its
authors:
•.• the internal labor market, is an administrative unit,
such as a manufacturing plant, within which the pricing
and allocation of labor is governed by a set of adminis-
trative rules and procedures. The internal labor market,
governed by administrative rules, is to be distinguished
from the external labor market of conventional economic
theory where pricing, allocating and training decisions
are controlled directly by economic variables. These
two markets are interconnected, however, and movement
between them occurs at certain job classifications which
constitute ports of entry and exit to and from the in-
ternal labor market. The remainder of the jobs within
the internal market are filled by the promotion or trans-
fer of workers who have already gained entry.70
Dual labor market theorists divide the labor market into a primary
sector characterized by "good" jobs and a secondary sector, where
jobs are not secure, where little training is provided by the
employer, where wages and promotion possibilities are meager and
where working conditions are unpleasant. The primary sector is
generally considered to be a sector in which administrative rules
govern wage determination, entry and promotion, while the alloca-
tion of labor within the secondary market conforms more closely to
the "bourse" notion of the competitive model. Although it is
tempting and analytically simple to conclude that sex segregation
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occurs along primary/secondary lines, women are found in the
primary sector and men in the secondary sector~ As Blau and
Jusenius point out,
It is likely that a higher proportion of women than men
are in secondary jobs, and the dual labor market analysis
is useful in understanding the causes and consequences
of this distinction~ However, this approach does not
explain the further sex segregation which certainly exists
in each sector. Nor does it do justice to the range of
characteristics of predominantly female jobs, that is,
the differentiation which occurs within the female sector.
Further, in contrast to the internal labor market model,
it is not helpful in elucidating the differenti~l treat-
ment accorded to women and men within the primary sector,
that is, within reasonably highly developed internal
labor markets. 7l
Unfortunately, no clear-cut standard for identifying jobs
as primary or secondary exists, although dual labor market theo-
rists can readily classify any given job on the basis of certain
characteristics. The only empirical tests of the hypothesis
must therefore rely on a subjective classification scheme which
follows the outlines set out by Piore:
The primary market offers jobs which possess several of
the following traits: high wages, good working condi-
tions, employment stability and job security, equity and
due process in the administration of work rules, and
chances for advancement. The ... secondary market has jobs
which, relative to those in the primary sector, are de-
cidedly less attractive. They tend to involve low wages,
poor working conditions, considerable variability in em-
ployment, harsh and often arbitrary discipline, little
opportunity to advance. 72
One of the few attempts to test for the operation of two dis-
tinct labor markets is Paul Osterman's study of earnings functions
in occupations which he designates as primary and secondary~ Al-
though we share Cain's belief that truncation bias will inevitably
cause earnings functions to appear significantly different in the
two sectors,73 we list selected occupations classified by
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Osterman in Table II-S, along with the percentage female in
each occupation. 74 In the absence of a standard classification
scheme, we adopt Osterman's and show that men and women are
found in each sector, but are segregated within sectors. In
addition, many of the traditionally female occupations are lo-
cated in the primary sector. The dual labor market distinction
would thus appear to be more useful in the study of racial dis-
crimination than in the study of sex discrimination, since racial
segregation between sectors is quite pronounced. The notion of
an internal labor market, however, does afford some insight into
the mechanisms through which occupational segregation are ac-
complished.
Doeringer and Piore identify three factors which generate
internal labor markets: skill specificity, on-the-job training
and customary law. Skill specificity requires that the employer
bear a large portion of training costs and ties the employee to
the firm so that stability and continuity of employment become
crucial to both employer and employee. The informal learning-by-
osmosis in the workplace also impels a firm to organize job
hierarchies so that promotion from within becomes more common
than recruitment of outsiders. Finally, the stability of inter-
nal labor markets and the perpetuation of shared, unwritten rules
of the workplace go hand in hand.
Each of the three factors illuminates the particular posi-
tion of women in the labor market, and raises issues which we
have encountered before, in our treatment of the neoclassical
approaches to occupational segregation. First, the continuity
of employment which is desirable from both the firm's and the
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Table 11-8
Female Share of Total Employment in 1970 in Occupations
Categorized by Osterman According to Dual Labor Market Theory
Upper Tier of the Primary Sector
Accountants
Architects
Chemists
College professors & instructors
Decorators
Economists
Lawyers & judges
Physicians & surgeons
Lower Tier of the Primary Sector
Advertising agents
Airplane mechanics
Assemblers
Bakers
Bank tellers
Bill collectors
Bookkeepers
Bus & street car conductors
Carpenters
Cashiers
Demonstrators
Dieticians
Dressmakers
Electricians
File clerks
Firemen
Hairdressers
Librarians
Machinists
Mail carriers
Metal molders
Nurses
Painters
Pharmacists
Policemen
Public relations
Religious workers
Secretaries
Stock clerks & storekeepers
Surveyors
Tailors
Textile spinners
30.1
5.8
14.4
33.8
70.4
22.9
9.4
11.3
35.4
3.0
52.1
48.4
91.5
57.7
90.7
2.6
1.0
87.1
94.8
92.9
87.4
0.8
85.7
0.5
89.1
84.5
3.1
11.7
13.0
97.0
5.2
16.9
5.9
40.5
14.8
99.2
31.2
2.4
31.1
66.2
Teachers, elementary
Tool & die makers
Truck drivers
Ticket agents
Typists
Vehicle dispatchers
Welders
Secondary Sector
Hospital attendants
Carpenters' helpers
Charwomen
Cooks
Gardeners
Guards, watchmen & doorkeepers
Garage workers, car washers
Housekeepers & stewards
Janitors
Laborers
Laundry operatives
Messengers & office boys
Newsboys
Office machine oper~tors
Shipping & receiving clerks
Telephone operators
Warehousemen
84.0
1.1
1.9
40.6
96.6
30.9
6.0
86.0
2.7
97.2
57.2
5.9
9.7
4.8
99.2
16.0
8.4
67.8
28.7
29.0
74.2
22.8
94.2
4.2
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worker's point of view has historically been unusual in women's
lifecycle participation patterns. If firms anticipate intermit-
tant labor force participation by women, they will be reluctant
to place women in jobs requiring anything other than general
skills. Thus, women are unlikely to gain entry positions into
internal labor markets, and if they do enter, are unlikely to be
found in jobs which lead to greater supervisory or managerial
responsibilities. Firms will not risk the loss of training costs
incurred if a woman were to quit halfway up the job ladder.
Thus, presence of internal labor markets will tend to cause sex
segregation between jobs requiring mainly general skills and jobs
requiring substantial specific skills. The human capital hypo-
thesis tested by Polachek and Landes is linked to the internal
labor market theory in the importance devoted to specific human
capital, although the neoclassical approach places the importance
on the supply side of the labor market, while internal labor
market theory, drawing on the concept of statistical discrimina-
tion, traces occupational assignment on the demand side back to
specific human capital investment. While both theories recognize
feedback mechanisms operating on the other side of the market,
they differ in the emphasis placed on occupational choice and
occupational assignment.
The importance of on-the-job training raises the possibility
of a phenomenon closely related to the employee discrimination
of the Becker model. Here we can link the internal labor market
to "tastes for discrimination." Suppose male (or female) incum-
bant employees refuse to train new workers of the opposite sex
adequately, or subtly withhold the kinds of information needed in
117
order to perform well. Three outcomes are possible: 1) if hired,
new employees will quit as a result of this hostile reception,
2) new employees will not learn quickly or well enough and will
be discharged, or 3) firms requiring continuity of experience will
refuse to mix the sex composition of the workforce. This raises
the question of the source and nature of incumbant workers' aver-
sion to training new workers. Popular wisdom has it that women
constitute a distraction (or, even worse, bring ill luck) in the
workplace, and some men are so convinced that women cannot do
certain jobs that they consider the amount of time spent training
a woman wasted. They may refuse to train new employees in order
to limit the supply of labor to that occupation, protecting their
monopoly rights to the job which are the result of skill speci-
ficity and their own on-the-job training. Whatever the motiva-
tion, it is clear that a firm characterized by internal labor
markets will avoid hiring women into jobs where their productivity
depends upon on-the-job training by discriminating fellow employees.
"Custom," a source of information which is both cheap and
shared by workers at all levels of employment, will also tend to
promote occupational segregation. The rapid growth in continuous
labor force participation by women since World War II is only now
dispelling the idea that women are secondary earners. Outdated
assumptions about women's proper role are so pervasive, inter-
woven into all social institutions such as marriage, schooling
and childrearing, that labor markets will only reflect changes in
these assumptions after a lag. Thus firms with internal labor
markets where production is organized according to "custom" are
unlikely to hire and promote women into men's jobs, those
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"customarily" held by men.
The internal labor market construct thus provides a rationale
for occupational segregation by sex. Its major drawback is the
lack of formality with which the theory has been developed; how-
ever, as Wachter points out, it constitutes " ... a rich and pro-
vocative set of loosely connected empirical hypotheses about labor
market behavior.,,75 Unfortunately, there have been few tests of
these hypotheses 76 and we are aware of only one empirical treat-
ment of sex discrimination in internal labor markets, the work
previously cited by Blau. 77
Blau concentrated on intraoccupational, establishment and
industry segregation, taking the distribution of men and women
across occupations as given. Although our focus is on interoccu-
pational segregation, her findings suggest that the internal labor
market framework provides insight into the origins and persistence
of interoccupational segregation as well. The model Blau presents
allows firms to exercise their hiring preferences within the con-
straints imposed by the presence of internal labor markets. The
most important constraints are:
1) Within firms, uniform wages are paid to workers in
each occupational category, with differentiation
occurring because of merit and seniority but not be-
cause of sex.
2) Wage relationships among occupational categories are
relatively rigid.
3) Firms are arranged hierarchically with respect to
their wage structures; any firm which pays high wages
in one occupational category will pay high wages in
all categories.
High-wage firms "purchase" greater selectivity by setting wages
above the market clearing level. Thus, they are able to screen
workers and utilize hiring standards as a tool through which to
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implement their preferences. Low-wage firms, on the other hand,
have less discretion in hiring. Blau assumes discriminatory pre-
ferences on the part of employers, although she allows for the
possibility of employee discrimination which then is translated
into discriminatory hiring patterns by the employer. Given the
hierarchy of wage structures, one would then expect to find re-
latively more male employees within an occupational category in
high-wage establishments than in low-wage establishments which
are limited in their ability to attract male workers:
While the preference for male labor is expected to be
fairly widespread, the ability to exercise this pre-
ference is not. In general, the higher-wage employers
will be freer to indulge whatever preferences they have
for hiring men, and we expect in general that they will
do so. (In addition, ... ,higher-wage firms are more
likely to invest heavily in their work forces and thus
to put a premium on job stability. This implies that
women are more likely to face statistical discrimination
on the part of these firms. Moreover, to the extent that
higher-wage firms are insulated from competitive forces
in their product markets, women are more likely to ex-
perience Becker-type discrimination on the part of such
firms ... after controlling for the occupational mix of
the establishment and thus the differing availability
of male labor among job categories, we expect that men
will comprise a higher proportion of the work force in
firms which pay higher wages to both men and women, while
women will be more highly represented in firms which pay
lower wages to workers of both sexes. 78
The model also predicts that within firms, there will be little
or no wage differential between men and women of equal seniority
in the same occupational category while substantial differences
will exist market-wide as a result of the differing pay scales
between firms which employ predominantly men and firms which em-
ploy relatively more women.
Despite the underlying similarities in employer preferences,
there are differences in the predictions of the internal labor
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market model and the Becker employer/employee discrimination
model. (Blau refers to the latter as a model of "unconstrained
employer preferences.") First, the Becker model does not pre-
dict intraoccupational wage differentials between women employed
in integrated firms and those employed in segregated firms. Blau
also argues that the Becker model predicts that "the wage d.if-
ferential between men and women employed in the same firm would
be roughly the same magnitude as the average market-wide sex
differential within the occupation."
The internal labor market model explains why competitive
pressures which would be expected to lessen discrimination have
not operated effectively. Since wage differentials and segrega-
tion patterns are more pronounced across industries than within
industries, mobility of capital and labor between industrie~which
is certainly less rapid than mobility within industries, might not
be sufficient to bring wages for men and women into equality.
The internal labor market model also differs from the Becker
model of employee discrimination in the nature of its predictions
for wage differentials. Discriminating employees in the Becker
sense require higher wages to work with members of the opposite
sex, and one will thus expect male workers in integrated work-
forces to earn more than men in all-male establishments. The
internal labor market model, on the other hand, suggests that
all-male establishments are likely to be high-wage firms, and that
men working with women will thus experience lower wages relative
to segregated male workers.
Blau's evidence, cited earlier, confirms her hypothesis that
establishment characteristics are the main source of male/female
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pay differentials within narrow occupational categories. That
substantial inter-establishment and inter-industry segregation
within occupations exists is established by comparing actual dis-
tributions of men and women workers to the results of a simulated
random hiring process. This exercise, cited in the first essay
as evidence of segregation within occupations, shows that hiring
patterns are not uniform across establishments, even for quite
narrowly-defined occupational categories.
Results for pay differentials between men and women across
firms indicate that in a majority of cases, pay differences were
more pronounced for segregated firms than for integrated firms.
Qualifying these findings, Blau notes that:
In the absence of direct information on the productivity-
related characteristics of workers, it is not possible
to argue that the interfirm effect on wages is entirely
due to the exclusion of women from the high-wage estab-
lishments. However, the consistency of the observed
relationships strongly suggests that the differential
distribution of men and women among establishments is of
great significance in explaining the sex differential
within occupational categories. 79
While Blau's study focuses on intraoccupational segregation,
the internal labor market model does provide a mechanism through
which the factors which cause discrimination in neoclassical models
result in occupational segregation. The internal labor market
model posits that employers cannot vary wages in response to a
dislike for women or in response to beliefs about relative male/
female productivity. Therefore, the initial hiring decision may
produce a discriminatory employment distribution in entry-level
jobs which will be perpetuated by the internal promotion ladders,
causing occupational segregation across jobs. The model thus in-
cludes the Becker-Arrow-Bergmann taste for discrimination as well
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as the Arrow-Spence statistical discrimination motives, and ex-
plains why wage differentials do not promote integration of oc-
cupations. Unfortunately, a precise test of the model must
await establishment-based data.
While we have concentrated only on those theories which
specifically predict occupational segregation, the presence of
an internal labor market increases the number of paths which lead
to this result. If wage relationships are governed by administra-
tive rules, and if the employer is not free to vary these rules,
any situation which might produce wage differentials in the neo-
classical world will tend to produce occupational segregation in
firms characterized by an internal labor market. Wages are
attached to occupations, not individuals, and an employer who
wishes to assign different wages to two equally qualified indivi-
duals must therefore place the individuals in two different jobs.
There is anecdotal evidence that a proliferation of job cate-
gories often occurs to permit employers to differentiate among
employees. (See, for example, descriptions of the job structure
at Bell Telephone.)80 While it does not explain the cause of
occupational segregation, the internal labor market model is thus
consistent with most of the hypotheses which have been advanced
for wage discrimination, and predicts that segregation will re-
sult along with wage differentials.
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Summary
In this ~ssay we have considered six theories of occu-
pational segregation put forward by economists. We have drawn
a distinction between two types of models: those drawing upon
traditional neoclassical assumptions of firm and worker behavior
and those which build on an institutional model of firm behavior.
Only the human capital model locates the source of the seg-
regation in the supply of labor. In the human capital model,
segregation is seen as the result of rational choice by workers
in the context of lifetime income maximization. Of all the theo-
ries considered, only the human capital model predicts the precise
pattern of occupational choice which should be observed if indivi-
duals do indeed maximize lifetime income given discontinuities in
their intended labor force participation.
Of the demand-based models, the crowding and employee dis-
crimination models invoke discriminatory preferences whose origins
lie outside the labor market, and then assess the consequences of
those preferences. In both models, the wage gap between men and
women arises as a consequence of segregation. In the crowding
framework, the larger supply of women workers to those occupations
in which they do not encounter barriers to entry depresses wages
relative to those of men. In models of employee discrimination,
wage gaps occur as long as costs of adjustment prevent the pure
segregation which would obviate wage differences.
Two other demand-based models, the model of employer per-
ception and the relating signaling model, show that the informa-
tional structure of the labor market can produce segregation.
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The employer perception model requires wage rigidities if seg-
regation is to occur, while the Spence model suggests that a wage
gap mayor may not occur, depending upon such factors as signal-
ing costs and the self-selection of some groups out of the market.
The final model considered, the internal labor market, pro-
duces segregation if employers wish to differentiate between
workers. A desire to differentiate can arise if employers are
prejudiced or if they statistically discriminate, but in both
cases employers must assign men and women to different jobs if
they intend to pay different wages.
The crowding model suggests that entry barriers will be
erected in prestige occupations (without specifying the nature
of those barriers) and the information models suggest that women
will be excluded from occupations in which an employer might lose
a personnel investment by assigning an unqualified worker to an
occupation. The information models thus predict that women will
be found in jobs in which there is little specific capital re-
quired or provided.
There are many areas of overlap between the models and many
of the models are, on the surface, consistent with the observed
patterns of the wage and job distribution between men and women.
It is most likely that several of these mechanisms interact in
each occupation to produce the sex-stereotyping across jobs which
is so pronounced in. the U.S. labor market. The following essay
investigates the wage patterns observed in a sample of men and
women for the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market Experi-
ence in order to determine whether any mechanisms predominate in
certain types of jobs.
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MECHANISMS OF OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION
Some Mechanisms of Occupational Segregation
In the preceding essays, we have examined the extent of oc-
cupational segregation and its stability over the past 40 years.
We have seen that women and men do different kinds of work and
that woreen are concentrated in occupations where wages are lower
than those paid in male occupations. We have employed factor
analysis to examine the characteristics of the occupations in
which men and women are found, learning that men's work tends to
be characterized by heavy physical and intellectual demands and
that women's work is more likely to involve working with people,
serving and interpreting ideas or feelings in terms of a personal
viewpoint. Economists have offered various explanations for this
division of labor between men and women, both in the horne and in the
marketplace; those explanations were described in an earlier essay.
In this essay we present the result of empirical tests de-
signed to explore the mechanisms of occupational segregation which
are operating in a sample of men and wo~en from the National
Longitudinal Survey. We hypothesize that different processes
are involved in occupational segregation at different skill levels
of occupations; for example, we believe that the mechanism under-
lying the concentration of women in teaching, a higher-skill oc-
cupation, is different from the mechanism responsible for the
concentration of women in lower-skill occupations such as file
clerks or chambermaids. While nothing would prevent the presence
of two or more of these mechanisms in the maintenance of occupa-
tional segregation at each skill level, it is possible that one
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or another mechanism dominates at a particular skill level. If
this were true, the task of policy-makers seeking to ensure free-
dom of occupational choice to men and women would be simplified,
since policies which were especially effective against a parti-
cular mechanism of segregation could be adopted. For example,
if the crowding model seemed most appropriate at a particular
skill level, one would attempt to dismantle barriers to entry such
as union gatekeeping. On the other hand, if the humari capital
model were most descriptive of the mechanism (i.e., if women were
unwilling to forego current earnings in a high-atrophy occupation)
one might wish to raise women's expectations of their intended
labor force participation and perhaps to subsidize their earnings
during the initial training period until women were established
in the occupation. If, however, employer uncertainty were the
problem, disseminating correct information to employers about the
turnover rate and qualifications of women would be the ~ost ef-
fective means of ensuring that women be hired in nontraditional
occupations.
In order to assist the task of policy formulation, we will
seek in the pages that follow to identify specific mechanisms of
occupational segregation in our sample. First, we examine the
predicted nature of segregation under each alternative hypothesis
in order to ascertain whether each theory is consistent with the
observed pattern of occupational distribution. We find, however,
that examination of the pattern of segregation is insufficient
to discriminate among the hypotheses, and turn next to regression
analysis of wages for men and women within skill levels and across
occupational sex-types. Each underlying model of segregation
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predicts particular wage patterns, and we infer the mechanism
of segregation from the particular wage pattern observed for a
sample of men and women workers in 1971 drawn from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market Experience. l In addition to
aggregate regressions, we perform separate regression analyses at
each level of specific vocational preparation for two reasons.
First, we believe that distinct mechanisms may be operating at
different skill levels,2 and, second, the discovery of distinct
mechanisms at different skill levels will facilitate the forrnu-
lation of "targeted" policies by simultaneously identifying the
mechanism and the target occupation.
We are particularly interested in assessing the relative
importance of supply-based and demand-based models of segregation
since these two mechanisms lead to very different policy measures.
As mentioned above, labor market policies are more effective
against demand-based occupational segregation, while supply-based
segregatiqn must be attacked before occupational choices are made.
In the conclusion to this essay, we propose policies which affect
both the supply of and demand of female labor; we are led to this
recommendation by the empirical results which follow. In general,
we discover that the effect of occupational sex-type on wages depends
upon the female share of total employment. The larger the female
share, the more consistent is the observed pattern of wages with
demand-based models of occupational segregation.
Predicted Patterns of Occupational Segregation
The models which we have discussed yield some predictions
as to the exact nature of the occupational distribution of men
and women. The following pages will examine the evidence for
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these hypotheses, after a brief suromary of the nature of the
predictions.
The supply-based human capital model, which predicts that
occupational choice will be affected by lifetime participation~
is the most explicit model of the occupational distribution, pre-
dicting a concentration of women who anticipate discontinuities
in lifetime participation in those occupations which will not
penalize intermittency. The human capital model therefore pre-
dicts that women will be found in occupations with relatively
flat wage-participation profiles, which Polachek characterizes
as low "atrophy" occupations. 3
Of the demand-based models, the information models suggest
that women will not be found in occupations in which the employer
must undertake a substantial personnel investment and in which
there is also some uncertainty about women's ability to perform
4
well. This uncertainty would only be dispelled by female parti-
cipation in those occupations, so the information models also
suggest that tipping phenomena should be present and should be
fairly rapid when they occur. In addition, these models predict
that the occupational distribution should vary with labor market
tightness, with women making inroads into male occupations during
periods of strong labor demand maintaining their position in those
occupations during subsequent slack labor markets.
The crowding model offers no actual prediction as to the
nature of occupational segregation. 5 Although Bergmann suggests
that a disadvantaged group might be excluded from"prestige" occu-
pations, that characterization of the model is not necessary for
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the conclusions. On the other hand, the Arrow version of the
employee discrimination model does depend upon a personnel in-
vestment by the employer which renders complete segregation im-
practical, and thus predicts segregation in occupations where
men (or women) are averse to working with other women and where
employer investments are necessary for good performance on the
. b 6)0 • On this basis, we would expect a low concentration of
women in supervisory positions where specific vocational.pre-
paration is high.
In summary, (see Table III-I), the human capital model of-
fers the most explicit prediction, the Arrow employee discrimina-
tion model suggests some areas where segregation is to be expected
and the information models predict certain patterns of segregation
over time. The crowding model offers no explicit predictions, and
is, therefore, consistent with any pattern of occupational assign-
ment for men and women.
Occupational Dissimilarity by Marital Status: A Test of the
Human Capital Model
An examination of the occupational distributions of single
and married women sheds some light on the relationship between
discontinuities in labor force participation and occupational
choice. Marital status affects labor force participation of women
much more strongly than it affects male participation rates, as
would be expected since women generally have greater horee respon-
sibilities. Table III~compares post-school participation for
married and single women in the National Longitudinal Survey,
demonstrating that single women aged 30-44 have more work experiencE
than married women of those ages. The human capital reodel predicts
Model
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Table 111-1
Nature of Predicted Se~reqation
--------------_-.:...:=...::..::.::...=.--=-=- ~ -----
HUMA.~ CAPITAL
EMPLOYEE DISCRIMINATION
EMPLOYER UNCERTAINTY
SIGNALING
CRO~'7DING
INTEm~AL LABOR HARKET
v70men will be found in low "atrophy"
occupations because of their inter-
mittent labor force participation, men
in high atrophy occupations because of
their stronger attachnent to the labor
force. Differences a~ong women by
marital status are expected.
Segregation is predicted for those oc-
cupations in which employees discrimi-
nate; wage differentials will occur
along with segregation when employees
discriminate but personnel investment
costs prevent employers from chanqing
the composition of the workforce.
There will be segregation whenever there
are personnel investment costs and un-
certainty concerning the ability of
workers of a given sex to perform a
·particular job. Tendencies toward seg-
regation will be exacerbated by wage
rigic.ities.
E~ployer discrimination and/or differen-
tial signaling costs can exclude groups
from any occupations in which hiring is
characterized by signaling activities.
No necessary prediction: instead, this
model demonstrates the effects of occu-
pational barriers to entry which are
erected as the result of employer pre-
judice. Bergmann suggests exclusion
from llprestige ll occupations.
Jcbs leading to positions on the internal
promotion ladder are likely to be male,
while "external ll jobs with few advance-
ment opportunities are likely to be femal
Table III-2
Average Proportion of Years Worked Since Leaving School for Women 30 to 44 Years Old
by Marital Status and Years of School Completed: 1967
Years of school completed Total Never Ever married, Ever married,
married no children with children
Total women, 30 to 44 ......... 52.7 90.3 79.0 46.6
Less than 4 years high school ...... 47.4 89.3 68.9 43.5
4 years high school ................ 53.4 87.1 81.3 47.5
1 to 3 years college ............... 55.6 91.9 88.0 46.7
4 or more years college ............ 66.8 95.0 88.2 56.3
Note: Number of years since leaving school in which woman worked at least 6 months as a
proportion of the total years elapsed since leaving school.
Source: 1967 National Longitudinal Survey of Work Experience.
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that this difference will be reflected in their respective occu-
pational distributions, or, more formally, that greater hometime
lowers the probability of participating in a "high atrophy" oc-
cupation. In this section, we investigate differences in the
distribution of men, single (never married) and married women.
Since single women are, on average, younger than married
women, it is necessary to investigate differences in the occu-
pational distributions within age groups. Single women might be
concentrated in entry-level jobs, while married women might have
advanced up the occupational ladder , purely as the result of age
differences rather than marital status differences. Table 111-3
illustrates the nature of the distribution across broad occupa-
tional categories of men, married and single women in each
of 5 age groups. We have calculated indices of dissimilarity for
each age group and between each pair of distributions, and these
indices are presented in Table 111-4. An index of 47.8 for the
single female-male comparison in the 14-24 age group means that
47.8 percent of workers in that age group would have to change
occupations in order for single females to be distributed across
jobs in the same manner as males. By contrast, only 12.2 percent
of the workforce need change jobs in order for single females to
be distributed like married females. (The workforce in each com-
parison refers to the total number of workers in the two marital
status/sex categories being compared.)
The indices show that the single female distribution across
broad occupational groups resembles the married female distribu-
tion much more closely than it resembles the male distribution,
for all age groups. In addition, the distributions are relatively
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Table III-3
Occupational Distribution by Marital Status and Age, 1970
14 - 24
Occupation
Professional, technical &
kindred
Managers & administrators,
except farm
Sales workers
Clerical & kindred workers
Craftsmen & kindred
Operatives, except transport
Transport equipment
operatives
Laborers, except farm
Farmers & farm managers
Farm laborers & foremen
Service workers, except
private household
Private household workers
Occupation
Professional, technical &
kindred
Managers & administrators,
except farm
Sales workers
Clerical & kindred workers
Craftsmen & kindred
Operatives, except transport
Transport equipment
operatives
Laborers, except farm
Farmers & farm managers
Farm laborers & foremen
Service workers, except
private household
Private household workers
Male
.097
.033
.082
.104
.145
.175
.053
.138
.007
.037
.126
.001
t-lale
.199
.098
.067
.072
.219
.141
.063
.052
.016
.012
.059
.000
Single
Female
.110
.010
.093
.442
.009
.071
.002
.012
.001
.007
.200
.043
Single
Female
.311
.031
.031
.346
.016
.100
.003
.008
.001
.005
.116
.033
Married
Female
Spouse
Present
.159
.014
.053
.467
.012
.131
.002
.008
.001
.004
.136
.014
25 - 34
Married
Female
Spouse
Present
.209
.025
.056
.357
.016
.151
.007
.009
.001
.006
.144
.019
Other
Female
Widowed
& Divorced
.098
.025
.052
.403
.034
.141
.008
.019
.002
.004
.193
.020
Other
Female
Widowed
& Divorced
.146
.041
.043
.380
.029
.140
.008
.011
.002
.003
.175
.023
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35 - 44
Married Other
Female Female
Spouse ~vidowed
Occupation Male Female Present & Divorced
Professional, techincal &
kindred ~168 .251 .159 .141
Managers & administrators,
except farm .136 .052 .037 .053
Sales workers .067 .037 .074 .051
Clerical & kindred workers .063 .340 .341 .331
Craftsmen & kindred .232 .019 .019 .029
Operatives, except transport .121 .124 .164 .151
Transport equipment
operatives .065 .003 .008 .006
Laborers, except farm .049 .009 .010 .010
Farmers & farm managers . 025 .003 .002 .002
Farm laborers & foremen .011 .005 .007 .004
Service workers, except
private household .061 .105 .156 .183
Private household workers .000 .052 .023 .040
45 - 54
Married Other
Female Female
Spouse Widowed
Occupation Male Female Present & Divorced
Professional, technical &
kindred .129 .217 .138 .122
Managers & administrators
except farm .143 .059 .050 .054
Sales workers .068 .040 .092 .069
Clerical & kindred workers .071 .355 .324 .300
Craftsmen & kindred .237 .022 .020 .025
Operatives, except transport .126 .139 .163 .158
Transport equipment
operatives .060 .002 .005 .004
Laborers, except farm .050 .009 .009 .010
Parmers & farm managers .035 .004 .003 .004
Farm laborers & foremen .012 .004 .006 .003
Service workers, except
private household .068 .098 .162 .189
Private household workers .001 .052 .029 .063
Occupation
Professional, technical &
kindred
Managers & administrators,
except farm
Sales workers
Clerical & kindred workers
Craftsmen & kindred
Operatives, except transport
Transport equipment
operatives
Laborers, except farm
Farmers & farm managers
Farm laborers & foremen
Service workers, except
private household
Private household workers
Male
.102
.134
.069
.070
.224
.128
.053
.058
.050
.017
.095
.001
Female
.243
.063
.050
.313
.018
.128
.002
.007
.005
.003
.104
.063
55 - 64
Married
Female
Spouse
Present
.156
.056
.104
.266
.020
.150
.003
.009
.005
.007
.175
.048
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Other
Female
Widowed
& Divorced
.124
.054
.085
.258
.021
.146
.003
.009
.004
.003
.202
.091
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Table III-4
Indices of Occupational Dissimilarity
Between Single Women, Men and Married Women
Age Group
Index of Dissimilarity
Between Males and
Never-Married Females
Index of Dissimilarity
Between Never-Married
Females and
Harried Females
14-24 47.7 14.1
25-34 47.5 12.2
35-44 45.8 13.7
45-54 46.6 14.5
55-64 45.6 15.6
65+ 44.6 16.4
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invariant with respect to age. This invariance may be the re-
sult of two opposing tendencies: an experience effect and a
cohort effect. The experience effect would tend to place older
women of either marital status in jobs which more closely re-
semble male jobs, but the cohort effect would cause older women
to be found in more traditionally female jobs. Legislative
barriers to entry into male occupations (such as state protective
legislation) have only recently been dismantled, and younger
workers might be freer from stereotypical notions of appropriate
work for women, bringing about this cohort effect. In addition,
younger women who expect to marry eventually may take jobs which
are similar to those in which married women are found, while men
who expect to be in the labor force continually regardless of
their marital status choose jobs with opportunities for advance-
ment. Women who do not marry are thus denied access to promotion
ladders because of their initial occupational choices even if
those initial occupations prove less than optimal in light of
continuous labor force participation.
This very limited evidence, along with the relative stabi-
lity of the overall distribution in the face of a secular increase
in participation, suggest that the lifetime participation model
of occupational choice does not shed much light on the nature of
the mechanism which generates the sexual occupational distribution.
However, it may be that the aggregate distribution disguises dif-
ferences among women which affect occupational choice, and we
turn next to regression analysis which enables us to hold constant
various factors which determine a woman's occupational status.
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The human capital model allows the level of education and
the length of the planning horizon to affect occupational choice,
and the concept of occupational "atrophy" developed by Polachek
formalizes the notion that the effect of discontinuity will vary
by occupation and by the level of human capital which has been
accumulated by the individual. We utilize this notion of atrophy
in our next test of the human capital model of the occupational
distribution, in which we see whether the degree of atrophy in
an occupation is related to the female share of employment in
that occupation. We define atrophy as the wage loss attributable
to a period of discontinuity in participation and follow Polachek's
7procedure.
Polachek's estimates of atrophy are derived from a human
capital earnings equation of the form:
(1)
where:
In (hourly earnings) = a + a Educ + a Horne + a Expos + £
o 1 2 3
Educ = years of schooling;
Home
Expos
= years of nonparticipation in the labor force
since leaving school full-time;
= years of exposure to the labor force, defined
as (Age - Educ - 6)8
The equation was also run using hometime as a percentage of total
exposure to the labor force (Homep). The atrophy estimates (a in
2
the first form of the equation, and a in the form using Hornep)
2
are equal to the percentage decline in earnings accompanying an in-
crease in hometime in each of the 5 broadly defined occupational
categories employed in the analysis. Polachek reports the corre-
lation between these atrophy estimates and the hometime coefficient
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in his logit equations as evidence that high atrophy reduces the
probability of entering an occupation for individual women. If
we accept this hypothesis, it follows that there would be a nega-
tive relationship between the atrophy rate in an occupation and
the female share of employment in that occupation at the agqregate
level. That is, if the probability of being in a particular oc-
cupation is low for an individual, then summing across individuals
would yield a prediction which is related to the logit model but
which can be tested with simpler techniques. Assuming that women
have less continuous labor force participation over the life-cycle
than men (an assumption which is true on a cross-section basis,
but which will be less appropriate in the future), the female
share of employment in an occupation would be negatively corre-
lated with the atrophy rate.
In order to test this logical extension of the Polachek
model, we run equation (1) above at the aggregate and at a de-
tailed occupational level using data on women aged 34 to 48 in
91971 from the National Longitudinal Survey. The atrophy esti-
mates were derived using only data for women. Since the NLS data
set which we employ surveys women in mid-career and pre-retirement
men, it was felt that the large discrepancy in age might lead to
biased estimates of the effect on nonparticipation on earnings.
The older men were likely to have experienced discontinuities in
participation for health reasons, while the women were more likely
to have left the labor force to raise children, and thus return
to the labor market in good health. In addition, since the survey
was collected before employers were required to grant maternity
leaves, it is more likely that the men were covered under employment
· 1.44
contracts which guaranteed that they could return to work in the
same position and at the same earnings level. Thus, while com-
bining the two samples would have increased the degrees of free-
dom and would have permitted us to gain atrophy estimates for
a broader group of occupations, it was considered inappropriate.
The atrophy estimates resulting from the estimation of both
forms of equation (1) for aggregate and detailed occupations are
presented in Table III-5 and III-6; the detailed occupations in-
eluded are those for which enough observations existed to permit
estimation of the equations. Next, we obtained the correlations
between these atrophy estimates and the female share of employ-
ment in each occupational group. The employment data were found
by matching the 1960 occupational classifications to 1970 Census
categories using the conversion tables supplied by the Bureau of
the census. 10
Table III-5
Atrophy Estimates for Broad Occupation Groups
Occupation Home Coefficient Percentage Home Coefficient
Professional -0.012* (.004) -0.256* (.086)
Managerial -0.036* (.008) -0.843* (.206)
Clerical-Sales -0.019* (.002) -0.455* (.047)
Operatives -0.004 (.003) -0.135* (.066)
Unskilled +0.001 (.003) +0.005 (.068)
*Significant at the .05 level; standard errors in parentheses.
Table 111-6
"Atrophy" Estimates by Occupation
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Occupation
Accountant & auditors
Librarians
Nurses, professional
Social workers, except group
Teachers, elementary schools
Teachers, secondary schools
Technicians, medical & dental
Managers, officials &
proprietors, n.e.c.
Bank tellers
Bookkeepers
Cashiers
Office machine operators
Receptionists
Secretaries
Telephone operators
Typists
Clerical & kindred, n.e.c.
Sales clerks, n.e.c.
Foremen, n.e.c.
Assemblers
Bus drivers
Checkers & examiners,
I manufacturing
Laundry & dry cleaning operators
Packers & wrappers, n.e.c.
Sewers & stitchers, manufacturing
Operatives & kindred, n.e.c.
Babysitters, private household
Private household, n.e.c.
Attendants, hospital
Chambermaids & maids
Charwomen & cleaners
Cooks, except private household
Housekeepers, except private
Kitchen workers, except private
Practical nurses
Waitresses
Farm laborers, wage workers
Hometime
Coefficient
+0.121*(.009}
-0.006 (.018)
+0.004 (.006)
-0.010 (.035)
+0.022*(.008)
+0.004 (.016)
+0.006 (.014)
+0.039*(.010)
+0.022 (.014)
+0.012 (.008)
+0.026*(.012)
+0.004 (.011)
+0.022*(.117}
+0.017*(.004)
+0.018*(.007}
+0.027*(.007}
+0.022*(.004)
+0.012*(.005)
+0.020 (.022)
+0.014*(.007)
-0.007 (.012)
+0.011 (.008)
+0.078 (.007)
-0.002 (.010)
+0.019*(.006)
+0.001 (.004)
-0.135*(.029)
-0.005 (.005)
+0.002 (.004)
-0.001 (.009)
+0.005 (.009)
-0.002 (.005)
+0.037*(.013)
-0.005 (.005)
+0.021*(.010)
+0.007 (.011)
+0.002 (.021)
Percentage
Hometime
Coefficient
+0.494*(.239)
-0.108 (.107)
+0.181 (.142)
-0.214 (.857)
+0.384*(.162)
+0.098 (.308)
+0.110 (.311)
+0.942*(.252}
+0.577 (.331)
+0.299 (.186)
+0.685*(.270)
+0.127 (.231)
+0.462*(.269)
+0.413* (.087)
+0.422*(.168)
+0.584*(.175)
+0.488*(.093}
+0.340*(.125)
+0.445 (.259)
+0.404*(.176}
-0.154 (.307)
+0.253 (.188)
+0.181 (.171)
+0.063 (.246)
+0.506*(.148)
+0.066 (.099)
-3.339*(.906)
-0.138 (.143)
+0.058 (.112)
-0.024 (.262)
+0.077 (.209)
-0.021 (.133)
+0.984*(.311}
-0.073 (.142)
+0.477*(.234)
+0.132 (.267)
+0.184 (.537)
.*Significant at the .05 level, one-tai·led test.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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The resultant correlations are presented in Table III-7.
The signs at both the aggregate and the detailed level are con-
sistent with the theory: the higher the atrophy rate in an occu-
pation (the earnings penalty for discontinuities in participation)
the lower the female share of employment. Notice that the re-
suIting correlations appear stronger for the aggregates than for
the detailed groupings. However, none of the correlations are
significant at the .05 level and we are unable to reject the
hypothesis that atrophy and the female share of employment are
uncorrelated across occupations. This suggests that we must look
further than interoccupational differences in atrophy as defined
by this method in order to explain interoccupational differences
in female employment.
Table 111-7
Correlations Between Atrophy Estimates and
Female Employment Shares
A. Broad Occupational Groupings (n = 5)
Corr (Home, Fshr) = +.37
(.27)
Corr (Homep, Fshr) = +.37
(.27)
B. Detailed Occupational Groupings (n = 37)
Corr (Home, Fshr) = +.16
(.17)
Corr (Homep, Fshr) = .17
(.16)
c. Detailed Occupational Groupings for Which the Hometime Co-
efficient is Significantly Different from Zero at the .05
Level (n = IS)
Corr (Home, Fshr) = +.27
(.16)
Corr (Homep, Fshr) = +.28
(.15)
Significance levels in parentheses.
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Finally, while the data are consistent with the distribu-
tion of women across occupations, it is not correct to infer
from this correlation that it has resulted from the exercise of
choice. Women may be found in low atrophy occupations because
they have performed a lifetime maximization experiment and dis-
covered that lifetime earnings are highest in low atrophy occupa-
tions or because they have been assigned to those occupations by
employers who are reluctant to risk a personnel investment on
women. Statistical discrimination could thus contribute to plac-
ing women in low atrophy occupations. Even though an individual
woman may have a stronger-than-average attachment to the labor
force, she may be assigned to a low atrophy occupation by an
employer who assumes that her intended lifetime participation will
be discontinuous.
Specific Capital and the Distribution of Men and Women Across
Occupations
Many theories predict that women are not as likely as men
to be found in occupations where specific human capital is re-
quired and for which specific training is necessary. Following
Becker, we define specific training here as training which raises
a worker's marginal product in one firm more than in another. ll
Becker has demonstrated that the gains to general human capital
are not appropriable by an individual employer, and that the bur-
den of financing this type of human capital falls upon the worker,
but that specific training costs are usually shared between the
employer and the employee:
The shares of each depend on the relations between quit
rates and wages, layoff rates and profits and •.. the cost 12
of funds, attitudes toward risk and desires for liquidity.
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To the extent that women's labor force experience is likely
to be discontinuous, and to the extent that firms believe that
female labor face attachment is weaker than that of men, we would
expect to find a concentration of women in occupations with low
specific capital requirements. Our proxy for the specific capi-
tal concept introduced by Becker is specific vocational prepara-
tion, defined by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles as:
The amount of time required to learn the techniques, ac-
quire information and develop the facility needed for
average performance in a specific job-worker situation.
This training may be acquired in a school, work or a vo-
cational environment ... Specific vocational training in-
cludes training given in any of the following circumstances:
(a) Vocational education .
(b) Apprentice training .
(c) In-plant training (training given by employer in
form of organized classroom study).
(d) On-the-job training (serving as learner or trainee
on the job under instruction of qualified worker) .
(e) Essential experience in other jobs (serving in less
responsible jobs which lead to the higher grade job
or serving in other jobs which qualify ... ) .13
Specific vocational preparation (SVP) is to be distinguished from
general educational development (GED) "which does not have a re-
o • 0 1 bOO ,,14
cognized, fairly spec~f~c occupat~ona 0 Ject~ve.
In order to examine the distribution of men and women over
SVP levels, we followed Jusenius in the construction of SVP levels
o 1 0 1 15from the Dictionary of Occupat~ona T~t es. The six-digit oc-
cupations in the DOT were classified into 1960 three-digit Census
categories using conversion tables published by the Department
of Labor. Next, the modal SVP code among the six-digit occupa-
tions comprising each three-digit category was designated the
skill level for that three-digit group. A list of occupations
and their SVP codes in presented in Appendix A, and the percentage
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distribution of men and women in the 1970 experienced civilian
labor force is presented in Table 111-8.
Table 111-8
Percent Distribution of Men and Women Workers in the
Experienced Civilian Labor Force, 1970
Level of Specific Vocational Preparation
Short demonstration of less than 30 days
Thirty days to less than 3 months
Three months to less than 6 months
Six months to less than 1 year
One year to less than 2 years
Two years to less than 4 years
Over 4 years
Total
Male
13.7%
12.8
10.1
13.6
5.9
36.9
7.0
100.0
Female
14.7%
12.8
16.3
18.3
18.1
17.5
2.3
100.0
Men and women appear in low skill categories (less than three
months of training) in roughly equal proportion. In the next three
skill levels, however, women are disproportionately represented:
approximately 53 percent of the experienced employed women are
found in jobs requiring from three months to two years of specific
training, while less than 30 percent of male workers are in these
categories. At the highest skill levels, however, this trend is
reversed, and greater proportions of men are found in jobs re-
quiring over two years of specific training. Thus, no easy con-
clusion can be drawn from this pattern, particularly since we do
not know in what proportion costs are shared in the low, medium
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and high skill groupings. In other words, an employer's aversion
to hiring a woman for an occupation which requires lengthy specific
training might be overcome if his portion of the costs were low and
he were able to pass on the greater share of costs to the employee.
We are not aware of studies of cost-sharing in specific training
which encompass sufficient occupations to enable us to generalize
about the distribution of men and women across training levels.
Stability of the Occupational Distribution
Segregation which occurs because employers do not have ade-
quate information about the ability of a given worker to perform
the job can be considered "informational" segregation. In Spence's
words, "Informationally based job segregation will collapse when
the informational system is jarred. The informational barriers
are real but fragile. Once the pattern of exclusion is broken,
employers' market experiences change, and one might expect a rather
rapid "tipping" phenomenon as the system moves quickly to a new
equilibrium. ,,16 Unfortunately, data on occupational distributions
of men and women are generally only collected in the decennial
census, so it is difficult to search for such tipping phenomena
on a systematic basis.
Two dramatic instances of occupational tipping have been in
secretarial work and elementary school teaching, both of which
began as male occupations but tipped toward female occupations
over a remarkably short time. The movement of women into these
occupations demonstrates the two factors which are often associated
with such tipping: a technological change in the occupation (the
introduction of the typewriter) and strong demand (the growth of
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the public school system). In neither case does it appear that in-
formational barriers were responsible either for the previous ex-
clusion of women or for their subsequent introduction to the job.
World War II provides a situation in which women moved into
a variety of male occupations. 17 Between 1941 and 1944, the female
labor force grew by 6.7 million. According to a 1957 report by the
National Manpower Council, approximately 3.7 million of those women
had been full-time homemakers in 1941, and of these, two out of
five entered nontraditional occupations: operatives, laborers,
craftsmen or foremen. Between 1940 and 1944, women in these occu-
pations increased 119 percent, women clerical workers increased 85
percent and women employed in agriculture increased 20 percent.
However, the end of the war saw a decline in female labor force
participation in nontraditional jobs. Many women had found employ-
ment in defense plants; with the collapse of war-related production,
these women left jobs as drill press operators, riveters, welders
and inspectors. Secondly, many special provisions had been made
during the war to facilitate the employment of women, such as
flexible shifts and day care centers. These special arrangements
were terminated at the war's end to honor a national commitment to
restore returning veterans to their jobs. Although the conditions
which precipitated women into traditional occupations were dramatic,
it is surprising that so few women remained in nontraditional occu-
pations. Table 111-9 shows the sex composition of employment in
three broad occupational groups from 1940 to 1970, illustrating
that very little permanent change took place as a result of the
influx of women into these occupations during the war years.
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(It is not clear from these data, of course, whether the women who
had left the nontraditional occupations by 1950 left in order to
return to the home full-time or to take up traditionally-female
market work.) We can infer from the composition of these occupa-
tions, however, that the inroads made by women during the war did
not bring about a significant change in the occupational distribu-
tion of men and women. This fact, combined with the relative
stability of the occupational distribution in the face of techno-
logical change and increased labor force participation by women,
suggests that the barriers to female employment in male occupations
are not informational, but instead reflect other supply-side or
demand-side forces.
Table III-9
The Composition of Employment in "Male" Occupations,
Pre- and Post-World War II
Women as a Percent of Total Employment
Occupational Group 1940 1950 1960 1970
Craftsmen, foremen & kindred 2.1% 3.1% 3.1% 5.0%
Operatives & kindred 24.8% 27.4% 28.7% 31.5%
Laborers, except farm 3.2% 3.6% 5.1% 8.4%
Source: 1940 Census of Population, Vol. I, p.48; Economic Report
of the President, January, 1973, pp.157-8.
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Predicted Patterns of Wage Differentials for Men and Women
It is apparent, then, that examination of the distribution of
men and women across occupations will not enable us to discriminate
among the various hypotheses advanced in the previous essay. We
therefore must turn in the following pages to an examination of the
wage patterns predicted by each of these theories to accompany oc-
cupational segregation of men and women. These patterns are sum-
marized in Table III-lO~ while many of the theories predict similar
patterns of wage differentiation, in some cases, the theories yield
contradictory predictions, and we will use these contradictions as
a lever to separate the various hypotheses.
Predicted Male-Female Differential in Integrated Occupations
The theories we have discussed make two predictions for male/
female pay differentials in integrated occupations: equality of
wages and higher wages for men. No theory predicts that women
will earn higher wages than men in integrated occupations. In what
follows, we are referring to wage differentials between workers of
similar skills and education, i.e., workers with the same qualifi-
cations for a given job. The comparison of wages is between laun-
dresses and janitors, for example, or between librarians and store
department heads.
A. Models Predicting Equality of Wages
The human capital model predicts that men and women will, in
general, choose to be in different occupations and will receive the
return on their human capital which characterizes each occupation.
~fuen men and women choose to be in the same occupation because
their intended labor force participation is the same, they should
Table 111-10
Predicted Wage Patterns for Male and Female
Workers of Similar skills and Qualifications
Male-Female Differential Male-Female Differential Segregated-Integrated
l-bdel in Integrated OCcupations in Segregated Occupations Differential for Each Sex
Human Capital HI = F MS > FS MI < M Fr > FSr S
Enployee Discrimination Mr > Fr MS = FS Mr > Ms Fr < FS
Eirployer Uncertainty M1 > Fr MS = FS 1'1 = MS F1 < FSr
Cro\tiling M1 = F1 MS > FS 1-11 < Ms Fr > FS
1ntemal Labor Market Mr = F1 r1s > FS M1 < 1'1S · Fr
> FS
(For the signaling model, the form of the prediction depends upon signaling costs and the extent
of exclusion. The model predicts tipping in occupational sex composition.)
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receive the same return and thus, the same wage. This implies that
in integrated occupations, sex should exert no effect on wages,
ceteris paribus.
The crowding model also predicts equality of wages in inte-
grated occupations; as in the human capital model, workers receive
the value of their marginal products. Wage differentials only
appear across jobs, since crowding lowers the marginal product of
those in the crowded occupations.
The internal labor market model involves institutional wage
rigidities, so men and women earn the same wage when they are em-
ployed in the same job. Firms differentiate between workers by
assigning them to different jobs (with resultant wage inequalities)
rather than by paying them different wages for the same job.
B. Models Predicting a Wage Differential
The employee discrimination model predicts that men in in-
tegrated occupations will earn more than women in those jobs be-
cause the men must be compensated for the loss of utility incurred
when they work with women. This model also predicts greater
intra-occupational variance in male earnings than female earnings
since men with different degrees of distaste for working with
women will receive different compensating changes in the wage.
The employer uncertainty model also predicts that men will
earn more than women in integrated occupations. An employer who
believes that women are, on average, less qualified than men will
only hire women if they earn a lower wage in an effort to equalize
the return on the employer's personnel investment. Where wage
rigidities prevent an employer from lowering the wage to women
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sufficiently to receive the necessary expected return, women will
be excluded from that occupation.
Predicted Male-Female Wage Differential in Segregated Occupations
The models predict one of two outcomes for the male-female
pay differential across segregated occupations: either men in
"male" occupations earn more than women in "female" occupations,
or there is a wage equality.
A. Models Predicting Wage Equality
Since integration generates compensating differentials for
discriminating male employees, when men and women work separately,
they earn the same wage in the employee discrimination model.
(Bear in mind that we are referring to workers with similar skills
and qualifications.)
The employer uncertainty model also predicts that the continued
employment of men and women in segregated occupations (where em-
ployers have less uncertainty about the productivity of a worker
of a given sex) will not generate the differential training costs
which lead to wage inequality. Thus, there is wage equality be-
tween men and women of similar skills employed in traditional
occupations.
B. Models Predicting a Wage Differential
The human capital model predicts that women, whose intended
labor force participation is lower than that of men, will be found
in occupations where little human capital is required and thus
little is depreciated. The model thus predicts that workers in
predominantly male, high-capital occupations will earn more than
workers in predominantly female, low-capital occupations. The
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wage differential between men and women across all occupations
follows from the occupational distribution: men in professional
and managerial occupations, women in clerical and sales occupations.
The crowding model also predicts that men in segregated occu-
pations earn more than women who are crowded into female occupations.
This occurs because the marginal productivity of women is lowered
by the crowding process, which produces a wage differential.
Finally, the internal labor market model also predicts that
men in segregated occupations will earn more than women in female
occupations. This follows from two aspects of internal labor mar-
kets. First, women's (actual or perceived) weaker attachment to
the labor force can cause them to be restricted to entry-level
positions and denied access to the higher-paying jobs on the pro-
motion ladder. Second, to the extent that firms characterized by
an internal labor market are representative of high-wage, "center"
firms rather than low-wage "peripheral" firms, internal jobs will
pay a higher wage. Women are thus likely to be found in firms
whose wages are lower than those paid by center firms.
Predicted Inter-Occupational Wage Differential for Each Sex
The theories generate a variety of predictions for the wage
differences associated with an occupation's sex-type. Three models
which predict identical results are presented first: human capital,
crowding and internal labor markets. The employer uncertainty and
employee discrimination generate unique predictions.
A. Similar Predictions
Three of the models predict that men in integrated occupations
will earn less than men in male occupations, while women in integrated
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occupations will earn more than women in female occupations. The
human capital model, which ranks occupations by the human capital
required to perform the jobs, predicts that the male occupations
will be those characterized by the" highest atrophy of human capi-
tal, and thus the highest market compensating wage differential.
Therefore, men in male occupations will receive higher wages
than men in the occupations characterized by less atrophy. Women,
on the other hand, will receive higher wages in integrated occu-
pations than in the female, low-atrophy and thus low-wage jobs.
The crowding model also predicts that wages will be lowest in
the crowded female occupations, higher in the integrated occupa-
tions, and highest in the restricted male occupations to which
the supply of labor is artifically low. This implies that men
in integrated occupations, forced to compete with women for those
jobs, will earn less than men in the privileged male jobs, while
women employed in integrated occupations will earn more than
those who are unable to escape from crowded occupations.
The internal labor market model predicts the same wage
pattern, since female jobs will offer little opportunity for
advancement and will be concentrated in low-wage establishments.
Integrated jobs represent improvement along both of these dimen-
sions, with male jobs affording the highest opportunity for
promotion, the most job security and the highest wages.
B. Models with Unique Predictions
The employee discrimination model is the only model which
predicts that men will earn more in integrated occupations than
in male occupations. This wage inequality occurs because men
who work with women earn a compensating differential which is not
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paid to men in segregated occupations. As long as there are men
who discriminate against women, the wage disparity can persist
in Arrow's modification of Becker's original model. The higher
wage paid to men who work with women is a transfer from women
in integrated occupations, who therefore earn less than women in
segregated occupations.
In the employer uncertainty model, men in integrated and
male occupations earn the same wage. However, women (who are
presumed to be newly introduced into integrated occupations) are
bearing higher training costs than women in traditional occupa-
tions, and a wage differential results from these costs.
Empirical Tests of Wage Predictions
In order to test these predictions for the effect on wages
of differing mechanisms of occupational segregation, we estimate
standard wage equations by race and sex groups. Two sets of
equations are estimated: regressions for the entire sample
stratified by race and sex, and regressions for whites only
stratified by the ievel of specific vocational preparation re-
quired for an individual's three-digit Census occupation. The
wage equations are of the standard semi-logarithmic form and are
estimated for 1971 data from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Labor Market Experience, a survey of men aged 50 to 64 and
women aged 34 to 48 in 1971. The independent variables are des-
cribed below. They can be divided into four categories: human
capital variables, human capital interactions with skill levels,
control variables and occupational sex-type variables.
Educationl:
Education2:
Education3:
Education4:
EducationS:
Education6:
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Human Capital Variables
Human capital theory predicts that an individual's formal
schooling, vocational training, experience in the labor market
and tenure on a particular job will add to his or her stock of
human capital and will thus earn a rental rate in the labor mar-
ket. The NLS permits an accurate assessment of each of these
variables, and is particularly meticulous in its labor market
histories of women. While men have generally continuous l~bor
force participation throughout their lifetimes, women experience
many discontinuities in experience, and the NLS' retroactive
work histories allow us to construct a variable which measures
the actual number of years in which a woman worked at least six
months full-time. The NLS also asks detailed questions about
the nature, duration and sponsor of training. We found that a
simple dummy variable for participation in vocational or on-the-
job training since leaving school full-time yielded results which
were very similar to more complicated specifications, a conclu-
sion which was also reached by others working with the same data
set. 18 The variables included in this set were:
Dummy variable for 8th grade educational attainmenti
Dummy variable for 11th grade attainment;
Dummy variable for 12th grade attainment;
Dummy variable for some college education;
Dummy variable for B.A. degree;
Dummy variable for some graduate education, with
or without degree.
Experience: For women, years worked 6 or more months full-time
since leaving school; For men, (Age - Grade - 6) =
Years out of the labor force since leaving school;
Experience-squared: {EXperie~ce)2 to capture diminishing returns
to exper~encei
Train: Dummy variable for participation in any vocational, on-
the-job or company training program since leaving school;
Tenure: Number of years with current employer.
Tenure-squared: {Tenure)2 to capture diminishing returns to tenure.
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Human Capital Interactions with Specific Vocational Preparation
Both human capital and segmented labor market theories re-
cognize that the returns to human capital depend upon the type
of occupation in which a worker is found. In general, it is be-
lieved that the effect of additional human capital increases as
the skill level of the occupation increases. In order to capture
differing returns to education in different occupations, we employ
interaction terms between dummy variables for skill levels two
through seven and three human capital variables, highest grade
completed, years of experience and years of tenure. (Skill level
one is the reference category.)l9Interaction terms between the
skill levels and the quadratic forms of the experience and tenure
variables were never significant at the 5 percent level and were
excluded from the analysis. In order to conserve degrees of
freedom, the interactions were constructed using the continuous
form of the education attainment variable rather than dummy vari-
abIes for differing categories of attainment.
Specific Vocational Preparation
Dummy variables for specific vocational preparation levels
two through seven were also included alone in order to capture
effects of varying skill requirements on the wage which do not
operate through the education, experience and tenure interactions.
Control Variables
Union: Dummy variable turned on if wages on the job are set by
a collective bargaining agreement;
JSMSA: Dummy variable turned on if job is located in a standard
metropolitan statistical area;. . ..
Bad health: Dummy variable turned on If lndlvldual reports that
health limits the type or amount of work he or she
can perform;
Unemployment rate: Local unemployment rate.
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Occupational Sex-Type Variables
The occupational sex-type is measured by the female share
of total employment in each three-digit Census occupation. The
derivation of this variable has been described earlier. In order
to allow for possible nonlinearities in the relationship between
wages and the female share of employment, we also include the
square of this variable.
In addition, we allow for interactions between the occupa-
tional sex-type and human capital variables in a group of vari-
abIes constructed by multiplying the human capital variables by
a dummy variable for occupational sex-type. For the purposes of
this study, and in the absence of any established criterion of
sex-typing occupations, we have adopted an arbitrary division
which differs from that employed by Jusenius in the study cited
20in the second essay. In our work, an occupation is considered
female if its 1970 employment was over 70 percent female, male
if its employment was under 20 percent female and integrated if
the female share of employment was between 20 and 70 percent.
This results in a division of individuals which is described in
Table III-II and a division of occupations which is listed in
Appendix B.
Despite what we consider to be fairly strict criteria for
segregation, over 60 percent of the women in the sample are
employed in segregated-female occupations and approximately two-
thirds of the men are found in segregated-male occupations. The
integrated occupations employ less than one-third of the women,
and less than one-quarter of the men. (The sample is not repre-
sentative in this regard; as was documented in the first essay,
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Table III-II
Distribution of National Longitudinal Survey Sample
of Men and Women by Sex Composition of Occupation, 1971
Percentage of Percentage of
Women as a Percentage Total Women Total Men
of Total Employment in Sample in Sample
0-5 1.1 30.7
5 -10 5.7 24.0
10-15 2.0 14.5
15-20 0.6 2.0
20-25 3.1 1.8
25-30 2.7 9.3
30-35 1.7 1.8
35-40 0.4 0.7
40-45 7.8 2.8
45-50 3.1 2.0
50-55 2.8 0.7
55-60 1.8 0.5
60-65 7.3 1.1
65-70 1.0 0.3
70-75 11.7 2.9
75-80 1.3 0.1
80-85 14.5 4.2
85-90 3.1 0.1
90-95 9.2 0.0
95-100 19.2 0.5
Total 100.0
100.0
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most of the u.s. labor force works in a single-sex segregated
occupation.)
Predicted Signs
According to human capital theory, the following coefficients
are all predicted to have positive signs:
Educationl through Education6
Experience
Tenure
Training
SVP2 through SVP7
Interactions between education, experience, tenure and
SVP dummies.
Union bargaining should raise wages, as should the higher costs
of living in standard metropolitan statistical areas; bad health
should lower wages. The sign on the unemployment rate is not
clear: while tight labor markets should raise wages (a Phillips
curve effect), Hall has also argued that areas with high wages
and high unemployment continue to attract workers who are maxi-
21
mizing the expected value of wages. Signs on the occupational
sex-type variables are predicted by the different theories of
occupational segregation as discussed earlier in this essay.
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Results of Wage Equations
Part A of this section presents the results of aggregate
wage equations estimated for whites and blacks, stratified by
sex. The interaction between racial and sexual discrimination
is subtle and complex, and deserves more exhaustive treatment.
Rather than confound the effects of race and sex, we have sepa-
rated the samples and estimated wage equations for each group.
We do not present complete results for blacks, focusing only on
the occupational sex-type variables. Part B presents the esti-
mated coefficients on variables measurinq occupational sex-type
for whites, stratified by sex and level of specific vocational
preparation, and discusses differences between these results and
those in Part A in light of possible truncation bias.
A. Results of Wage Equations Stratified by Race and Sex
White Men
We estimate wage equations for white men in two specifica-
tions: first, we run wage equations of the standard form, and
second, we allow for interactions between the human capital
variables and skill levels and between occupational sex-type and
human capital. These interaction terms allow us to test whether
the returns to human capital vary systematically across skill-
levels and sex-types of occupation.
White Men: No Interaction Terms
The results of this specification are presented in Table III-
12. The human capital variables are generally significant at
the one percent level with the exception of the experience terms
and tenure squared, which may be involved in multicollinear
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Table 111-12
Wage Equations for Whites, by Sex
Dependent Variable: Ln (Hourly Wage) in 1971
Independent Variable
Human capital Variables
Educationl
Education2
Education3
Education4
EducationS
Education6
SVP2
SVP3
SVP4
SVP5
SVP6
SVP7
Experience.
Experience squared
Tenure
Tenure squared
Train
Control Variables
Bad health
Union membership
Job in SMSA
Unemployment rate
White Men
.0107 (.0389)
.0775 (.0392)*
.1335 (".0418)**
.3050 (.0529)**
.4874 (.0656)**
.4105 (.0744)**
.1165 (.0466)**
.2305 (.0482)**
.3192 (.0472)**
.3859 (.0604) **
.4424 (.0392) **
.4685 (.0609) **
.0224 (.0259)
-.0004 (.0003)
.0065 (.0030) **
.0000 (.0001)
.0759 (.0242) **
-.1117 (.0272)**
.1666 (.0241) **
.1721 (.0251)**
.0014 (.0005)**
White Women
.1552 (.0621) **
.1813 (.0512)**
.2620 (.0496)**
.2871 (.0594)**
.4234 (. 0662) **
.5472 (.0883)**
.1243 (.0482) **
.1775 (.0401)**
.1693 {.0392} **
.2233 (.0421) **
.3305 (.0473)**
.4112 (.0786)**
.0145 (. 0060) **
-.0002 (.0002)
.0268 (.0053) **
-. 0007 (. 0003) **
.0823 (.0250) **
-.0347 (.0354)
.1367 (.0275)**
-. 0259 (. 0458)
.0015 (.0005) **
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Independent Variable White Men White Women
Occupational Sex-Type Variables
Female share of employment
-.2119 (.1767) -.3753 (.2018)*
Female share squared
.1455 ( .2102) .2840 (.1727)*
constant
S.E.E.
-2R
4.9164
.4521
.34
4.7856
.3332
.35
*Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
**Significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.
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relationships. The education dummies rise monotonically as
expected, since that reference category is the lowest level of
educational attainment, less than eighth grade. Dummy variables
for specific vocational preparation are also significant at the
one percent level, and with coefficients which again rise mono-
tonically as predicted. All the control variables are highly
significant and have the predicted signs. The positive coeffi-
cient on the unemployment rate is consistent with the Hall effect
described earlier, and indicates that there are high unemployment
rates in areas where there are high wages. Bad health significantly
lowers wages, while union membership raises wages.
Neither the linear nor the quadratic forms of the female
share of employment prove to be significantly different from zero
at the 5 percent leve~,suggesting that sex-type has no indepen-
dent effect once human capital and other variables have been
controlled for. However, in the next section, we present results
of equations in which we allow for interactions between human
capital and occupational sex-type. This specification, shown in
Table III-13, produces interesting results which differ from those
obtained without interaction terms.
White Men: Interaction Terms
The results of the estimation including interaction terms
are presented in Table III- 13. Human capital variables are
generally significant at the I percent level, as predicted, with
the exception of experience and experience-squared. There may be
multicollinearity involving the tenure and experience terms here
jus.t as in the earlier equation without interaction terms.
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Of the eighteen interaction terms between skill levels and
human capital, only four are significantly different from zero
at the 5 percent level. Those terms indicate that in general,
the returns to education do not depend upon the level of speci-
fic vocational preparation required for an occupation.
The control variables are significantly different from zero
at the 1 percent level with predicted signs, just as in the
earlier equation. The positive sign on the unemployment rate
implies again that the Hall effect may dominate the Phillips'
curve effect.
The occupational sex-type variables are now siqnificant at
the 5 percent level. We account for this by noting that the
interactions between the female occupation dummy and both ex-
perience and training are positive, while the interaction with
education is negative. Failing to allow for these differing
indirect effects of occupational sex-type presumably caused the
sex-type variables to be insignificant in the earlier equation.
The signs on the variables suggest that there is a wage
penalty associated with male participation in increasingly female
occupations, but that the penalty disappears at the point where
22
the female share reaches approximately 30 percent. Male partici-
pat ion in occupations which are over 30 percent female then leads
to a premium in the wage. These results are consistent with the
human capital, crowding and internal labor market theories of
occupational segregation up to occupations which are nearly one-
third female, but suggest that employee discrimination becomes
a factor which raises male wages in occupations over one-third
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Table 111-13
Wage Equations for Whites, By Sex
Dependent Variable: Ln (Hourly Wage) in 1971
Independent Variable
Human Capital Variables
Educationl
Education2
Education3
Education4
EducationS
Education6
SVP2
SVP3
SVP4
SVP5
SVP6
SVP7
Experience
Experience squared
Tenure
Tenure squared
Train
White Men
-.0026 (-.0018)
.0678 (.0556)
.1251 (.0748)*
.2940 (.0990)**
.5149 (.1310)**
.4454 (.1555)**
-1.6911 (.6035)**
.1110 (.4737)
.2511 (.5384)
2.1613 (.8947)**
.4115 (.1212) **
1.0623 (.6971)
.0341 (.0269)
-.0005 (.0003)
.0137 (.0043)**
-.00003(.00009)
.2201 (.0939)**
Whi te ~vomen
.1877 (0.0656)**
.2132 (.0673) **
.2801 (.0819)**
.2482 (.1052)**
.2960 (.1391)*
.3058 (.1740)*
.3239 (.2225)
.1758 (.1829)
.1060 (.2274)
-.3148 (.2094)
.0488 (.2368)
-.0671 (.4929)
.0053 (.0072)
-.0002 (.0002)
.0351 (.0120)**
-.0002 (.0004)
.0500 (.0755)
Human Capital Interactions with SVP
Grade X SVP2 .0665 (.0221)**
Grade X SVP3 -.0077 (.0177)
Grade X SVP4 -.0004 (.0211)
Grade X SVP5 -.0750 (.0320)**
Grade X SVP6 .0099 (.0120)
Grade X SVP7 -.0233 (.0251)
Experience X SVP2 .0322 (.0109)**
Experience X SVP3 .0067 (.0090)
Experience X SVP4 .0043 (.0098)
Experience X SVPS -.0249 (.0167)
Experience X SVP6 n.a.
Experience X SVP7 -.0061 (.0120)
-.0221 (.0209)
-.0116 (.0161)
-.0019 (.0196)
.0398 (.0181)*
.0298 (.0185)
.0395 (.0301)
.0111 (.0077)
.0175 (.0065)**
.0112 (.0063)*
.0198 (.0071)**
-.0025 (.0077)
-.0045 (.0117)
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Independent Variable White Men White Women
Tenure X SVP2
-.0084 (.0046)*
-.0087 (.0128)
Tenure X SVP3
-.0059 (.0043)
-.0258 (.0104)**
Tenure X SVP4
-.0040 (.0044)
-.0121 (.0113)
Tenure X SVP5
-.0073 (.0056)
-.0237 (.0120)*
Tenure X SVP6
-.0057 (.0036)
-.0132 (.0095)
Tenure X SVP7
-.0059 (.0053) .0102 (.0147)
Control Variables
Bad health
-.0995 (.0271) **
-.0213 (.0354)
Union membership .1657 (.0245) ** .1263 (.0280)**
Job in SMSA .1803 (.0250)**
-.0155 (.0462)
Unemployment rate .0016 (.0005)** .0015 (.0005)**
Occupational Sex-Type Variables
Female share -.4562 (.2119)* -.4646 (.2087)*
Female share squared .7597 (.3557)* .4047 (.2018)*
Fern X Experience .0304 (.0166)* n.a.
Fern X Grade -.0572 (.0142)** .0021 (.0092)
Fem X Train .1304 (.0747)* .1326 (.0520)**
Fem X Tenure -.0136 (.0094) .0071 (.0109)
Fern X Experience -.0005 (.0003) .0015 (.0011)
squared
Fern X Tenure squared .0003 (.0003) -.0005 (.0005)
Constant 4.6475 4.8751
Standard error of the .4463 .3285
estimate
-2
.35 .37R
*Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
**Significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.
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female. Slightly over one-quarter of the men in the sample may
be receiving a wage premium for participating in female occupa-
tions. For the remaining three-quarters of the sample, however,
an increasing female share of employment lowers the wage.
White Women
We also estimate wage equations for white women using both
specifications, one without interaction terms and another
which includes both interactions between human capital variables
and skill levels and interactions between human capital and
occupational sex-type. These results are presented in Tables
111-12 and 111-13 next to the results for white men.
White Women: No Interaction Terms
With the exception of experience squared, all the human
capital variables are significantly different from zero at the
1 percent level in the wage equation without interaction terms
presented in Table 111-12. Coefficients on the education dummies
rise monotonically, and the return to experience with the
current employer, tenure, is slightly larger than the return to
general labor market experience. White men reap larger rewards
to experience and tenure than do white women; in the absence of
significant coefficients on all the quadratic terms, we cannot
compare the magnitude of diminishing returns to experience for
men and women. The SVP dummies are also significant at the 1
percent level, rising monotonically with the exception of SVp4.
Only two of the control variables are significant for women,
compared to all four for men. It appears that bad health and
urban jobs do not significantly affect female wages. The
different effect of bad health may occur because women are more
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likely to leave the labor force entirely than are men. The
Hall effect again dominates the Phillips' curve effect in the
coefficient on the unemployment rate, and union membership
significantly raises the wage, but less, in percentage terms,
than for white men.
Even without interaction terms, the female share of
employment lowers the wage significantly and the quadratic
term is significant and positive at the 5 percent level. The
magnitudes of the coefficients imply that women's wages fall
as the female share of employment grows to approximately
two-thirds, while women employed in occupations which are
more than two-thirds female receive a wage premium as the
female share rises, ceteris paribus. Of the theories
discussed earlier, the human capital, crowding and internal
labor market models are consistent with the wage pattern observed
for women in occupations which are less than two-thirds female,
while the employee discrimination and employer uncertainty
models predict the wage pattern observed in the more female-
intensive occupations. Roughly 40 percent of the women in the
sample, therefore, are penalized for participation in female
occupations while the remaining women receive a wage premium as the
female share of their occupation rises.
White Women: Interaction Terms
Of the human capital variables in this equation, presented
in Table III-13, only education and tenure appear to signifi-
cantly affect the wage. with the exception of Education4, the
coefficients on the education dummies rise monotonically as
predicted. Unlike the white men whose results are presented
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along with those for white women, white women do not receive
a wage premium for participation in training programs, and
the differing levels of specific vocational preparation are also
insignificant at the 5 percent level. Since many of these
variables were significant in the equation without interaction
terms (see Table III-12), we offer two explanations for their
insignificance here. First, the interaction terms may introduce
multicollinearity, and second, the effects of different levels
of specific vocational preparation may operate only through
returns to human capital •.
For white women, six of the 18 human capital variables are
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
Interactions between skill levels and education and experience
variables are of the predicted signs, but the interaction term
with tenure at SVP3 is curiously negative.
The wage effect of rising female share is again negative
for women in occupations which are up to 60 percent female. 23
After that point, women in female occupations receive a wage
premium as the female share of employment rises. It is interesting
to note that the inflection point is only slightly different from
that in the equation without interactions.
Only one of the female interaction with human capital
variables is significantly different from zero, indicating that
women in female occupations receive a higher return to training
than do women in integrated or male occupations. This effect
was also present in the interaction equation for white men, and
was of similar magnitude. For white women, unlike white men, the
returns to education are not significantly lower in female occu-
pations than in integrated or male occupations.
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Black Men and Black Women
An interesting result emerges from the estimation of
wage equations for black women and men. We do not reproduce
the entire equations here, but the results are generally
consistent with our expectations for signs and significance.
The pattern of occupational sex-type effects on the wage
is presented in Table 111-14, along with that pattern for
white men and women. While black men's wages follow the same
sex-type pattern as that for white men, the magnitude of the
coefficients is very much larger. The inflection point at
which participation in female occupations raises male wages
occurs at 34 percent female for black men, a point very close
to the 30 percent turning point for white men. 24 We attribute
the larger magnitude of the coefficients for black men to
industry and region effects which may be correlated with the
female share of employment.
For black women, a more startling difference in the effect
of occupational sex-type appears and raises questions about the
interaction of racial and sexual discrimination. The signs on
female share and female share squared are actually reversed from
the signs on these variables in the equation for white women.
It appears that black women are in fact rewarded for participation
in occupations which are less than 60 percent female. After
that point, they suffer a wage penalty as the female share increasE
These results are consistent with models of employee discrimination
and employer uncertainty in occupations which are less than 60
percent female. These results mask further racial segregation
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Table 111-14
Fe~ale Share C~efficient5 from Wage Equations
w~th 1nteract~on5, for Men and Women by Race
Sample Group Female Share Female Share Squared
Black Men
-10.5879** 15.3568**
(.5405) C.7713)
White Men
-.4562* .7597*
( .2119) , (.3557)
Black Women 1.3841*
-1.1605*
(.3916) (.3215)
White Women
-.4646* .4047*
(.2087) ( .2018)
Standard errors in parentheses.
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
Other variables in the equation: Educationl through Education6,
SVP2 through SVP7, Experience, Experience squared, Tenure, Tenure
squared, Train, human capital interactions between SVP and education
experience and tenure, control variables: Bad health, Union member-
ship, Job in SMSA and Unemployment rate, and Occupational sex-type
interactions between Fem and Education, Experience, Experience squar~
Tenure, Tenure squared and Train.
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within the rigid sex segregation which we have documented earlier.
In other words, black women in occupations which are over 90
percent female are likely to be found in domestic service, while
white women are in nursing or secreterial work.
We are unable to examine this result further within the
boundaries of this study, but future work should investigate
the nature of occupational segregation along racial lines within
those jobs which are held primarily by women. Such an inves-
tigation is vital for policy which attempts to improve the
earnings of black women. Unless racial discrimination is addressed
simultaneously, attempts to move black women into men's jobs
may actually result in a deterioration in their earnings position
relative to white women.
B. Results of Wage Equations Stratified by Sex and Level of
Specific Vocational Preparation for Whites
As mentioned earlier, we are interested in identifying
specific mechanisms of occupational segregation which may be
operating at particular skill levels, and in this section we
investigate segregation at a disaggregated level by stratifying
the sample according to the level of specific vocational pre-
paration required for the job. We then examine the sign of
the occupational sex-type coefficients. This procedure yields
results which differ from those obtained at the aggregate level,
as demonstrated in Tables III-IS and 111-16. The differences
are of two types: first, sex-type variables are generally
insignificant in the stratified samples, and second, in the
instances in which the variables do appear to affect the wage,
the sign is sometimes different from that found in the aggregate
equation. For instance, Table III-IS shows that the linear
Table 111';""15
Wage Equations for White Women, By Level of SVP
Dependent Variable: Ln (Hourly Wage) in 1971
Level of Specific Vocational Preparation
Independent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Variable
WHITE WOMEN
Female share 2.0605* -.7710 -.0461 -.7535 -.8218 -1.2643* -2.2143
(.9372) (.6090) (.4921) (.6630) (.7951) (.5190) (2.0725)
Female share -2.7451* .0822 -.0300 .7539 1.0562 1.7863** 1.9420
squared (1.1277) (. 7643) (.4509) (.4978) (.6581) (.5265) (2.5990)
Fern X Grade .0645 .0196 .0250 -.0623 -.0395 -.0299 n.a.
(.0478) (.0274) (.0190) (.0322) (.0206) (.0241)
Fern X Experience -.0018 .0012 -.0019** -.0056** n.a. .0002 n.a.
(.0019) (.0011) (.0007) (.0009) (.0010)
Fern X Experience .0027 -.0004 .0035 -.0062 -.0008 -.0014 -.0039
squared (.0066) (.0038) (.0027) (.0038) (.0023) (.0038) (.0097)
Fern X Tenure -.0004 -.0370 .0065 .0325 .0689 -.0270 n.a.
(.0707) (.0467) (.0195) (.0240) (.0430) (.0325)
Fern X Tenure .0014 -.0002 -.0004 -.0010 -'.0041 .0004 n.a.
squared (.0046) (.0030) (.0009) (.0012) (.0028) (.0016)
R2 .24 .42 .23 . 32 .25 .20 .44
S.E.E. .3948 .2565 .2604 .3013 .3062 .3850 .3072
N 77 88 193 284 192 183 27
*Significant at a = . 05, two-tailed test •
**Significant at a . o~, two-tai~ed test .
Table 111-16
Wa e E uations for White Men, B
Dependent Var1able: Ln (Hourly
Level of Specific Vocational Preparation
Independent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Variable
WHITE MEN
Female share -2.6122 4.4992** -.4076 -3.6049** -.6708 .4154 -2.0419**
(2.3911) (.7983) (.4241) (.9371) (1.0292) (.4950) (. 7546)
Female share 3.8623 -8.9609** .5876 8.2457** .1513 -1.2829 3.9745**
squared (3.3467) (1.4803) (.8163) (2.0506) (1.580) (1.0654) (.8973)
Fern X Grade -.0075 .2941* n.a. -.0270 -.2351 -.0249 -.1092
(.1186) (.1381) (.0321) (.2923) (.0184) (.0573)
Fern X Experience n.a. -.0223 n.a. -.0842* .2469 .0533 .0332
(.1059) (.0411) (.2371) (.0273) (.0823)
Fern X Experience n.a. .0011 n.a. .0011 -.0041 -.0008 -.0010
squared (.0019) (.0007) (.0037) (.0005) (.0005)
Fern X Tenure n.a. -.0700 n.a. -.0207 -.0895 -.0053 -.0221
(.0489) (.0158) (.0848) (.0130) (.0437)
Fern X Tenure -.0371 .0014 .0073 .0009* .0031 -.0001 -.0001
squared (.0287) (.0015) (.0041) (.0004) (.0021) (.0004) (.0011)
R2 .23 .41 .32 .29 • 34 .23 .40
S.E.E. .6311 .3949 .2556 .3699 .3648 .4215 .4844 t-'-....J
\.0
N 184 198 212 204 82 822 104
*Significant at a = .05, two-tailed test.
**Significant at a = .01, two-tailed test.
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female share term has a positive coefficient in skill level
one for white women, but a negative coefficient in skill level
six. (Note that the wage pattern this implies for white women
in jobs of the lowest skill requirements is that which we
obtained in the aggregate equations for black women, who are
disproportionately represented in low-skill jobs.)
For white men (see Table 111-16), the same phenomenon
occurs: the sex-type variables are significant in only three
skill levels, and in one instance bear the opposite signs from
those obtained in the aggregate equations.
One possible explanation for this inconsistency is
truncation bias. It is well known that truncation of the sample
on values of the dependent variable or on values of a variable
which is related to the dependent variable can produce bias in the
estimated coefficients. In the one-variable case, it has been
demonstrated that this bias is toward zero; in the many indepen-
dent variable case, the direction of bias depends upon the rela-
tionship between the dependent variable, the variable upon which
the truncation is taking place and the independent variables whose
coefficients are to be estimated. It is generally acknowledged
that the human capital variables in a truncated wage equation
will be biased toward zero if the sample is stratified in a manner
which is related to wages. 25
It is not clear, however, that truncation bias will affect
the coefficients on the occupational sex-type variables in a
direction which can be determined ~ priori. For instance, if
the female share of employment is associated with rising wages,
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the direction of bias in a truncated equation is likely to be
different from the direction of bias which would be introduced
in a system in which the female share lowers wages. Since we
do not know a priori whether wages are raised or lowered by
participation in female occupations ceteris paribus, we cannot
predict the direction or the extent of bias on these coefficients.
We suspect, however, that some bias may be involved in the
insignificance of the coefficients at most skill levels. Another
factor which might produce insignificant coefficients is the
simultaneous existence of differing mechanisms of segregation in
the different occupations which comprise a particular skill level.
In other words, there may be bias as a result of the aggregation
into skill levels as well as truncation bias. Nonetheless, the
disaggregated results do demonstrate some support for each of
the theories discussed earlier which might be associated with
occupational segregation of men and women.
We also performed disaggregated equations in which the
occupational sex-type interaction terms with human capital were
excluded. None of the signs or significance tests were affected
by excluding the interaction terms, and thus none of the conclusions
differ from those at which we arrived using the information in
Tables III-IS and II1-l6.
In light of the strong possibility of truncation bias in
these disaggregated equations, we do not calculate the inflection
points at which the effect of occupational sex-type on wages
reverses in those skill levels in which there appears to be an
effect. Truncation bias thus prevents us from examining the impact
of occupational sex-type at greater detail. Perhaps future research
can address this question at a less aggregated level.
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summary and Conclusions
Our examination of the wage differences among men and
women in the National Longitudinal Survey points to differing
effects of occupational sex-type on wages at differing female
shares of total employment in an individual's three-digit
Census occupational category. For black men and white men,
a rising female share of employment lowers wages until the
occupation is approximately one-third female. From there on,
rising female employment raises wages. Both supply- and
demand-based theories of segregation are consistent with the
pattern observed in the lower range of occupational sex-type,
while the wage pattern observed for occupations over one-third
female is consistent with two demand-based theories of segregation.
For women, the effect of occupational sex-type diverges for blacks
and whites. White women's wages are lowered as the female share
of employment approaches two-thirds, as predicted by both
demand- and supply-based models. In occupations over two-thirds
female, white women's wages rise as the female share continues to
increase, a pattern consistent with demand-based theories. For
black women, wages rise as the female share of employment
approaches two-thirds and fall thereafter.
These results hint at the complex, subtle and multi-dimen-
sional nature of the mechanisms which generate and promote occu-
pational segregation. While it does appear that particular mecha-
nisms predominate in certain occupations, we are unable to rule
out any of the mechanisms examined in the second essay. It is
perhaps inappropriate to attempt to separate supply-side from
demand-side mechanisms of segregation. Women prepare themselves
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for traditionally-female occupations for many reasons. They
know that they can find employment in these occupations and that
they are less likely to face discrimination in hiring or pro-
motion if they confine themselves to those jobs which are
considered "women's work." In addition, the wage-participation
profile of some female occupations does indeed appear to permit
discontinuous labor force participation without undue penalty,
but it is a moot point whether the structure of other occupations
might not easily be adapted to facilitate women's participation.
It is possible that stringent requirements which exclude women
from certain occupations because of their less continuous parti-
cipation might be based on a desire to exclude women rather than
on the technological requirements of the job. Flexible hours and
industrial day-care arrangements, for example, would most likely
increase the female labor supply to many occupations which are
currently dominated by men. It is also true that traditional
notions of femininity are so deeply embedded in attitudes toward
work that role conflicts of disabling proportions can arise in
the pursuit of nontraditional careers. Therefore, much of what
appears to be supply-motivated segregation could actually have
arisen as a response to demand-side discrimination. The simul-
taneity of work and family decisions and the existence of socially-
conditioned gender roles all combine to make the study of occupa-
tional segregation an extremely complicated undertaking.
It is our opinion that the role of economic analysis in the
study of occupational segregation must be a partial one: given a
historically, psychologically and sociologically determined divi-
sion of labor between the sexes, what are the economic conse-
quences of that division, and what economic forces operate to
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perpetuate it? We feel th ta economic theory cannot explain
the source of occupational segregation, just as it fails to pro-
vide an adequate explanation for racial discrimination. Arrow
defines the task of economic models of racial discrimination in
the following manner~
There is no reason to impose 'the burden of a full ex-
~la~atio~ upon eco~omic theory, but it should provide
1ns1ght 1nto the l1nks between the social cultural and
individual facts on the one hand and the ~conomic facts
on the other just as the theory of production is sup-
posed to provide a link between the !gct of technology
and the uses and rewards of factors.
Economic theory can also play a role in the formation of
policy toward the division of labor between men and women which
promotes economic efficiency as well as socially-determined equity
goals. Judging from recent judicial and legislative interpreta-
tions of equity, it is a national goal to provide freedom of access
to all occupations for men and for women. Freedom of access re-
quires freedom of choice among occupations for equally-qualified
men and women, and the removal of barriers to the acquisition of
equal qualifications. Even if these barriers are removed, how-
ever, employer discrimination in the labor market continue to
exclude women from certain occupations. Policies which attempt
to alter the occupational distribution of men and women must be
informed by an awareness of the economic forces which operate to
perpetuate the division of labor as well as by an awareness of
the historical and social conditions in which that division of
labor is rooted. In the final part of this essay, we develop
some policy recommendations which draw upon economic theory as
well as upon our understanding of the sociology and history of
occupational segregation of men and women.
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Directions for the Future: Policy and Research
Differences in the occupational distribution of men and wo-
men pose in our opinion one of the most difficult and yet most
important policy problems in labor economics today. The major
difficulty resides in our inability to differentiate between oc-
cupational choice and occupational assignments, or, in the words
of the Council of Economic Advisors in 1973, between "direct
discrimination" and "role differentiation. "27 Many have argued
. that women have chosen to be in traditionally female occupations,
and that the occupational distribution follows from the efficient
division of labor within the family, viewed as an economic unit.
They support this argument by pointing out that women's occupa-
tions draw upon qualities which are traditionally considered fe-
minine traits and that many of these occupations complement
household production. Others argue that discriminatory mechanisms
such as those described in the second essay restrict the occupa-
tional choices of women in a way that is at once inefficient and
inequitable.
We feel that our results demonstrate that demand-side theo-
ries of discrimination and concomitant occupational segregation
have considerable validity and that it is therefore incumbent
upon policy-makers to develop strategies for freeing both men
and women from traditional occupational assignments. In this
final essay, we point to some policies which we feel would
achieve that aim, and also describe further research which might
assist us in distinguishing between direct discrimination and
role differentiation.
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Extra-labor Market Policies
Any policy which seeks freedom of occupational choice must
simultaneously address the process of role differentiation prior
to labor market entry and the sUbsequent assignment of occupa-
tions once an individual has entered the labor force. Some
extra-market policies which would open up nontraditional occu-
pations to women have already been adopted. For example, school
regulations barring high-school girls from courses in industrial
arts and high-school boys from horne economics are now illegal.
As a result of this ruling and of a prohibition on discrimination
in admissions to vocational and technical schools, more women
have begun to prepare themselves for the skilled trades. The
entry of women into a volunteer Armed Forces has also increased
the flow of women into these occupations. However, instances of
discrimination still prevade the educational system and the exist-
ing anti-discrimination apparatus must be enforced if it is to
be effective. The effort to eradicate stereotyped concepts of
women from the various media must also continue and we must be
especially vigilent in scrutinizing textbooks and other educa-
tional materials lest they perpetuate these stereotypes.
Another policy which is needed to free women from the strait-
jacket of custom is counseling which educates them to the pro-
bability of continuous labor force participation. Many women
plan to leave the labor force soon after marriage but find them-
selves working continuously as a result of divorce, separation
or the need to supplement family income. It is imperative that
women learn the true chances that they will at some time become
heads of households. The female-headed household is rapidly
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becoming a common form of family organization, but unlike men,
women are rarely prepared to shoulder this burden. Many women
do not plan careers and are thus caught unaware without the hu-
man capital needed to enter high-wage occupations.
The policies described above will be particularly effective
in combating segregation which is generated in the context of
the human capital model of occupational choice, as they would
ease women's internal barriers to entering high-atrophy occupations
The policies described above will not aid in bringing women
into jobs where demand-side phenomena serve to exclude them. A
list of policy suggestions and regimes under which they are parti-
cularly effective follows.
Labor Market Policies
Where employer uncertainty is the problem, the traditional
approach of enforcing equal pay while requiring equal access to
employment could actually bring about further segregation. If
an employer is not sure that a woman can perform as well a man,
he will be unwilling to employ women unless a wage differential
exists as an inducement. Here it is important to disseminate
information to employers about women's qualifications and turnover
rates. State employment agencies must make an effort to match
women to nontraditional jobs for which they are already qualified
or for which they can be trained. Greater participation by women
in government-sponsored training programs,_ and perhaps wage sub-
sidies or tax credits to firms which employ women in nontraditionaJ
jobs, are also called for. Finally, it has long been recognized
by feminists that full employment policies will encourage employer~
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to experiment with female labor. (Note that full employment
policies will not be effective against supply-side segregation;
not only must employers hire women, but women must also apply
for jobs in nontraditional areas.)
Much of current policy appears to have been formulated with
an employee discrimination model in mind, as quotas and equal
pay legislation are more effective here. Since our study did
find support for this model, we would urge the enforcement of
these provisions. A clear threat to desegregation is posed by
the existence of seniority systems and labor union gatekeeping -
both mechanisms which translate individual employee discrimination
into systematic mechanisms of exclusion - and this threat is most
severe whenever there is considerable unemployment. Full employ-
ment policies might enable government to enlist the participation
of the labor unions in effect to recruit and promote women in the
skilled craft occupations.
The crowding model is a model of barriers to entry, and the
pOlicies suggested above which dismantle these barriers are all
called for wherever crowding seems to be occurring. Thus, we
would wish to monitor job evaluations which are artifically con-
structed so as to exclude women and we would attempt to enlist
union assistance in broadening the number of occupations open to
women. This is another regime under which equal pay for equal
work legislation is ineffective since the inequality of work
causes unequal wages; with a fixed occupational distribution,
equal pay legislation is impotent.
Where internal labor markets operate, quotas and the dis-
semination of information on women's qualifications will be
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effective. The quotas are most easily imposed at entry-level
jobs but care must be taken lest women fail to advance along the
promotion paths customarily trod by men. Here, too, job evalua-
tions must be carefully monitored so that women not be excluded
by artificial requirements.
In many of these suggestions, a restructuring of jobs is
implicit. It is our belief that many jobs can be changed so as
to permit more flexible scheduling, part-time work and sharing
of jobs. All of these changes are in the interest of both men
and women since they will permit a freer, less constrained divi-
sion of home and market responsibilities within the family. We
have not argued that any division of labor is inappropriate, but
rather that society's well-being is maximized if individuals are
free to choose how best to allocate their labor among the market
and horne occupations available in the economy.
Since we were unable to identify a single mechanism of seg-
regation among the many which have been described by economists
we must advocate the simultaneous adop~ion of all of these poli-
cies. Our research has point to an urgent need for establishment-
based data which would enable us to pinpoint the mechanisms of
segregation more accurately than is possible with the individual
data we utilize in this study. The information we need would
trace the hiring and promotion process within establishments.
We might then identify the "checkpoints ll at which women are dif-
ferentiated from men in the labor market. If the major parting
of the ways takes place at entry-level jobs, we would then know
to concentrate our policy efforts at that level. On the other
hand, if women enter at the same type of jobs, and are subject
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to the same review process but are consistently passed over for
promotion at certain establishments, we would concentrate our
policy efforts on the promotion process rather than on the hiring
standards. Our research has enabled us to choose between pre-
dominantly-supply side explanations and predominantly demand-side
explanations at various skill levels, but to choose among these
demand and supply theories we will need more information on the
nature of the demand for female and male labor.
Until we have obtained that information, we must begin to
institute new pOlicies and enforce existing policies toward
changing the occupational distribution of men and women. As we
described earlier, occupation plays a major role in the earnings
differentials between men and women of similar education and
skills. The earnings differential will become a matter of even
more concern in the future if the current trend toward increasing
numbers of female-headed families continues. Nearly one-third
of the families headed by women in 1975 were living below the
poverty level, and more recent data indicate that over 10 million
children live in female-headed families; their futures are at
stake in the effort to bring freedom of occupational choice to
women.
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FOOTNOTES
1
For more information on this data set, see Parnes {47].
2Jusenius {30] has described the need for stratification
by skill level. She argues that it is "essential" to stratify
in order to differentiate between the effect of the skill level
required by typically male and typically female occupations and
the effect of an occupation's sex-label controlling for skill
level. We believe that workers in one skill level are not sub-
stitutable for workers in another and that the wage determination
mechanism differs across skill levels. In order to avoid confu-
sing the effect of skill levels with the effect of occupational
sex-type, we perform separate analyses for aggregate and disag-
gregated samples. In so doing, of course, we invitethe possi-
lity of truncation bias. This problem is addressed later on
in the text.
3polachek [SOl.
4This uncertainty might arise because of prevailing notions
of women's capabilities or simply because an individual employer's
experience with women in certain types of jobs might be limited.
SBergrnann [ 9] •
GArrow [3].
7polachek [50].
8Mincer [39] originally developed this concept.
9The NLS was developed to examine the labor market experience
of particular cohorts of men and women. We utilize only the older
female group here.
10U.S. Bureau of the Census [62].
IlBecker [7].
12Ibid .
l3U. 8 . Department of Labor [63].
l4 Ibid •
15 . [30] employs the modal SVP value and we haveJusen~us . ' . h h
followed this procedure. To employ a we~ghte~ mean m~g t ave
b f bl but would have involved cons~derable computereen pre era e I • • d t
time and access to Current populat~on Survey tapes ~n or er 0
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find th7 prop~rtion of those employed in each three-digit Census
occupat:on ~h7ch was cu~rently employed in each of the consti-
tuent slx-dlg1t occupatlons. Instead, we simply utilize the
va1u7s.for the modal SVP codes which were developed by Jusenius
speclflcally for the National Longitudinal Survey.
16Spence [57].
17 . 1Natlona Manpower Council [42].
18See, for example, Jusenius [30] and other studies listed
in Parnes [47].
19strict1y speaking, it was only necessary to exclude one
of the interaction dummies to avoid perfect collinearity. In
the specification reported here, therefore, the reference cate-
gory becomes the mean effect of all interactions with skill level
one.
20we have tested for the sensitivity of the results to
changes in the definition of this variable. The results are
quite insensitive to changes in occupational categorization, and
do not change at all as long as an occupation is considered
female when the female share of employment is over 60 percent.
This is not surprising since most of the men and women in the
sample are found at the segregated extremes, where changes in
the definition of this variable do not affect the classification
of their occupations. See Table III-II for the occupational
distribution of the sample across sex categories.
21Ha11 [27].
22we calculate this inflection point by taking the partial
derivative of the equation with respect to female share of employ-
ment. The presence of the interaction terms utilizing the female
occupational dummy obviously presents a problem in differentiation
since the function is not continuous at the point where an occu-
pation changes categories from integrated or male to female. Our
derivatives thus represent the effect of increasing female share
holding the female dummy constant, a~d are valid only ~n th~se
circumstances. A marginal increase ln female share WhlCh tlpS an
occupation into another category would lead to different results
from those presented here.
23see note 22 above.
24See note 22 above.
25For a longer discussion of truncation bias, see Cain [14]
and Cain and watts [15].
26Arrow [4).
27Economic Report of the President [23].
193
194
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Adelman, Irma and Cynthia Taft Morris. "Factor Analysis of
the Interrelationship Between Social and Political
Variables and Per Capita Gross National Product."
Quarterly Journal of Economics 79 (November 1965):
555-78.
[2] Aigner, Dennis J. and Glen G. Cain. "Statistical Theories
of Discrimination in the Labor Market." Industrial and
Labor Relations Review 30 (January 1977): 175-87.
[3] Arrow, Kenneth J. "Models of Job Discrimination" and "Some
Mathematical Models of Race Discrimination in the
Labor Market," in Racial Discrimination in Economic
Life. Edited by A.H. Pascal. Lexington, Mass.: D.C.
Heath and Company. Lexington Books, 1972.
[4] "The Theory orDiscrimination" in Discrimination
in Labor Markets. Edited by o. Ashenfelter and A. Rees.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973.
[5] Barrett, Nancy Smith. "Women in Industrial Society: An
International Perspective," in Economic Independence
for Women: The Foundation for Equal Rights. Edited
by J.R. Chapman. Volume 1 of Sage Yearbooks in Women's
Policy Studies. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976.
[6J Becker, Gary S. The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1957.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12 ]
Human Capital. Second Edition. New York;
Columbia University Press, 1975.
Bergmann, Barbara R. "The Effect on White Incomes of
Discrimination in Employment." Journal of Political
Economy 79 (March/April 1971): 294-313.
. "Occupational Segregation, Wages and Profits
---Wh-"-e-n-Employers Discriminate by Race or Sex." Eastern
Economic Journal 1 (April/July 1974): 103-110.
Blau, Francine D. Equal Pay in the Office. Lexington,
Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington Books, 1977.
Blau Francine D. and Wallace Hendricks. "Occupational
, "J 1Segregation by Sex: Trend~ and Prospects. ourna
of Human Resources 14 (Spr~ng 1979): 197-210.
Blau Francine D. and Carol L. Jusenius. "Economic Dimen-
'sions of Occupational Segregat~on," in Women and the
Workplace. Edited bY,M. Blaxa~l and B. Reagan.
Chicago: The Univers~ty of Ch~cago Press, 1976.
[13]
[14]
[15 ]
[16 ]
195
Blinder, Alan S. "Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and
Structural Eestimates." Journal of Human Resources 8(Winter 1973): 437-55.
Cain, Glen.G. "The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market
T~eor1es to Orthodox Theory." Journal of Economic
L1terature 12 (December 1976): 1215-1257.
Cain, Glen G. and Harold W. Watts (editors). Income
Maintenance and Labor Supply: Econometric Studies".
New York: Academic Press, 1973.
Chaney, Elsa. Supermadre: Women in Politics in Latin
America. Latin America Monograph No. 50. Austin,
Texas: University of Texas Press, 1979.
[17] "Women at the 'Marginal Role' of the Economy
in Lima, Peru." Paper presented at the Conference
on Women and Development, Wellesley College, Wellesley,
Massachusetts, June 1976.
[18] Child, Dennis. The Essentials of Factor Analysis. London:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.
[19 ]
[20J
[21J
[22]
[23]
[24 ]
[25 ]
[26J
Chiswick, Barry R. "Racial Discrimination in the Labor
Market: A Test of Alternative Hypotheses." Journal
of Political Economy 81 (November/December 1973):
1330-1352.
Doeringer, Peter B. and Michael J. Piore. Internal Labor
Markets and Manpower Analysis. Lexington, Mass.:
D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington Books, 1971.
Duncan, Otis Dudley and Beverley Duncan. "A Methodological
Analysis of Segregation Indexes." American Sociological
Review 20 (April 1955): 210-17.
Edgeworth, F. Y. "Equal Pay to ~1en and Women for Equal Work."
Economic Journal 32 (September 1922): 431-57.
Economic Report of the President, 1973. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.
Fawcett, Millicent G. "Equal Pay for Equal Work." Economic
Journal 28 (March 1918): 1-6.
Fuchs, Victor. "A Note on Sex Segregation in Professional
Occupations." Explorations in Economic Research 2
(Winter 19750.
Gross, Edward. "Plus Ca Change ••. ? The Sexual Structure
of Occupations Over Time." Social Problems 16
(Fall 1968): 198-208.
196
[27J Hall, Robert E. "Why is the Unemployment Rate So High at
Full Employment?" Brookings Paper on Economic Activity
1970 (3): 369-410.
[28J Hanoch, Giora. "An Economic Analysis of Earnings and
Schooling." Journal of Human Resources 2 (Summer 1967):
310-29.
[29 J Hanushek, Eric A. and John E. Jackson.
for Social Scientists. New York:
Statistical Methods
Academic Press, 1977.
[30 J
[31]
[32 ]
[33J
[34 J
[35J
[36J
[37J
Jusenius, Carol L. "The Influence of Work Experience and
Typicality·of Occupational Assignment on Women's
Earnings," in Dual Careers. Manpower Research Mono-
graph No. 21, Vol. 4. u.s. Department of Labor.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1976.
Kahne, Hilda. "Economic Perspectives of the Roles of Women
in the American Economy." Journal of Economic
Literature 13 (December 1975): 1249-92.
Kerr, Clark. "The Balkanization of Labor Markets," in Labor
Mobility and Economic Opportunity. Edited by E.W.
Bakke et ale New York: Wiley.
Kim, Jae-On and Charles W. Mueller. Factor Analysis:
Statistical Methods and Related Issues. Sage University
Paper series on Quantitative Applications in the Social
Sciences, series no. 07-114. Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications, 1978.
Landes, Elizabeth. "Sex Differences in Wages and Employ-
ment: A Test of the Specific Capital Hypothesis."
Economic Inquiry 15 (October 1977): 523-38.
Lucas, Robert E.B. "The Distribution of Job Characteristics."
Review of Economics and Statistics. (November 1974):
530-40.
Madden, Janice Fanning. The Economics of Sex Discrimina-
tion. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company,
Lexington Books, 1973.
McCall John J. "The Simple Mathematics of Information,
J;b Search and Prejudice," in Racial Discrimination
in Economic Life. Edited by A.H. Pascal. Lexington,
Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington Books, 1972.
[38] McNulty, Donald J.
to'lomen Workers."
1967): 40-3.
"Differences in Pay Between Men and
Monthly Labor Review 90 (December
197
[39] Mincer, Jacob.
New York:
[40]
Schooling, Experience and Earnings.
Columbia University Press, 1974.
and. Solomon Polachek. "Family Investments in
Human CapJ.tal: Earnings of Women." Journal of
Political Economy 82 (March/April 1974): 576-5108.
[41] "Women's Earnings Re-examined." Journal of
Human Resources 13 (Winter 1978): 118-34.
[42] National Manpower Council. Woman Power. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1957.
[43] Newland, Kathleen. The Sisterhood of Man. New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, 1979.
[44] Oppenheimer, Valerie Kincaide. The Female Labor Force in
the United States: Demographic Factors Governing its
Growth and Changing Composition. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1970.
[45] Oster, Sharon. "Industry Differences in the Level of
Discrimination Against TfJomen~' Quarterly Journal of
Economics 89 (May 1975): 215-229.
Osterman, Paul.
mentation."
(July 1975):
[46J
[47J
[48]
[49 ]
[50]
[51]
[52J
"An Empirical Study of Labor Market Seg-
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 28
508-23.
Parnes, Herbert S. "The National Longitudinal Surveys:
New Vistas for Labor Market Research." American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings (Hay 1975).
Phelps, Edmund S. "The Statistical Theory of Racism and
Sexism." American Economic Review 62 (September 1972):
659-61.
Piore, Hichael J. "The Dual Labor Market," in Problems in
Political Economy. Edited by D~ Gordon. Lexington,
Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971.
Polachek, Solomon. "Occupational Segregation: Theory,
Evidence and a Prognosis." Paper presented at the
Conference on Women in the Labor Market, Barnard
College, New York, New York, August 1977.
. "Potential Biases in Measuring Male-Female
---D-J.T"""·s-c-rimination:' Journal of Human Resources 10
(Summer 1975): 205-29.
Robinson, Joan. The Economics of Imperfect Competition.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965.
[53]
[54]
[55]
[56 ]
[57]
[58 ]
[59 ]
[60 ]
[61]
[62 ]
[63]
[64 ]
[65J
198
Rosen, Sherwin. "Human Capital: A Survey of Empirical
Research." Discussion Paper 76-2, Department of
Economics, University of Rochester, revised, January
1976.
Rozeboom, William. Foundations of the Theory of Predication.
Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1966.
Schell~ng, Tho~as C. "The Process of Residential Segrega-
t~on: Ne~ghborhood Tipping," in Racial Discrimination
in Economic Life. Edited by A.H. Pascal. Lexington,
Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington Books, 1972.
Schultz, T. Paul. Estimatin Functions for
Married Women. R-1265-NIH EDA. Santa Mon1ca,
California: Rand Corporation, February 1975.
Spence, A. Michael. Market Signaling: Informational Trans-
fer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.
Stevenson, Mary H. "Relative Wages and Sex Segregation by
Occupation," in Sex, Discrimination and the Division
of Labor. Edited by C. Lloyd. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1975.
Stigler, George J. "Information in the Labor Harket."
Journal of Political Economy 70 (October 1962): 94-105.
u.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Current
Population Reports, Special Studies Series P-23, No. 58.
1970 Census of Population, Vol. I, Part 1(0)
and Vol II, Part 7(A).
1970 Occupation and Industry Classification
Systems in Terms of Their 1960 Occupation and Industry
Elements, by John A.Priebe, Joan Heinkel, and Stanley
Greene (Technical Paper No. 26). u.S. Government
Printing Office: .Washington, D.C., 1972.
u.s. Department of Labor. Dictionary of occ~pa~iona1
Titles 3rd Edition, Selected Character1st1cs of
Occupations, a Supplement. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1966.
Employment and Earnings. (January 1978).
Wachter, Michael. "The Primary and Secondary Labor Harket
1-1echanism: A Critique 0 f the Dual Approach."
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1974(3):
637-80.
[66]
[67]
199
Wallace, Phyllis A., editor. Equal Employment Opportunity
and the AT&T Case. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press, 1976.
Zellner, Harriet. "The Determinants of Occupational
Segregation," in Sex, Discrimination and the Division
of Labor. Edited by C. Lloyd. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1975.
200
Appendix A
Census Occupations and the Length of Specific
Vocational Preparation Required to Perform the Job
Short Demonstration to Less Than Thirty Days
Cashiers
Express messengers & railway mail clerks
Messengers & office boys
Telegraph messengers
Hucksters & peddlers
Newsboys
Heat treaters, annealers & temperers
Attendants, auto service & parking
Dyers
Produce graders & packers, except factory
Graders & sorters, manufacturing
Laundry & dry cleaning operatives
Packers & wrappers, n.e.c.
Painters, except construction & maintenance
Baby sitters, private household
Laundresses, private household
Private household workers, n.e.c.
Attendants, recreation & amusement
Bootblacks
Chambermaids & maids, except private household
Charwomen & cleaners
Janitors & sextons
Porters
Watchmen, crossing & bridge tenders
Ushers, recreation & amusement
Service workers, except private household, n.e.c.
Farm laborers, wage workers
Farm laborers, unpaid
Farm service laborers, self-employed
Carpenters' helpers
Truck drivers' helpers
Warehousemen, n.e.c.
Laborers, n.e.c.
Thirty Days to Less Than Three Months
Baggagemen, transportation
Collectors, bill & account
File clerks
Mail carrlers
Stock clerks & storekeepers
Demonstrators
Upholsterers
Che:kers, examiners & inspectors, manufacturing
Del~verymen & routemen
Furnacernen, smeltermen & pourers
Oilers & greasers, except auto
Spinners, textile
Taxicab drivers & chauffeurs
Truck & tractor drivers
Housekeepers, private household
Attendants, hospital & other
Attendants, professional & personal, n.e.c.
Bartenders
Counter & fountain workers
Elevator operators
Kitchen workers, n.e.c., except private household
Guards, watchmen & doorkeepers
Waiters & waitresses
Garage laborers, car washers & greasers
Gardeners, except farm
Longshoremen & stevedores
Lumbermen, raftsmen & woodchoppers
Teamsters
Three Months to Less Than Six Months
Attendants, library
Office machine operators
Postal clerks
Receptionists
Shipping & receiving clerks
Typists
Bakers
Bookbinders
Stationary engineers
Asbestos & insulation workers
Assemblers
Brakemen, railroad
Chainmen, rodmen & axmen, surveying
Knitters, loopers, toppers, textile
Mine operatives & laborers, n.~.c.
Motormen, mine, factory & logg~ng camp etc.
Photographic process workers .
Sewers & stitchers, manufactur1ng
Stationary firemen
Switchmen, railroad
Weavers, textile
Operatives & kindred, n.e.c.
Midwives
Fishermen & oystermen
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Six Months to Less Than One Year
Conductors, railroad
Credit men
Floormen & floor managers, store
Bank tellers
Bookkeepers
Dispatchers & starters, vehicle
Payroll & timekeeping clerks
Stenographers
Telegraph operators
Telephone operators
Ticket, station & express agents
Clerical & kindred, n.e.c.
Salesmen & clerks, n.e.c.
Cranemen, derrickmen & hoistmen
Excavating, grading & machinery operators
Rollers & roll hands, metal
Boatmen, canalmen & lock keepers
Bus drivers
Conductors, bus & street railway
Filers, grinders & polishers, metal
Heaters, metal
Milliners
Sailers & deck hands
Sawyers
Welders & flame cutters
Barbers
Firemen, fire protection
One Year to Less Than Two Years
Athletes
Entertainers, n.e.c.
Radio ·operators
Surveyers
Technicians, medical & dental
Therapists & healers, n.e.c.
Attendants, physicians' & dentists'
Secretaries
Advertising agents & salesmen
Auctioneers
Real estate agents & brokers
Blacksmiths
Brick masons, stone masons & tilesetters
Cabinetmakers
Cement & concrete finishers
Engravers, except photoengravers
Forgemen & hammermen
Inspectors, scalers & graders, lumber
Inspectors, n.e.c.
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Job setters, metal
Loom fixers
Molders, metal
Motion picture projectionists
Opticians & lens grinders & polishers
Shoemakers & repairers, except factory
Craftsmen & kindred, n.e.c.
Blasters & powderers
Dressmakers & seamstresses, except factory
Meat cutters, except slaughter & packinghouse
Power station operators
Boarding & lodging housekeepers
Cooks, except private household
Housekeepers & stewards, except private household
Practical nurses
Hairdressers & cosmetologists
Policemen & detectives
Two Years to Less Than Four Years
Actors & actresses
Airplane pilots & navigators
Artists & art teachers
Authors
Chiropractors
Dancers & dance teachers
Designers
Dieticians & nutritionists
Draftsmen
Editors & reporters
Aeronautic engineers
Civil engineers
Electrical engineers
Farm & home management advisors
Foresters & conservationists
Funeral directors & embalmers
Librarians
Nurses
Optometrists
Personnel & labor relations workers
Pharmacists
photographers . .
Public relations men & publ~c~ty advisors
Recreation & group workers
Religious workers
Economists
Psychologists .
Statisticians & actuar~es
Miscellaneous social scientists
Teachers, elementary & secondary
Teachers, n.e.c.
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Technicians, electrical
Technicians, other engineering & physical sciences
Technicians, n.e.c.
Professional, technical & kindred, n.e.c.
Buyers & department heads, store
Inspectors, public administration
Managers & superintendants, building
Officers, pilots, pursers & engineers, ship
Postmasters
Purchasing agents & buyers, n.e.c.
Managers, officials & proprietors, n.e.c.
Agents, n.e.c.
Insurance adjusters, examiners & investigators
Insurance agents, brokers & underwriters
Stock & bond salesmen
Boilermakers
Carpenters
Compositors & typesetters
Decorators & window dressers
Electricians
Foremen, n.e.c.
Furriers
Glaziers
Jewelers, watchmakers, metal smiths
Linemen & servicemen, telegraph, telephone & power
Locomotive engineers
Locomotive firemen
Machinists
Mechanics & repairmen, air conditioning, heating &
refrigeration
Mechanics & repairmen, auto
Mechanics & repairmen, office machine
Mechanics & repairmen, radio & TV
Mechanics & repairmen, railroad & car shop
Mechanics & repairmen, n.e.c.
Millers, grain, flour & feed
Painters, construction & maintenance
Paper hangers
Pattern & model makers, except paper
Piano & organ tuners & repairmen
Plasterers
Plumbers & pipe fitters
Pressmen & plate printers
Roofers & slaters
Stone cutters & stone carvers
Structural metal workers
Tailors & tailoresses
Tin smiths, coppersmiths & sheet metal workers
Tool makers & die makers & setters
Apprentice, auto mechanics
Apprentice, brick layers & masons
Apprentice, carpenters
Apprentice, electricians
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Apprentice machinists & tool makers
Apprentice mechanics, except auto
Apprentices, building trades, n.e.c.
Apprentices, metal working trades, n.e.c.
Apprentices, other trades
Farm foremen
Farmers, including owners & tenants
Farm managers
Millwrights
Over Four Years
Accountants & auditors
Architects
Chemists
Clergymen
College presidents & deans
College professors & instructors
Dentists
Engineers, chemical, industrial, mechanical, metallurgical,
mining, n.e.c.
Lawyers & judges
Musicians & music teachers
Agricultural scientists
Biological scientists
Geologists & geophysicists
Mathematicians
Physicists
Miscellaneous natural scientists
Osteopaths
Physicians & surgeons
Social & welfare workers, except group
Sports instructors & officials
Veterinarians
Officials & administrators, public, n.e.c.
Officials, lodge, society, union, etc.
Electrotypers & stereotypers
Photoengravers & lithographers
Apprentice plumbers & pipe fitters
Apprentices, printing trades
Note: n.e.c. = not elsewhere classified.
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Appendix B
Detailed List of Occupations by Sex-Type
Male Occupations (1970 Female Share of Employment Less
Than Twenty Percent)
Architects
Engineers
Lawyers & judges
Life & physical scientists
Pharmacists
Physicians, medical & osteopathic
Clergymen
Engineering & science technicians
Draftsmen
Photographers
Public administrators & postal inspectors
Administrator, n.e.c., Federal & State
Officials of societies & unions
Purchasing agents & buyers, n.e.c.
Managers & administrators:
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Communication & utilities
Wholesale trade
Retail hardware, etc.
Retail foodstores
Retail motor vehicles & accessories
Retail furniture, etc.
Other retail trade
Finance, insurance & real estate
Business & repair services
Managers & administrators, self employed, except:
Retail, general merchandise
'Retail food
Retail apparel & accessories
Other retail trade
Personal services
All other industries
Advertising agents & salesmen
Insurance agents, brokers & underwriters
Newsboys
Sales representatives, manufacturing & wholesale trade
Dispatchers & starters, vehicle
Mail carriers, post office
Messengers & office boys
Shipping & receiving clerks
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Compositors & typesetters
Electricians
Linemen & servicemen, telegraph, telephone & power
Foremen
Inspectors
Machinists
Mechanics & repairmen
Painters
Pressmen & plate printers, printing
Stationary engineers
Upholsterers
Meat cutters & butchers, except manufacturing
Painters, manufacturing
Sawyers
Deliveryrnen & routemen
Taxicab drivers & chauffeurs
Truck drivers
Miscellaneous & nonspecified operatives:
Lumber & wood products
Stone, clay & glass products
Primary metal industries
Machinery, except electrical
Transportation equipment
Chemicals, etc.
Business & repair services
Public administration
Laborers, except farm
Farm workers
Barbers
Janitors & sextons
Guards & watchmen
Policemen & detectives
Other protective service workers
Integrated Occupations (Female Share of Employment is Over
Twenty Percent But Less Than Seventy Percent)
Accountants
Farm & home management advisors
Personnel & labor relations workers
Therapists
Other religious workers
Social scientists
Social workers
Recreation workers
Teachers, secondary, college & university
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Radio operators
Authors
Designers
Editors & reporters
Musicians & composers
Other professional, technical & kindred workers
Buyers, wholesale & retail trade
Credit men
Managers & superintendants, building
Administrators, n.e.c., local
Postmasters & mail superintendants
Restaurant, cafeteria & bar managers
Managers & administrators, salaried:
Retail, general merchandise
Retail, apparel & accessories
Personal services
Managers & administrators, self-employed:
General merchandise
Food
Apparel & accessories
Personal services
Advertising agents & salesmen
Real estate agents & brokers
Salesmen & clerks, retail
Collectors, bill & account
Telegraph operators
Ticket, station & express agents
Bakers
Bookbinders
Decorators & window dressers
Engravers, except photoengravers
Opticians, lens grinders & polishers
Tailors
Filers, polishers, sanders & buffers
Photographic process workers
Textile operatives
Bus drivers
Miscellaneous and nonspecified operatives:
Furniture & fixtures
Fabricated metal industries
Electrical machinery, equipment & supplies
Professional & photographic equipment & watches
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
Food & kindred products
Tobacco manufacturing
Paper & allied products
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Printing, publishing, etc.
Rubber & miscellaneous plastic
Leather products
Wholesale & retail
Cleaners & charwomen
Bartenders
Cooks, except private household
Attendants, recreation & amusement, personal service, n.e.c.
Elevator operators
Female Occupations (Female Share of Employment is Over
Seventy Percent)
Librarians
Dieticians
Registered nurses
Health technicians
Teachers, elementary
Dancers
Demonstrators
Hucksters & peddlers
Bank tellers
Bookkeepers
Cashiers
Library attendants & assistants
Office machine operators
Stenographers, typists & secretaries
Telephone operators
Dressmakers & seamstresses, except factory
Laundry & dry cleaning operatives
Milliners
Operatives, apparel & other fabricated textile products
Counter & fountain workers
Waitresses
Practical nurses
Other health service workers
Boarding & lodging housekeepers
Hairdressers & cosmetologists
Housekeepers
Private household workers
Note: n.e.c. = not elsewhere classified.
